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Abstract
1973 was a period in the history of the Atlantic Alliance when United States and 
European interests diverged to an unprecedented degree. Kissinger's Year of Europe 
initiative (1973/74) and the associated proposal, originally for a new Atlantic Charter 
and later for a less far-reaching declaration of principles, was an American attempt to 
inspire an explicit restatement of Alliance obligations. The intention was to take ac­
count of changes in the Atlantic relationship consequent upon EEC enlargement, 
economic pressures, and a dwindling of US domestic support for commitments to 
Europe at a time of detente with the USSR and the Watergate debacle. But the prob­
lems which the US sought to resolve were exacerbated by events, by different priori­
ties in Europe, and by the attitude of France, which chose to interpret American 
proposals as a diplomatic offensive rather than an attempt to address Alliance prob­
lems. Closer US-Soviet relations, the eclipse of European interests during the 1973 
Middle East war, and different approaches to the energy crisis created real tension 
between the allies. It increased - temporarily - the rival attractions of greater European 
cooperation before leading to recriminations within the Nine members of the EEC and 
eventual French isolation in the face of Paris's continued hostility to Kissinger's pre­
scription for renewed cooperation.
This thesis re-evaluates these events. It looks at the background to 1973 and the 
prevailing wisdom on such concepts as Atlantic partnership and interdependence. It 
examines the view that the US initiative was misinterpreted because of unwillingness to 
jeopardise newly-established European objectives for greater cooperation. It describes 
how the difficulties were resolved by enhancing - albeit only marginally - the impor­
tance of consultation within the Alliance and permitting a degree of US influence 
within European political cooperation on issues affecting US interests. Finally, it 
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The Atlantic Alliance in the early 1970s was widely assumed to be in real crisis 
as a result of a breakdown of shared perceptions on economic, security and political 
interests. There was a temptation, with good reason, for the US to attribute much of 
this to the greater assertiveness of the the nine members of the European Economic 
Community ("the Nine") following enlargement, and for the Nine to blame a continu­
ing American tendency to interfere in matters of European concern. Clarifying Al­
liance and EEC obligations in security, foreign policy and trade issues was the purpose 
of the Year of Europe initiative put by Henry Kissinger, the US national security 
adviser, to a dubious Nine and an apprehensive Alliance early in 1973. The problems 
created as a result make 1973 historically important in its own right as well as for what 
it tells us about the overall management of US-European relations and the differences 
between how those relations were and are handled in the respective frameworks of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and US-EEC/Nine relations.
This thesis reviews those events and examines the progress of the US initiative in 
revising Alliance relationships so as to reflect the changed international environment. 
The thesis places the debates of 1973 into a theoretical context initially, and then 
examines the issues on the Atlantic agenda throughout the Year of Europe. It looks at 
the trade, monetary, energy and security/political issues which dominated the Alliance 
agenda in the 18 months of the Kissinger initiative with a view to assessing the seri­
ousness of the crisis and the degree to which the resolution of specific problems con­
tributed to a stronger overall Alliance relationship.
A chronology of the Year of Europe
In a chronological view of the events of 1973/74, four discrete phases emerge:
1) the initial phase when the US administration's intentions toward Europe were first
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declared in Kissinger's speech in New York in April 1973, which articulated the 
meaning of the Year of Europe and the need for a new Atlantic Charter. There were a 
number of false starts, notably President Nixon's announcement in January 1973 that, 
despite earlier suggestions of intent, he would not be visiting European capitals in the 
first half of 1973;
2) the period from April to September 1973 when foreign ministers of the Nine decid­
ed in Copenhagen to formulate their own response in the light of the Community's 
institutional and political difficulties with American proposals. European uneasiness 
became clear, and tensions and irritation were growing between Europe and the US;
3) the period October 1973 to February 1974 when there were outright differences 
over the Middle East war and resulting energy crisis. Failure to concert policy in the 
face of the Arab challenge to the Alliance's economic security demonstrated weakness­
es in both the Alliance and the EEC. The rhetoric became acrimonious. The French 
foreign minister accused the two superpowers of duopolistic intentions in handling the 
Middle East conflict, and complained that Europe had been treated "like a non-person, 
humiliated all along the line."1 In response to European complaints that the US did not 
consult them adequately over the nuclear alert in October 1973, Kissinger accused the 
Nine of failing to consult the US at all over the initiation in March 1974 of the Euro- 
Arab dialogue which threatened to cut across US diplomacy in the Middle East and the 
prospects for serious cooperation within the International Energy Agency (IEA), estab­
lished by the Washington conference of February 1974;
4) a period of reconciliation which concluded in June 1974 with the signing of the 
Ottawa Declaration by NATO heads of government, and agreement within the Nine to 
the formula agreed in spring 1974 at Schloss Gymnich, which allowed the US a consul­
tative role in certain elements of the Nine's decision-making. It coincided with - and 
was made possible by - greater Alliance solidarity as part of a cooling of detente with 
the USSR and a recognition by the EEC that, in the light of flagrant conflicts of inter­
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est at their summit in Copenhagen in December 1973 and thereafter, more realistic 
objectives were needed which above all did not lead automatically to differences with 
Washington.
The importance of 1973
1973/4 was a landmark in the Alliance, as important as the Grand Design of the 
Kennedy administration and the debate about the relationship between Europe and 
America which took place at the end of the 1980s. The early 1970s marked the begin­
ning of a new era when the comparative optimism of the 1950s and 1960s about 
working toward an Atlantic ideal became lost in competing rather than complementary 
interests, and assumed common political objectives were subordinated to the less in­
spired hard-bargaining in trade and monetary issues. It marked the end of the rhetoric 
on Atlantic community which had underlain assumptions about the Alliance in the 
1950s and 1960s and which was temporarily revived in the late 1980s under very dif­
ferent military, political and economic circumstances. Even at the time, it was realised 
that the tensions in the relationship showed the Alliance to be at a decisive stage in its 
development. If it was "the end of the age of innocence for the Community,"2 it was 
also the end of unchallenged American domination in the Alliance. 1973 was a water­
shed in US policy toward the Nine and in the way the Nine approached policy-making 
in those areas where US interests were affected. It proved to be a time of preliminary 
skirmishings in what has become the now well-established pattern of Alliance man­
agement where apparent divisions are often more remarked on than unifying themes. It 
marked a shift from American guardianship of the system to one of greater US ambiva­
lence. In the security sphere, NATO obligations were qualified by US-Soviet detente. 
In economics, the US had demonstrated a willingness to take a tougher approach in 
August 1971; it moved to floating exchange rates in early 1973, and in its unilateral 
approach to trade policy was reflected in the 1974 US Trade Act.
1973/4 is probably not the most important period in the Alliance's history. There
u
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were other actual or potential turning points which could, or did, change decisively the 
US-European relationship (Suez; President Kennedy's Grand Design; President de 
Gaulle's withdrawal of France from the military Alliance), and since 1973 there have 
been whole series of disagreements: over policy toward Iran at the end of the 1970s; 
the future of detente after the invasion of Afghanistan; German unification; handling 
out-of-area threats in the light of the Gulf war; the collapse of the Soviet Union; and 
further moves toward a more unified Twelve (Spain, Portugal and Greece having 
joined the Nine), including defence cooperation. 1973 did, however, mark an evolution 
in Alliance theorising moving away from Kennedy's advocacy of an indivisible part­
nership toward a relationship built on the sort of equality assumed by theories of the 
two Atlantic "pillars", but without the accompanying assumptions of compatible inter­
ests across the board. The Year of Europe marked a change in the historical continuum 
from the idea of an alliance community to a new vision of partnership which required 
the US to head off the - still remote - possibility that European Community interests 
might undermine the Alliance by conflicting with US interests, both within the Alliance 
framework and outside it. Washington did so partly out of US self-interest (because the 
Alliance served their interests as much as those of the Europeans), and partly to avoid 
the paralysis which would otherwise result from the incompatibility of two rival con­
cepts: an "organic" Atlantic community or a bipolar relationship between the US and 
the Nine.
While some events of the time (the culmination of superpower detente, the 
Middle East war, and the energy crisis) have individually been treated seriously, the 
Year of Europe has largely been dismissed as an irrelevancy, a piece of domestic 
theatre, or a diplomatic stunt by Kissinger which went out of control as it became 
caught up in the issues which were genuinely weakening the Alliance. The US's rela­
tionship with Europe has been seen as an issue which, in contrast to his more notable 
and enduring legacies, Kissinger somehow failed to get right. In Alliance historiogra­




This is too simplistic. Important issues were at stake which came to a head as a 
result of competing US-European interests. In this respect, domestic timetables in 
Alliance member-states, and how they affected those countries' perception of the 
Alliance, were important. In the US there was Watergate, all the associated fallout 
from Vietnam, and a determination to strike a deal with Moscow and not peg US 
diplomacy on the wishes of increasingly unhelpful and intransigent European allies. 
Among the most influential members of the Nine, for France, 1973-74 was a period of 
reassertion of interests arising out of concern at US and German diplomacy in Europe. 
In the UK, the priority for Edward Heath's government was presentation of European 
credentials and consolidation of the relationship with Paris, if necessary at the expense 
of what was seen in 10 Downing Street, if not the British Foreign Office, as wayward 
US diplomacy. In Germany, the concern was marginalisation of Ostpolitik by super­
power detente and, latterly, the lengths to which France appeared ready to go to pursue 
her interests at the expense of Community solidarity and long-term European interests. 
They were objectives which, if not intrinsically competitive, were at least difficult to 
reconcile simultaneously. Hence the problem of finding reliable Alliance interlocutors.
1973 demands proper analysis also because it was the first time that basic struc­
tural tensions, institutional differences between the Alliance and the Community, were 
exposed. A potentially competitive relationship between the US and the EEC, and the 
breakdown within the Alliance of agreement over what constituted shared security 
interests at a time of detente, led to an acute crisis of confidence to which the Year of 
Europe exercise contributed further. While the US believed the time had come to 
review Alliance management and redistribute burdens according to the ability of the 
now enlarged Community to pay, the Europeans took the opposite view; the Nine 
wished to define their political role with respect to the US (both directly through the 
Community machinery and indirectly through NATO), but they hoped to keep this
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separate from the imbalance in the security/defence relationship. They were unwilling 
to cooperate in Kissinger's initiatives - particularly when US foreign policy appeared 
increasingly liable to respond to domestic pressures, and as a result responsive more to 
the exigencies of detente rather than to long-term Alliance interests.
Which of the European/American approaches - that is, whether to leave the 
future of the Alliance to chance or not - was more likely to be beneficial was never put 
to the test. By the latter half of 1974, a loss in momentum of detente and a Community 
more disposed to respond to US needs (important in this was the change in dramatis 
personae, with the departure from office in four months of Heath, Pompidou, Brandt 
and Nixon) led to an easing of tensions. The Ottawa Declaration (which broadened 
slightly the scope of legitimate issues for Alliance discussion) agreed by NATO heads 
of government in June 1974, and the Nine's Schloss Gymnich formula for improved 
Nine-US consultations, satisfied the immediate requirement. They did not pretend to be 
the revitalisation for which Kissinger had called, but they were to prove a workable 
basis for future Alliance relations and for weathering the difficulties of the late 1970s 
and the early years of the Reagan administration.
The Kissinger analysis3 remains the most complete record to date. But it is not 
the last word on the period, and does not close off this revealing piece of Alliance 
history from further debate. Despite Kissinger's apparently painstaking preparation of 
the diplomatic ground in advance of and during the initiative, he failed to convince 
Europe that American ideas were intended to benefit the Alliance, not just the US. The 
unveiling of US plans was late and poorly handled, and the initiative never recovered 
from the Nine's attempt at their own Atlantic diplomacy as a European response to 
what the US was trying to do. The difficulty was not that 1973 turned the spotlight too 
much on Europe but that the US administration was unable to allocate sufficient time 
and resources to it: commitments in Vietnam, relations with Moscow, and later Water­
gate. undercut the declared intention to review jointly the workings of the Alliance and 
reallocate some of the burdens. Added to this was Kissinger's evident frustration every
14
Introduction
time the Europeans discerned US plotting in Washington's initiatives. The difficulties 
in negotiating seriously for trade compensation and international monetary reform, and 
formulating compatible objectives in handling the Warsaw Pact, were all symptoms of 
a relationship lacking mutual confidence.
The European perspective was coloured also by the suspicion that Washington 
was trying to work round or ignore the Community in areas, such as political coopera­
tion, which the Nine took increasingly seriously. The Year of Europe, rather than a 
far-sighted initiative to address the Alliance's systemic problems, seemed to betray US 
fears that further integration of the Community/Nine would be incompatible with 
shared Alliance objectives, and so would erode US influence in Europe4. Washing­
ton's assumption appeared to be that even if Europe remained Atlanticist in disposition 
it would be less frankly American-led. Rather than holding out partnership, Kissinger's 
prescription for restoring Alliance coherency came across as a reassertion of US au­
thority. For European capitals, on the other hand, the way to strengthen Alliance 
confidence was for the US to open up its own decision-making process to the Alliance 
(given the Nixon administration's poor record on consultation), rather than for the US 
to try to neutralise the Nine's cooperation in this area before it was properly estab­
lished. It was the partial satisfaction of this mutual demand for greater transparency in 
decision-making which, in the end, permitted a peaceable resolution of the many 
inflamed issues which came up on the Alliance agenda during the 18 months of the 




(1) Michel Jobert's speech to the French National Assembly, reported in Le Monde, 14 November 1973.
(2) Sir Christopher Soames, in a private conversation, March 1982.
(3) Years o f Upheaval, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1982.
(4) Lothar Ruhl's The Nine and NATO, The Atlantic Papers, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris, 
July 1974, addresses head-on the variable geometry of the Alliance/European fora in the early 1970s, and reflects 
the problems of the Alliance as the framework for the more specific US-EC relationship.
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Competing concepts of Atlantic cooperation
Alliance orthodoxy up to 1973
The difficulties which the Atlantic Alliance faced in 1973/4 in agreeing a policy 
on issues requiring consensus were a result of pressures arising from the first real thaw 
in the Cold War. These difficulties were also a product of unresolved problems and 
differences of opinion about the ultimate destination of the Alliance which had existed 
since its creation. Was this a working relationship based simply on mutual interest in 
denying Soviet influence in the Western world? Or did there need to be more to the 
relationship, like shared values and destinies? How far would these common values 
alone take the Alliance in terms of creating an effective relationship in the face of 
potentially competing interests in economic issues and foreign policy outside of Eu­
rope?
The difficulty in determining both the nature of the Alliance and its proper objec­
tives is shown, for instance, by its history up to 1973, characterised largely by the 
tension between alternative policy positions: working toward either Atlantic community 
or partnership. Hegemony was undesirable and, to be stable, the Alliance had to be 
among roughly comparable entities. Community was believed to be the slippery slope 
to institutionalised US hegemony, while partnership pointed to the other extreme, that 
of a solely European Europe. The popularity of either variant fluctuated in Washington 
and the European capitals during the 1960s and early 1970s. These fluctuations de­
pended on the prevailing similarity between US and European views at the time, and 
on the US's assessment of its global responsibilities and the relative importance of the 
European role in fulfilling them1. 1973 is important because it put to the test professed 
American support for the concept of Atlantic partnership when, for the first time, 
Europe looked capable of taking on the responsibilities inherent in partnership which 
had been hypothesised by the Kennedy administration a decade earlier.
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These fluctuations reflected also the disparity since 1949 between the rhetoric of 
plurality and the fact of US dominance. David Calleo describes the ambiguity in 
NATO from the outset whereby "post-war American leadership developed a character­
istic style that clothed the realities of hegemony in at least the trappings of pluralism. 
An American mini-protectorate for Western Europe was packaged in the multilateral 
hocus pocus of NATO."2 The eventual resolution of this tension between doctrine and 
reality would come, it was assumed, through greater European unity heading automati­
cally to a more balanced relationship among equals. As a result, the theory ran, US 
domination was temporary and benign. In fact, US support for European unity was 
inconsistent and often more apparent than real; hence US irritation when Europe did 
try to advance a separate identity, albeit one consistent with Alliance obligations. "In 
short, NATO, which in theory suggests interdependence, integration and a potential 
federation, in practice involves dependence, subordination, and potential empire."3
Atlantic community and partnership
The events of 1973 were a test of existing orthodoxy about Alliance structure and 
how far it was in European and American interests. The concept of Atlantic communi­
ty - a federation of western democracies strong enough to avoid the fate of less durable 
historical alliances - dominated Alliance thinking in the early years. It led, for in­
stance, to an attempt to justify a broadening of Alliance concerns so as to include non­
military cooperation based on Article 2 of the Washington Treaty of 1949 (which 
established the Alliance), and to the specific proposals of the Committee of Three Wise 
Men in 1956, which recommended, "If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept 
of an Atlantic community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a 
solid basis of confidence and understanding. A sense of community must bind the 
people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations."4
The lack of clear direction about how to achieve common objectives was indica­
tive of the weakness of the Atlantic community model and the degree to which the
18
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Alliance had become the assumed and largely acceptable basis for perpetuating Ameri- 
\
can prevalence. "In a sense, America's post-war commitment to Western Europe has 
been based on the assumption that the United States and Western Europe are, in fact, 
part of a common Atlantic community. Behind this view has lain not only cultural 
sympathy but also fear of what an unattached Europe might become."5 And there was 
the more fundamental problem of how prepared the US was to accept such an ideal as 
the basis of American security. President Kennedy's adviser for national security af­
fairs, McGeorge Bundy, struck a chord when he said in a speech in Chicago in 
December 1961: "A full-blown Atlantic union is still constitutionally and psychologi­
cally out of range for the people of the United States. "6
Given the prevailing feeling on both sides of the Atlantic during the 1960s on the 
acceptability of partnership and a stronger European pillar, ideas of both Atlantic 
community and temporary American leadership became unfashionable. Instead, as part 
of the search for some overriding theory to provide a conceptual framework for the 
US-European relationship, there was greater American support for a more coherent, 
self-standing (probably supranational) Europe as a natural counterpart to US strength. 
In contrast to Atlantic community, which emphasised the solidarity of North America 
and Europe even in the absence of an institutional infrastructure to translate common 
aspirations into joint action, the concept of partnership was more restrictive because of 
the limited ways in which Europe could match the US. It referred primarily to econom­
ic relations and, as Gerhard Mally points out, "If Community emphasises unity in 
defence, Partnership stresses competition in trade. Atlantic Community gives priority 
to Euro-American integration whereas Partnership establishes European unification as 
the immediate policy objective."7 The objective was established by President Kennedy 
in his "Declaration on Interdependence" on 4 July 1962 in Philadelphia which called 
for a partnership of equals. The Grand Design would depend on political unity in 
Europe which the US would continue to support. "The first order of business is for our
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European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will some day 
make this union possible." The important point was that the US would not regard a 
strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. "To aid its progress has been the 
basic objective of our policy for seventeen years."8
Although more in conformity with US and European thinking at the time, part­
nership still left much to chance. Rather than the hoped-for development of compatible 
goals or the carrot-and-stick methods of Atlantic hierarchy as practised by John Foster 
Dulles, American Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, the emphasis 
was on bargaining and compromise. Partnership was assumed to be a desired US 
objective, regardless of warnings from Kissinger and others that the supranational 
route to European unity which it assumed would be encouraged "could in fact bring 
about results quite contrary to those intended. The United States should therefore leave 
the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity in 
devising new forms of Atlantic cooperation."9 Writing four years prior to that, Kiss­
inger had advised that "the goal of Western policy must be to develop greater cohesion 
and a new sense of purpose. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Atlantic commu­
nity. The minimum condition is to move in the direction of a North Atlantic Confeder­
ation."10
In fact, partnership and the challenge to Europe to prove itself as a viable equal 
of the US was a policy which put the onus for completing the new Alliance architec­
ture on Europe rather than the US. The Grand Design did not add up to much more 
than general ideas and descriptive phrases. By not requiring an active US role (beyond 
the not inconsiderable assumption of US tolerance of the eventual costs of greater 
European economic cooperation), it led to drift in US-Alliance policy-making in the 
1960s. This laissez-faire approach to the Alliance fitted with the times: US preoccupa­
tion with Vietnam, French withdrawal from NATO, the progress of European detente, 
and the weakness of the dollar "all produced impatience with American leadership and 
indifference toward the Atlantic b loc".11 From these origins of US inactivity and
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European preoccupations elsewhere came Kissinger's own efforts to resurrect the 
Atlantic Community idea, first in his call for a new Atlantic Charter to be the "fresh 
act of creation" to serve the common objectives which underlie unity, and then later on 
in his statement that "the United States is committed to making the Atlantic community 
a vital, positive force for the future as it was for the p a s t" .12 The two concrete 
achievements of the Year of Europe were in line with these philosophies. The Ottawa 
Declaration of June 1974 affirmed "the common destiny and the values which are the 
heritage of their civilisation" while the International Energy Agency emerged as the 
first supranational organisation in the Atlantic region (albeit as part of the OECD, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, rather than the Alliance, as 
Kissinger would have preferred).
Illustrative of the potency of rhetoric about either community or partnership is
the fact that the advocacy of the former by the Nixon administrations was not couched
%
unambiguously in those terms. As much as the Nixon administration saw the dangers 
of encouraging greater European unity through the EEC, it too spoke as though there 
was compatibility in the concepts of community and partnership between Europe and 
America. Hence Nixon had been prepared to say, "we favour a definition by Western 
Europe of a distinct identity. Our support for the strengthening and broadening of the 
European Community has not diminished. I went to West Europe [in 1969] to reaffirm 
America's commitment to partnership with Europe."13 In his 1971 Foreign Policy 
Report to Congress, Nixon had also fused the two concepts together. "To link together 
the foreign and defence policies of a uniting Europe and the US will be another test of 
community... In the near future, however, the tangible expression of the new partner­
ship is in greater material contributions by the a llies."14 Kissinger's writings had 
similarly supported greater political unity in Western Europe, even accompanied by a 
European nuclear force, as the next best solution to the unlikely emergence of NATO 
as a single political unit15. In spelling out the content of the Year of Europe in May
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1973, Nixon again reverted to the language of partnership: America and Europe were 
"challenged to forge a more mature and viable partnership" in which there would be 
cooperation in "developing a new and more equitable international economic system," 
in "providing a strong defence" and in "building a common framework for diplomacy 
to deal with fundamental security issues."16 Squaring the circle of community/partner­
ship, Kissinger envisaged something amounting to partnership as the precursor of, 
rather than alternative to, Atlantic community. In his Year of Europe initiative, Kiss­
inger spoke of continuing US support for European unification on the basis that "we 
have no intention of destroying what we have worked so hard to help build ."17 In 
going on to say that "we shall continue to support European unity as a component of a 
larger Atlantic partnership," Kissinger was carefully hedging US support in favour of 
an Alliance relationship which, while it might need to carry the label of partnership 
(given the heightened European sensitivities about their role in the Alliance), was 
closer to US thinking about an Atlantic community (in which initiatives such as the 
N ine's European identity issued in July 1973 would be kept more under careful US 
control). The tendency of the rhetoric tilted further to community as European policy 
became more out of step both with US objectives and as Kissinger would argue) with 
long-term European interests.
The conclusion is that although these concepts were described in heavily weight­
ed terms, their use was not always consistent and could not always be taken at face 
value. Whatever the rhetoric, underlying the argumentation and theorising was the bald 
fact that up to the early 1970s, US-European relations were more or less dominated 
across the board by the US. The terms on which it would share responsibilities while 
not giving up that dominance remained the principal stumbling-block of the Year of 
Europe. The policy of the Nixon administration, based on the rationale of the Nixon 
doctrine, was to discharge some of the burdens of this position but without foregoing 
real influence over the Nine at a time of the European Community's enlargement and 
over the Alliance at a period when detente made it important that the West stay in step
22
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so as not to expose weakness.
The Europeans approached resolution of the competing objectives of Atlantic 
community and partnership from a different direction. They aspired to greater freedom 
of manoeuvre and a stronger international identity. At the same time they did not wish 
to see a diminution of the US security commitment, nor were they prepared to respond 
to US requests that Europe do more to meet the costs of the collective Alliance effort. 
As a result, and not for the first time in Alliance history, discussion of ultimate ends 
became confused, reflecting the current state of Alliance relations rather than trying to 
determine long-term policy.
Up to 1973, this de facto  hegemony had been a relatively stable pattern for 
Alliance relations. As Calleo said, "Europeans have remained confident that since 
America would defend their territory whatever they did, their competing diplomatic 
and economic initiatives need not be sacrificed for Alliance solidarity."18 Kissinger 
expressed it similarly: "As long as NATO strategy was nuclear and the United States 
had no obvious alternative to nuclear retaliation, our allies were ready to acquiesce in 
the hegemonic position of the United States."19 Although it survived, this pattern was 
badly shaken by President de Gaulle's drive to establish Europe as a third force, and 
by the more brusque style of the Nixon administration under pressures from Congress 
and middle America to reverse a situation in which the US was growing weaker as 
Europe got stronger.
One clear sign that the post-war Atlantic relationship could not continue as before 
was the redefinition of the economic relationship attempted by Nixon in August 1971 
in the NEP (new economic policy). The US's refusal to continue to accept uncomplain­
ingly the burdens of Alliance leadership led to concern in Europe about US neo-isola­
tionism and to a determination to work toward a more equal relationship and be less 




The NEP demonstrated that various American formulae to provide hegemony on 
the cheap had lost their efficacy. New ones were needed for Europe to be shaken out 
of its lethargy and contribute commensurate resources to the Atlantic commitment. But 
the tendency for each side to draw selective conclusions20 diffused the shock adminis­
tered by the NEP. It did not transform the Alliance from a dependent relationship to 
one between equals, but to an unstable, semi-pluralistic one in which the US and 
Europe pulled different ways on economic and political issues while neither had a 
serious interest in revision of the integrated military structure. As much as the US 
sought hegemony on the cheap, so Europe sought independence on the cheap21.
Kissinger and the American approach
The question which confronted Kissinger in 1973 was where, in the light of 
increasingly overt structural tensions and the implications for the Alliance of the NEP, 
these oscillations between US domination and a more plural Alliance structure would 
lead. As a result of evident Atlantic tensions, and above all of serious deterioration in 
the US's relationship with France, Kissinger came to abandon the Nixon administra­
tion 's earlier rhetorical support for equal partnership as an interim solution which 
would satisfy immediate American wishes to have greater freedom of manoeuvre and 
European grievances arising from this turn in US policy. European military weakness 
meant there was no short-term stabilising position in overall Atlantic relations: Kiss­
inger's  policies came to be framed more unambiguously in terms of an Atlantic 
community, always his long-term prognosis for the Alliance, and regarded by him in 
1973-74 as the most realistic model for keeping the US closely bound up in European 
affairs at a time when many Europeans would have had it otherwise.
His conclusion that Atlantic partnership left too much to chance and to Washing­
ton 's ability to influence European capitals marked the end of unthinking optimism 
about the Alliance. The description by Harlan Cleveland, former American ambassa­
dor to NATO, of the Alliance as "a large, complex and dynamic bargain kept political­
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ly acceptable by constant recalculation of the costs assumed and benefits received by 
each party to the deal" reflected more the hard currency of Alliance business22. But, 
although Kissinger's revised intellectual framework did affect the Atlantic debate, in 
practice, rather than resolve the lack of clarity in Alliance rhetoric and policy, the 
policy of half-hegemony /half-pluralism continued as the least controversial way to 
preserve US influence across the board. At the same time it allowed the Nine greater 
scope for coordination of policy and development of a more coherent identity.
The handling of Alliance business throughout the Year of Europe is associated 
inextricably with Kissinger. His freedom of manoeuvre was conditioned mainly by two 
factors in 1973-74: the declining influence of Nixon and the time the president had 
available for foreign policy issues, with a resulting increase in Kissinger's influence; 
and the overall decline of the presidency under siege from Congress over Watergate, 
incipient protectionism and a diminished disposition to internationalism23. While it is 
true that the so-called special relationship between Nixon and Kissinger remained as 
important during 1973-4 as during the first Nixon administration, the president's 
domestic preoccupations and the influence which the office of national security adviser 
had accrued under Kissinger meant in practice that, long before he became secretary of 
state in August 1973, it was Kissinger who assumed overall responsibility for foreign 
policy and therefore for Alliance management during the Year of Europe. "The Nixon- 
Kissinger partnership stands as a wholly exceptional one, remarkably, in which the 
power and influence of the aide increased even as that of the patron diminished.1,24
In the particular instance of the Year of Europe initiative, the balance of evi­
dence is that this was Kissinger's brainchild25. He brought to the task precise views on 
where US interests in Europe lay and how they should be secured. He contributed to 
bringing about a crisis in Atlantic relations which, while consistent with his own read­
ing of the dynamics of Western cooperation, he had sought to avoid.
Given Kissinger's significance in making and implementing the key policy deci­
sions, it is important to examine briefly his philosophical approach and the basic
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assumptions and predispositions which lay behind that policy. The strength of the 
correlation between Kissinger the academic and Kissinger the statesman has been tested 
with respect to his Alliance policies more than in any other area, given his extensive 
writings and expertise26. These studies show a man guided strongly by concerns about 
international stability and the domestic legitimacy of governments rather than moral 
absolutism as the criterion of policy formation; by the belief that, as part of the new 
"structure of peace", US policy could no longer be motivated by the unthinking con­
tainment of Communism which had led to its involvement in Vietnam, but instead 
needed a more realistic, practical philosophy which took account of US interests and 
resources and the overriding issue of security through avoidance of war; and (follow­
ing from that) by a strong disposition to fatalism. This manifested itself particularly in 
the way Kissinger sought a new approach to the end of the bipolar world: working 
with regard to prevailing circumstances in order to secure the best results, rather than 
operating either as though the international order were different or as though the US 
should view itself as having a self-imposed task to transform the international commu­
nity. Writing in 1968, Kissinger had summed this up as the need for coherence, "relat­
ing our commitments to our interests and our obligations to our purposes"27. It was a 
search for a foreign policy based on "permanent values and interests."28
In Europe, this sober assessment came across particularly acutely. As Dickson 
has pointed out:
"Calculated moderation is not really sufficiently inspiring as a political principle 
to convey a sense of idealism or moral purpose. The philosophy of moderation 
and restraint cannot really motivate men to greater deeds. There was clearly an 
unmistakable lack of vision and sense of ultimate purpose in this world view 
which Kissinger's successors have tried to overcome by formulating policy in 
terms of traditional American ideals and democratic values."29
The particular problem by the late 1960s was that, despite Kennedy's offer of 
partnership, an Alliance blueprint in which US influence in effect continued unchal­
lenged no longer reflected the relative economic strengths of the US and Western 
Europe30. It ran counter to the evidence of greater diffusion of economic and political
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power both within the Alliance and globally and the European aspirations aroused as a 
result. While Atlantic community was a principle to which Kissinger would return in 
1973, it was contrary to the immediate priority of US foreign policy in the first Nixon 
administration: international stability (which meant detente with former adversaries), 
and a reduction in unnecessary US commitments overseas. Addressing Alliance prob­
lems was not the chief concern for as long as the Soviet Union remained to be fully 
engaged in the detente process. Furthermore, Kissinger believed it was unlikely to 
repay the diplomatic effort expended, because of the structural limitations imposed by 
concerns about sovereignty in a multilateral Alliance, concerns linked to the asymme­
try created by the preponderant influence within the Alliance of US nuclear weapons. 
Hence, argues A G Andrianopoulos, the disappointed, because misplaced, expectations 
in Europe in 1969 that the US would "do something" about arresting the atrophy of 
Alliance relations. Pessimism about the possibility of genuinely reforming the Alliance 
relationship was an example of the much-scrutinised "doctrine of limits" associated 
with Kissinger's approach to policy-making, in which politicians could not expect, and 
should not try, to transform the world31.
Kissinger's position, therefore, was that no simple solution existed to make 
American and European perspectives compatible. The Alliance's problems owed much 
to the false premises of US policy toward the allies and a policy of partnership which 
had failed to take account of the real economic weight of the EEC and to recognise 
that, while there was a price to be paid for either Atlantic community or partnership, a 
common Atlantic policy was more likely under the former32. The Nixon presidency 
needed to break out of a well-established pattern of believing Alliance problems could 
be resolved through architectural adjustments, recognising that "structural constraints 
and the nature of the issues to be resolved imposed limits [and made] the solution of 
the beleaguered problems of the Alliance unlikely in the foreseeable future regardless 
of who governed in Paris or in Washington."33 Hence, despite his call for a fresh act
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of creation, Kissinger proposed in the Year of Europe initiative only a small shift in 
respective American and European obligations to meet Alliance burdens. By Kissing­
er's standards it was a minimalist initiative aimed at adjustments, not the wholesale 
reform as was the interpretation in Europe.
Much has been made of Kissimger's and Nixon's allegedly Gaullist view of 
Europe, and their shared view that nnore fundamental structural problems than de 
G aulle's nationalist perspective and intransigence had been the cause of Alliance 
recriminations during the 1960s34. It iis true that a greater readiness to understand de 
G aulle's views within the unbalanced relationship and to work for improved US- 
French relations was the starting pointt for Nixon's European policy in 1969. Further­
more, federalist ideas on augmenting the power of Community institutions were not 
ideal for advocates of Atlantic partnership because too ambitious and not promising 
quick results in terms of better European cohesion and a greater European contribution 
to NATO. But if concerns about the e ffect on US interests of greater European unity 
amounted to compatibility with Gaulllism, it was with the opposite intention to de 
Gaulle's. For the French president, a lioose intergovernmental rather than supranational 
grouping of European states would preserve the Franco-German axis from interference 
from Community institutions and develop an independent European role in world af­
fairs, so creating the conditions for wider, Atlantic to the Urals, European cooperation. 
This would be too difficult if conducted through an elaborately-organised but weak 
federal government based in Brussels.. Such an intergovernmental model for Western 
Europe would mean an Atlantic relationship in which the European voice was stronger 
than hitherto. But if achieved through intergovernmental cooperation, Kissinger inter­
preted it as consistent with American iinterest in the Atlantic community, and certainly 
the best means of keeping open the US's bilateral channels in European capitals. The 
latter point was expressed in Nixon's 1970 Annual Foreign Policy Report: "For many 
years to come these [bilateral relatioms with several European countries] will provide 
essential trans-Atlantic bonds - we will therefore continue to broaden and deepen
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them."35
Kissinger was clear-sighted about the scope for Atlantic disagreement and about 
the responsibility for past disagreements36. As Western Europe - which for the pur­
poses of this thesis primarily means the Nine - became more assertive and increasingly 
sensitive on the quality of America's Alliance leadership, so new differences would 
emerge, particularly over policy outside Europe (including the particular instance of 
out-of-area threats). West European unity diminished some of the economic and politi­
cal influence which Washington could deploy with allies, but fell short of relaxing the 
structural tensions within the Alliance. Instead of creating a new equilibrium, it would 
only increase the potential for US-European conflict. The implications of the imbalance 
of military capabilities would never be far from the surface, and would receive new 
impetus once the inevitable conflicts of US and European political interests became 
more distinct. Kissinger saw no prospect of resolving them, but at the same time he 
believed that such disputes would not break the Alliance for as long as it was Europe 
rather than the US which stood to gain most ffom collective Alliance security.
In short, Kissinger did not bring to the National Security Council and subsequent­
ly the State Department an idealistic view of Alliance relations and of the tasks which 
lay before him. Post-1945 rhetoric about the automatic identity of Atlantic interests 
disappeared after 1973 despite Nixon's good intentions on coming to office (and 
remained out of sight really until the speech in Berlin in 1989 by secretary of state 
James Baker which called for a new Alliance initiative). Not only was solving Alliance 
problems now assumed to be impossible, but even superficial harmony in US-European 
interests was regarded as too difficult an objective at a time of detente (when US-USSR 
relations would develop their own dynamics) and at a stage when the Nine were liable 
to become more assertive on both issues affecting the US-European relationship (such 





All these problems were aggravated by Kissinger's lack of openness in foreign 
policy management and the consultation of allies. In Washington, as within the Al­
liance, information and ideas were exchanged on a highly selective basis. Kissinger 
equated institutionalised diplomacy with bureaucratic statesmanship, and made clear 
his conviction that a large bureaucracy could not produce good foreign policy, howev­
er well it might be organised, because of the competing tendencies to inertia and crea­
tivity: "The spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are dramatically opposed. The 
essence of policy is its contingency; the essence of bureaucracy is its quest for safety. 
Profound policy thrives on perpetual creation; the attempt to bureaucratically conduct 
policy leads to a quest for calculability which tends to become a prisoner of events."37 
Kissinger's inclination to free policy-making from this was fully shared by a president 
mistrustful of a State Department staffed by eight years of Democrat presidency. 
Nixon's determination to run foreign policy from the White House without interference 
from the Democratic foreign policy establishment goes to the heart of the Nixon-Kiss- 
inger special relationship. The assumption that the formulation of foreign policy was 
primarily a presidential function was spelled out by Nixon before becoming president. 
He said in an interview, "I've always thought this country could run itself domestically 
without a president. You need a president for foreign policy, the president makes 
foreign policy."38 The respective appointments of Kissinger at National Security and 
the inexperienced William Rogers as secretary of state appeared to confirm that foreign 
policy would be an executive responsibility.
This was not simply a matter of policy-making by a small circle of close advis­
ers. It was Nixon's and Kissinger's preferred way of operating. Even when the style 
became less secret once Kissinger became secretary of state in August 1973, the result 
was not open foreign-policy making but rather a situation in which the process became 
more decentralised if still highly personalised39. Throughout, the room for manoeuvre 
required by Nixon's less ideological foreign policy was inimical to institutionalised
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foreign-policy making, with the result that policy making "became a perpetual tourde 
fo rce"40 which prevented domestic consensus-building. And while having possible 
merits in building new bridges with the USSR and China, secrecy over the next US 
moves on detente, and on Alliance diplomacy, increasingly corroded Alliance confi­
dence in Kissinger's handling. "It meant that as much as the allies, either collectively 
or individually, wanted to believe what Henry [Kissinger] told them, their better 
judgments told them to act more carefully."41 From a European perspective, the 
conclusion was that Kissinger's Alliance management simply meant deploying in 
Europe the sort of diplomatic practices which had transformed radically and rapidly 
(and successfully) the US's relations with its former adversaries.
Kissinger and Europe
Kissinger's preference for policy-making in secret to reach and execute decisions 
made it inevitable that US policy was shaped with a view to carrying Alliance support 
in the absence of proper consultation. This alone would have been a recipe for Alliance 
tension, particularly as the Year of Europe was launched inauspiciously amidst Al­
liance claims of lack of consultation, rather than as an opportunity to remove the ten­
sions which had arisen from the first Nixon administration. Anthony Hartley42 de­
scribed this as "secrecy and centralisation normal to European diplomacy." It had the 
effect of moving the US approach away from traditional Alliance policy toward the 
kind of unilateralism practised by de Gaulle. Under Kissinger, the US aspired to the 
role of a balancing force within an emerging international multipolarity, so allowing 
the US a less committed military and diplomatic posture. As a result, distinctions 
between allies and adversaries were less sharply drawn. The erosion of this distinction 
was a product of what Kissinger's critics regarded - and still do regard - as a tenuous 
concern for "morality" in foreign policy, and by extension less regard for those of 
America's friends who had such status simply because they were "like-minded". The 
perception (particularly strong in Europe after Kissinger's surprise visit to Peking in
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July 1971) that Kissinger's priority was stability rather than international morality was 
an uncomfortable one for American allies in Europe who stood to lose much from the 
subordination of the ideological cement of the Alliance in order to open the way to a 
more stable and therefore predictable relationship between the US and the Soviet 
Union.
P W Dickson43 suggests the intellectual origins of this moral relativism: scepti­
cism about moral progress in history and acceptance of a value system in which power 
was the basis of political activity, even at the expense, if necessary (Kissinger's critics 
aver), of the US's democratic values. Under Kissinger's influence, US foreign policy 
was interested less in reinforcing and sustaining anti-Soviet alliances than in the pursuit 
of a relaxation of US-Soviet tension. Replacing containment with negotiation, and 
elevating detente to the mutual acceptance by the US and Soviet Union of a given 
structure of international politics (Kissinger's "legitimate order") involved a less robust 
opposition to Soviet interests as part of detente. It required a fundamental shift in 
Alliance perceptions of the US as the leader of Western resistance to the Soviet threat. 
In the late 1960s, the Nixon administration saw a better chance than hitherto to estab­
lish stability in the international system. That subordination of Alliance interests would 
be a price worth paying, irrespective of the awkwardness of the timing given Europe's 
already aggravated sensitivities, had been reflected in Kissinger's earlier writings: "We 
cannot permit the balance of power to be overturned for the sake of allied unity. We 
must beware not to subordinate the requirements of the overall strategic balance to our 
policy of Alliances,"44 The fact of this came out clearly in the Declaration on the 
Prevention of Nuclear War signed by Nixon and President Brezhnev of the USSR in 
June 1973 (although strong European criticism of this missed the point that there was a 
great deal of superpower theatre in the agreement). Although the Europeans overdid 
the moral indignation, Kissinger's willingness to gratify a long-standing Soviet objec­
tive which was not in NATO's interest demonstrated painfully that US global interests
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now revolved around the Soviet Union, not NATO.
This was the damaging context of the Year of Europe. Once the pursuit of peace 
and avoidance of war had taken on such importance (amounting, says Dickson, to what 
in Kantian terms was the highest moral imperative for Kissinger), it became possible 
both theoretically and in practice to justify any action that could be described as con­
tributing to the prevention of war, whatever its implications for other, subordinate, 
policy objectives. The Nixon doctrine announced the shift in US doctrine from chang­
ing the system to maintaining the system and working within it. "The pivotal impor­
tance of this principle transformed the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy into the art of the 
possible, the science of the relative."45 It was materially to affect Alliance relations 
during the euphoric phase of detente from May 1972 to October 1973. Kissinger's 
view was that the Alliance would not split badly over detente because Europe still had 
more to gain than the US from NATO; his tendency was therefore to bank on NATO 
even when the ground was not prepared. While the allies might go their own way from 
time to time on political and economic issues (where the penalties for non-cooperation 
with the US were small), "it was hard to visualise a deal between the Soviet Union and 
Europe which would jeopardise our interests without jeopardising European interests 
first."46 In that way the structural problems which Kissinger identified as lying at the 
root of Alliance difficulties (that is, the imbalance in the US-European military rela­
tionship) were a serviceable instrument for supporting US foreign policy objectives. 
But the wisdom, in the context of Alliance confidence, of displaying a readiness to 
downgrade the Alliance while relying on its acquiescence was, even at the time, open 
to question - even more so in the light of the setbacks to detente which began with US- 
Soviet (and US-European) divisions over the handling of the October 1973 war in the 
Middle East.
As much as Andrianopoulos and others explain the basis of Kissinger's ideas and 
the obvious priorities of US foreign policy in 1969, the fact remains that Kissinger's 
assumption that the inherent structural tensions of the Alliance were too difficult and
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sensitive to handle resulted in continuation during the first Nixon administration of the 
neglect of Europe which had begun under Johnson. Even in the absence of long-term 
solutions, this was not itself a reason for allowing the Alliance to deteriorate further. 
By 1973, it had done so because of the structural problems which Kissinger had cited, 
divisions over economic issues, and European fears that the Nixon administration was 
prepared to be too soft on the Soviet Uniom by conceding strategic parity and too liable 
to sell European interests short, without proper consultation, in the search for super­
power accommodation47.
Kissinger's approach to NATO and the Nine
Allied uncertainty about the implications for them of the Nixon-Kissinger special 
relationship and of incipient US neo-isolatiionism was not based only on the less doctri­
naire attitude of the US administration. Thie Nixon doctrine, the counterpart to detente, 
involving a limited devolution of US pow<er at the periphery, was an attempt to reduce 
US commitments while preventing a resulting security gain for the Soviet Union and 
China. To preserve a regional security ne*t as part of a multipolar world, the doctrine 
relied on the development of regional "miiddle" powers to enable a drawdown of US 
forces. The Nixon doctrine as applied to the Alliance envisaged, however, the same 
level of US political-military involvements (albeit at reduced costs). This differentiated 
application produced a superficially contradictory result. The US administration with­
held a transfer of regional security responsibilities to those two theatres most capable, 
in theory, o f assuming new tasks - West Europe and Japan. But this provided little 
comfort to the Europeans: toward West Eiurope a new ambiguity had been introduced 
in US policy (an ambiguity which, admilttedly, had always existed in other regional 
theatres): uncertainty about the degree ito which the US would in future underpin 
regional security where this was no longer consistent with progress in the US-Soviet 
relationship. The Nixon doctrine, ratherr than dispelling this uncertainty, provided 
valuable negotiating capital for the US in iits dealings with its allies. In European capi­
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tals, continuation of US security responsibilities was interpreted as requiring genuine 
economic burden-sharing, such as offset payments for US forces in Europe.
The US policy of linking security with economic issues, while not a new tempta­
tion for Washington, was a logical part of the Nixon doctrine's application in Europe. 
It put the squeeze most immediately on the EEC (despite the high profile of the Octo­
ber 1972 Paris summit meeting and the objectives established there), but it also fea­
tured largely in Washington's approach to the Alliance. The linkage (by which the 
EEC would finance the burdens of the European members of NATO) highlights an 
important point in Kissinger's differentiated policy toward the Fifteen and the Nine, 
and his views about the inherent tension in US-European relations. The importance 
given to improving US-French relations in the early years of the Nixon administration, 
and the desire of the administration's foreign policy-makers to preserve influence in 
many different centres of decision, led to a tendency to downgrade the importance of 
links with the institutions of the EEC. This exacerbated the growing malaise in US- 
EEC relations which Nixon had inherited from the Johnson administration.
It was a tendency discernible from the time of Nixon's visit to Western Europe in 
early 196948. The visit had been intended to underline Nixon's commitment to Europe 
and to reducing Cold War tensions, particularly in Berlin, but it was clear that the 
EEC did not rank high among the president's priorities. His meeting with the Commis­
sion was conspicuously less important ithan the discussions at NATO. The problem was 
compounded as the State Department became ever more removed from the centre of 
decision-making in Washington. Philosophical distrust of the Community machinery in 
Brussels and the impetus toward supra-national cooperation were to become two of the 
raisons d'etre  in the Year of Europe. Blunting the growing political and economic 
power of the EEC was an integral parti of an initiative ostensibly holding out an olive 




Using NATO to rein in the Community was a high-risk strategy, producing 
strains in the US's relations with both institutions. Formally, the administration's posi­
tion was that "the structure of Western Europe itself is fundamentally the concern of 
the Europeans. We cannot unify Europe and we do not believe there is only one road 
to that goal. When the United States in previous administrations turned into an ardent 
advocate it harmed rather than helped progress."49 But Nixon's and Kissinger's stud­
ied neglect of Community institutions (reinforced, it was widely held at the time, by 
Kissinger's lack of background in economics) was based on opposition to established 
thinking (which previous administrations had shared) that the only road for European 
unity was federation. The automaticity of the federal route was, for instance, instru­
mental in how Alastair Buchan saw the evolution of the Community:
"In order to become partners in their own right and to claim equality of status, if 
not of strength, in this new relationship with the United States, the European 
countries must construct an intimate Community which will be sufficiently inde­
pendent not to become a satellite. Their final objective is the creation of the 
United States of Europe. This is a federal structure, with a federal parliament 
and a federal government to which the component states surrender powers of 
decision in the field of economic, monetary, defence and foreign policy."50
The fear that the European sense of identity would create difficulties for the 
Alliance relationship and ultimately diminish American power on the Continent51 was 
very real in the early 1970s. Whatever the short-term effect on American policies, 
which ocasionally appeared to work in the opposite direction, that the US should con­
tinue to place primacy on the Alliance was not, therefore, surprising. NATO was the 
institutional link which guaranteed US influence in Europe; and it had a coherency of 
subject matter and obvious areas of common US-European interest which were lacking 
in the fine detail needed to assess the state of US-EEC business. Consistently with the 
more cautious approach to the prevailing wisdom on the desirability of a federal 
Europe which Nixon and Kissinger brought to the White House, the state of Alliance 
relations dominated the American approach to solving European problems:
"For Nixon and Kissinger it was important to subordinate everything to the 
Atlantic community. They were convinced that only the United States could 
effectively take on the leadership of the industrialised democracies, all the while
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acknowledging that its material means, more limited than in the past, forced 
them to redefine their strategy on a more cynical basis. Consequently, they 
demanded virtually exclusive freedom in the management of detente with the 
Soviet bloc and a more equitable redistribution of the Western European defence 
burden."52
Lukewarm American endorsement of the role of the Community became the 
central dilemma (more for the Nine than the US) in 1973/4 in resolving the apparently 
conflicting obligations involved in joint membership of both Alliance and the Nine: the 
common Alliance military purpose was forged by the threat from the Soviet Union and 
based on US security guarantees, whereas the common aspirations of the Nine for 
increased international status and more effective internal cooperation would lead in­
creasingly to differences with the US.
The bottom line for Kissinger was, therefore, that the US would always feel 
more comfortable with the Alliance than with the EEC given the shared purpose and 
the opportunities for the US to lead and control discussion. The EEC was more prob­
lematic for Washington since the US was excluded by definition and there were no 
institutional penalties if the Nine failed to cooperate with US policy. Apart from its 
potential for aggravating trade problems between the US and Europe, the degree to 
which the US could control its allies was particularly important during the period of 
building bridges with the Soviet Union. Even within NATO it was not always easy to 
carry US proposals for handling the Soviet Union. But there was an even greater 
underlying tension between US policy of detente and support for a more united Eu­
rope. An assertive Nine might deflect US diplomatic energies away from non-Euro­
pean priorities. By providing the Soviet Union with an alternative potential partner for 
doing business with the West, it would also complicate the use of American diplomatic 
trade leverage as an element of the linkage strategy within detente. An assertive Nine 
would, in short, confuse the dynamics of superpower detente and diminish American 
control over the process. The US had a strong interest in Atlantic cohesion in order 




Events did bear out Kissinger's view that American foreign policy had to recog­
nise that there was an implicit price to be paid for European economic and political 
cooperation in terms of US trading interests and US influence in Europe. Sometimes 
that price might be worth paying (for example, to secure British accession to the 
Community), as President Nixon had said explicitly in his first annual foreign policy 
report to Congress in February 1970 (at the time of negotiations for EEC enlarge­
ment):
"We recognise that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe's evolu­
tion, and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider 
that the possible economic price of a truly united Europe is outweighed by the 
gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole."53
Nonetheless, expansion of the Six came at a time when the US was feeling 
embattled over the weakness of its trading position and the role of the dollar, reinforc­
ing pressure for protectionist trade measures and troop reductions. These pressures 
threatened the administration's control of foreign policy. The trade negotiations (of 
which Kissinger had been a strong advocate) which began with Community officials in 
October 1970 were intended to head off this very real problem, but they were over­
whelmed by the announcement of the 15 August 1971 package of measures which 
responded to the protectionist tide in Congress and the country by suspending dollar 
convertibility into gold and placing a unilateral surcharge on imports. It was Kissinger 
who sought a diplomatic solution to the Atlantic rift over dollar policy, orchestrating 
the Nixon-Pompidoi) d iscu ssio n s in the Azores in December 1971 which led to the 
Smithsonian agreement and agreed devaluation of the dollar. Kissinger sought a 
similar role in 1973. To avoid a repetition of 1971, he warned, economic matters could 
not be left in the hands of the technicians. An overall political approach was required. 
To some degree he succeeded in smoothing the rougher edges of the US's negotiating 
position; but the handling of the GATT trade talks and of international monetary 
reform were driven more by US Congress than by the Year of Europe initiative. As 
relations between the US and the institutions of the European Community deteriorated,
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Kissinger himself became instrumental in increasing the pressure on the Nine as the 
means to reassert Alliance discipline.
The problems of interdependence
Interdependence as an Alliance problem rather an automatic force for unity 
became an issue of intensive study in the late 1960s and early 1970s and an important 
element in Alliance literature which hitherto had not focused much on transnational 
influences on relations between the US and Western Europe54. It became the theoreti­
cal context of the specific US reappraisal of economic ties with Europe, and of the 
Year of Europe initiative generally. In the spring of 1974, the insertion of a reference 
to "interdependence" was to become one of the principal American desiderata, meeting 
strong European - mainly French - opposition. While in that context "interdependence" 
was code for greater cooperation on economic issues within the Alliance, underlying it 
was the question, firstly, of whether Atlantic relations really were interdependent, 
given the inequality of the US-European relationship, and secondly, in whose interest it 
was to develop further such a relationship. From optimism that transatlantic economic 
cooperation would be a basis for genuine US-European partnership and more intense 
interdependence, the evidence being accumulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
suggested that trends were working in the opposite direction and that economic ties - 
whether because they were converging or diverging - were creating policy divergencies 
which could no longer be ignored. The end of optimism in the economic field became 
infectious. Studies which showed that interdependence could perpetuate inequality in 
international relations and was a cause of competitive rather than complementary 
policy objectives went hand-in-hand with examination of an Atlantic relationship bear­
ing all the signs of such systemic weakness.
The fallacy of assuming that inevitably Atlantic relations were heading in the 
right direction led in the early 1970s to critical appraisal of the premises on which 
convergence had been predicated; whether European independence and integration
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were compatible with growing but hitherto unregulated political and economic interde­
pendence within the Atlantic community; and to what degree international obligations 
would conflict with national objectives. They were arguments felt most keenly in 
Washington. In the late 1960s, Stanley Hoffmann was among the first to criticise the 
mythology of Atlantic orthodoxy: according to him, the exhortatory approach to de­
veloping common values and achieving common tasks "supposes what has still to be 
solved, the political problem of cooperation, and that what has still to be demonstrated, 
the need for solidarity, is beyond demonstration."55
The trend against assuming an Atlantic political community set in quickly. The 
legitimacy of US attempts to lead from the front was compromised variously by Viet­
nam, US unilateral economic measures in August 1971, and Watergate. Meanwhile, 
the EEC had failed to move much beyond its status as an economic superpower, de­
spite the concerted efforts toward greater political cooperation after 1969. As Calleo 
described it, Europe remained a supermarket, not a superpower56. Increasingly, 
managing the complexity of Atlantic policy was framed with domestic rather than 
Alliance interests in mind. This potential for transnational relations to estrange rather 
than encourage common policies was described by Earl C Ravenal:
"Interdependence creates the need for more world order without creating order 
itself. Indeed it diminishes the effectiveness of the existing degree of world 
order. Interdependence, which is widely mistaken as part of the solution, is 
actually part of the problem."57
This double-edged quality of interdependence produced constant tensions as a 
result of an overload or deficit of linkages. "This dilemma tends to produce resentment 
and frustration and necessitates common efforts to redress the balance between mutual 
dependencies. The only way to determine the critical mass between excessive and 
insufficient interdependence is by means of insectoral marginal trade-offs: for instance, 
one country offers additional economic rewards for military protection."58
Certainly in the early 1970s, the thrust on both sides of the Atlantic, reflecting 
these pressures, was to seek insulation from the effects of interdependence so as to
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restore or protect an element of economic independence. This would, on the one hand, 
reduce the Nine's vulnerability to the US tendency to link issues and, on the US side, 
allow greater freedom to correct its chronic trade deficits and its enforced tolerance of 
an overvalued dollar. This attempt to weaken selective ties in the trade, monetary and 
foreign policy relationship within an interdependent economic structure and a one-sided 
military Alliance which no-one wanted to change was the reason for Alliance tensions 
in the early 1970s. Because the asymmetry in Alliance relationships was inherent in 
interdependence, the causes of these tensions could be defused but not eliminated. As a 
result:
"It is clear to the most casual observer that proclamations of Atlantic solidarity 
and community are frequently belied by the persistence of disputes and mutual 
recriminations. In all phases of the development of Atlantic relations problems 
have been caused by the asymmetry of relationships and perceptions, and by the 
conspicuous absence of any cumulative progress towards a new kind of interna­
tional community. There is a great deal going on in relations between the United 
States and its West European partners, but a great deal of this is (as it always has 
been) rather fraught and sometimes bitter."59
Chapter 4 describes the bitterness and rancour in the policies of the Nixon admin­
istration. They were reflected initially in freeing the dollar, taking unilateral action to 
correct the current account deficit, and pursuing detente with Moscow over the heads 
of the Europeans, and later in trying to reconcile these uncoordinated interdependent 
linkages with the initiative for a Year of Europe. Because the EEC benefited from the 
existing structure and had no disposition to amend it, the problems of greater interde­
pendence were felt mainly by the US, where "loss of control"60 was combined with 
economic decline relative to the Community and Japan. The other side of that coin was 
resentment in Europe at the way the US could run such a large overseas deficit on the 
basis of a fixed-value dollar and large international indebtedness. Richard Cooper and 
others had predicted the potential for a strained Alliance relationship as a result of 
uncoordinated economic interdependence. He favoured measures to interrupt that 
interdependence until the means for effective economic management, including recog­
nition of the importance of transnational (that is, non-governmental) flows in politically
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sensitive areas such as international monetary relations, had been worked out. This 
involved, if necessary, measures intended to bring about market disintegration, notably 
flexible exchange rates, the eventual solution to which the Nixon administration turned 
in August 197161.
The solution devised by the former treasury secretary John Connally in August 
1971 suggested that Atlantic economic relations could no longer go unregulated, or 
rather regulated only by existing anramgements overseen inadequately by the post-war 
institutions of cooperation such as MATO, the OECD, GATT, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It required what Miriam Camps has called "the management of 
interdependence"62 in order to follow7 a stabilising route to improved cooperation in 
which the high levels of interdependence no longer coexist with weak structures for 
institutional policy coordination, both within the Alliance and globally. While the IMF, 
GATT and the OECD all had roles iin 1973-74 in providing a forum for issues of most 
interest to Alliance countries, it was to NATO that Washington turned as the best 
instrument to restore American authority over the Nine. Washington could do so be­
cause all the elements of interdependence - security and political, not just economic - 
aggravated the imbalance in the Alliamce as a result of its tendency to work in favour 
of the dominant powers where there were other variables linked to it63. As Keohane 
and Nye recognise, transnational relations create new kinds of interdependence and de­
pendence. Transnational relations make all states dependent to some degree on forces 
that none of them can control individually; "they may have a much less even-handed 
result by creating new instruments for influence for use by some governments over 
others among unequal states. Transnational relations may merely put additional means 
of leverage into the hands of the more powerful states"64. It was another reason why 
economic cooperation alone would nott automatically bring about a two-pillared Atlan­
tic relationship and why the European Community had an equal interest with the US in 
adjusting the dynamics of an interdependent relationship which protected relative US
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superiority.
Challenging this interpretation of the Alliance relationship and the argument 
about additional leverage, Kenneth Waltz raised the question of whether in fact the 
importance of growing interdependence for US foreign policy had been overstated. 
Arguing that R N Cooper and others had focused misleadingly unsteadily on economic 
interdependence only, and using a stringent definition of interdependence (as a mutual 
vulnerability), Waltz argued that interdependence (or, at least, the US's interdepend­
ence) was low or even declining. The lesson of the 1973/4 energy crisis was that 
countries worked even harder to lessen dependence. The policy implications were that, 
although the US was now part of an interdependent economic structure, this did not act 
as a major obstacle to pursuing purely American objectives. Indeed, in the purely 
economic sphere, the US, more than its allies, was in a position to change the rules of 
the game whenever - within reason - it wished65. Despite US complaints to the con­
trary, the 1970s were a time when international transactions were lessening relative to 
intranational transactions. Although the newly-enlarged EEC also might perceive a 
short-term interest in parochial rather than international solutions, as the latter came up 
for negotiation the situation increased US leverage internationally as the least "interde­
pendent" country in the Western economy, particularly in the context of the energy 
crisis.
While Waltz goes too far in consigning transnational influences to a marginal 
role in international relations66, the fact was that relative US immunity to international 
pressures gave it an advantage in negotiation both within the Alliance and international­
ly, for instance on international monetary reform and the Tokyo GATT round. Inter­
dependent relations in the Atlantic Community were thus described by Waltz as 
"varying structures of relative dependence for some nations and of relative interde­
pendence for others."67 The early 1970s were the time when the US rediscovered the 
national tools at its disposal, rather than the time when the US became irreversibly 
hemmed in by the responsibilities of an interdependent Alliance. The apparent compat­
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ibility of interdependence with occasional unilateral American action meant that, rather 
than break up a system which was not a constraint on their freedom of action, the US 
had the greatest incentive in preserving such a system in the face of closer economic 
relations between members of the EEC which might one day rob unilateral US action 
of much effect. Interdependence described the way US administrations interpreted 
America's military and political objectives toward their Allies: it did not describe the 
actual conditions of those relationships. Hence, on this interpretation, the solution to 
Alliance problems was to exercise freedom of action whenever US interests required, 
so going against the Atlantic-managerial habits of three decades. Those habits had 
carried the danger that the US would do too much rather than too little: "No matter 
how one turns it, the same answer comes up: we depend somewhat on the external 
world, and most other countries depend on the external world much more so ."68 In 
proclaiming the energy crisis as marking a new era of interdependence, Kissinger had 
really made this very point? that the US was in a position to go it alone in seeking 
greater energy self-sufficiency; Europe was not. Rather than the economics of interde­
pendence as Cooper and others had chosen to describe it, this was in reality the 
economics of US interdependence. Whatever the effect of twenty-five years of cooper­
ation within the Alliance, interdependence was not one of them: but the myth of inter­
dependence led to erroneous assumptions about the conditions that had promoted Al­
liance harmony in the early years and what was thought to be needed to restore good 
relations in the early 1970s. Keohane and Nye describe this in more measured tones as 
a situation in which:
"the preponderant size of the United States is one of the major problems of 
contemporary world politics. From a state-centric perspective, the United States 
seems highly constrained by the structure of world politics, yet from the perspec­
tive of transnational relations the United States often seems to have too much 
freedom of action. It would be difficult to argue that the United States is too 
constrained in transnational relations."69
Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye conceded that US dominance would be further 
diminished by the effect of transnational relations. It meant that the "control gap"
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arising from the loss of political and economic autonomy which had so exercised US 
foreign and economic policy makers would intensify. The prospect was that it would 
remain a problem for Washington, with implications for its European allies. Whether 
interdependence would emerge as a positive or negative determinant of relations within 
the Alliance depended, as a result, on the degree to which cooperation would be possi­
ble at government level and the degree to which negative interdependence demonstrat­
ed in August 1971 could be avoidable in future70.
Alliance management: the issues in 1973
It is the management, or lack of it, of the interdependent relationship between 
North America and West Europe and the perceived loss of national control over the 
elements of that relationship which explain why much of Alliance history has been 
characterised by recurring - because systemic - crises over the past three decades. 
These crises have been both military (strategic doctrine, burden-sharing, role of 
conventional and theatre nuclear forces) and political/economic (trade, monetary 
reform , European integration and identity). Although these conflicts of interest 
changed as the context of their recurrence altered, they had recognisably the same 
lineage. Those to be addressed as part of the Year of Europe were:
- trade and international monetary stability, focusing principally on the GATT 
round (the Nixon or Tokyo round), and the handling of exchange rate fluctuations in 
the light of the collapse of the post-1945 regime of fixed exchange rates. With the 
small ($165 million) but first-ever US trade deficit with the Community in 1972 (taken 
as evidence of the relative decline of the US as the predominant economic power in the 
West), the Americans were disposed to take a tough attitude. As chapter 4 describes, 
agreement proved elusive on how to reform the international trade and monetary 
regimes so as to redress those specific problems which had disadvantaged the US. 
These issues went to the heart of the enlarged Community and the objectives of the
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Paris summit, particularly for the French who regarded an end to the dollar's influence 
over the future European economic integration as a matter of urgency if the Nine were 
to aspire seriously to greater freedom from US domestic interests. Instead, following 
the October 1973 war in the Middle East, the Nine's weakness was exacerbated by 
increased oil prices and the relative weakness of the European currencies compared 
with the dollar;
- the scope of Alliance obligations, most particularly in 1973 the long-standing 
issue of what constituted NATO's operating area, and the requirement to consult Al­
liance partners on issues of common concern. They were, and remain, the greyest 
areas of the Washington Treaty. Both were confirmed as serious weaknesses during the 
Alliance response to the Middle East war and resulting energy crisis, described in 
chapter 6. The absence of clear reference in the treaty to mutual obligations "out of 
area" was interpreted by the Americans in October 1973 as justifying their expectation 
of a common Alliance approach on the grounds that what is not explicitly excluded 
from the treaty is included, or open to be included, in Alliance obligations. Article 6 of 
the treaty, on this interpretation, describes the area in which there is a clear obligation 
for mutual assistance. It does not exclude military action by the Alliance beyond that 
defined area provided that the proposed action is compatible with the stated values of 
the Alliance in Article 2 of the treaty (that is, contributing to, and promoting, peace in 
international relations). In practice, most of the European allies held firmly in 1973 to 
the line that NATO forces could not be deployed other than in defence of NATO terri­
tory as defined in Article 6; that is, that NATO forces should only defend the territory 
of a NATO country or counter an attack presumed to emanate from the Warsaw Pact;
- the way to interpret the Alliance obligation for consultation, similarly exposed 
as in need of review in the light of the Middle East war. Questions about consultation 
were always likely to arise because it was not a precise, formal requirement under the 
Washington Treaty, beyond the terms of Article 4 which stated that consultation would 
take place "whenever, in the opinion of any one of [the allies], the political independ­
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ence or security of any of the parties is threatened." It placed consultation very much 
in the context of military threat (and even here the timing and intensity were discre­
tionary). Its weakness was that, with the creation of the European Community and 
more determined foreign policy cooperation in 1973, Article 4 did not, for instance, 
oblige Alliance members who were also part of the Nine to consult the Alliance about 
their own moves toward political cooperation. A better source for the ground-rules of 
consultation was the Report of the Committee of Three in 195671, which had argued 
that unity on defence and disunity on political and economic relations were incompati­
ble, and that a "habit of consultation" was needed to facilitate multilateral consensus 
formation. Hence the committee recommended more effective political consultation "in 
the early stages of policy formation and before national positions became fixed." While 
this 1956 report looked at internal NATO consultations, the 1968 Harmel report noted 
that, even in out-of-area crises, "in accordance with established usages, the allies or 
such of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without 
commitment and as the case may demand."72
As the resolution of the Year of Europe came to focus increasingly on the need 
for greater transparency between the Alliance and the Nine, obligations of consultation 
became a crucial test of mutual determination to avoid a breakdown of standing Al­
liance channels in Brussels. Kissinger, regarding the matter as one of utmost impor­
tance, pressed for consultation to become a treaty commitment, but faced French 
opposition in so doing. It produced, as described in chapter 7, the Nine's agreement at 
Schloss Gymnich to inform the US in advance of impending decisions which might 
affect US interests; and, in the Ottawa Declaration, agreement that the allies "are 
firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of 
frank and timely consultations by all means bearing in mind that [Alliance] interests 
can be affected by events in other areas of the world" (Article IX);
- burden-sharing within NATO, another issue of long-running contention which
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at the outset of 1973 was no closer to resolution. Europe was concerned that progress 
in the mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks might lead to significant reduc­
tions in the number of US forces in Europe, and about the prospect of unilateral US 
reductions imposed by Congress should the MBFR process fail to hold out any realistic 
chance of negotiated, reciprocal reductions. Their concerns about the defence relation­
ship were not eased by remarks by Kissinger in April 1973 referring to a closer exami­
nation of NATO's defence posture, nor by persistent rumours of US-Soviet agreement 
on equal (and therefore unbalanced) force reductions in central Europe. The shadow of 
Mansfieldism (the view in Congress that unilateral US force reductions in Europe were 
permissible and desirable) had grown longer in 1973 than at any time since 1966, and 
the US administration was increasingly on the defensive, seeking either to reduce the 
costs involved the existing level of deployments, or reducing overseas deployments;
- different US and European perspectives of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and its link to MBFR. The Americans ap­
peared willing to acquiesce in Soviet proposals for a quick outcome to CSCE in order 
to allow early reductions under MBFR. The Europeans, however, attached importance 
to a substantive, rather than simply symbolic, CSCE as the first real forum to promote 
East-West detente in Europe. Although none of the European allies had any real liking 
for MBFR, they felt unable to oppose US intentions to press ahead as fast as possible. 
The position that there was nothing good for Europe in troop reductions was one held 
particularly strongly by the French, who opposed the US on both the need and timing 
for MBFR negotiations. European concerns remained acute with continuing concern 
from early 1973 onward that a US/Soviet deal was on the cards and it would settle the 
MBFR/CSCE nexus over the heads of the Europeans.
On all these fronts, years of US pressure had extracted little more than cosmetic 
changes from the Europeans. As a result, on both sides of the Atlantic conflicting 
perceptions developed: of the US as a protectionist giant afraid of foreign competition, 
exerting pressure on other nations to rectify the US balance of payments; and of the
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Nine as an inward-looking club of nouveaux riches, repaying US assistance after 1945 
with high tariff walls, discriminatory trade agreements, gold surpluses and refusal to 
take responsibility for their own defence. With the end of US involvement in Vietnam 
came the US opportunity to remove these misperceptions and turn around relations 
with Europe in the same way as had been possible with Moscow and Peking. The 
problem Kissinger faced was that US motives were open to interpretation either as 
disinterested (which Washington claimed they were) and concerned only with the same 
grand design for peace that had driven detente, or as inspired by domestic political 
circumstances and intended to block European political cooperation by asserting US 
weight in the Alliance. The preparation and marketing of the Year of Europe initiative 
failed to allay these European concerns.
The particular problem of detente
Of these issues, it was management of detente which in the early 1970s was the 
genuinely new factor in Alliance relations and which most sensitised European political 
concerns about their relationship with the US and that between the US and Soviet 
Union. The Europeans, most particularly the Nine, were more conscious of the possi­
bilities of increasing their international standing in the early 1970s than hitherto. There 
was a strong sense that military power no longer counted for what it has and that 
economic power was an equally valid claim to superpower status73. In this case the 
EEC could contemplate a confident future in which they could at least negotiate from a 
position of equal strength with the US and have greater standing, for instance in the 
Middle East and the CSCE74. This confidence was, however, dented badly by the 
political implications of this devaluation of military power, notably the mechanics of 
superpower detente and the prospect of closer US-Soviet ties eclipsing the new civilian 
power of Europe. The linkage of issues in the Atlantic area, of which Kissinger spoke 
in April 1973, further circumscribed the Nine's ability to project its new-found status 
as an independent actor. In the end, prosperity as the basis of a new international role
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rapidly proved illusory in the light of the 1973 oil shocks and consequent recession:
"It is instructive to note the dramatic change in Europe's economic prospects in 
1974, a truly historic moment. From the gathering momentum of the Marshall Plan 
until the end of 1973 the economic 'real world' of Europe seemed to be one of substan­
tial and sustained economic growth aided by even more buoyant international trade. 
People and politicians alike rested their expectations and plans on the endless summer 
of this expansion. The Yom Kippur [Middle East] war, the quadrupling of energy 
costs, international recession and inflation destroyed this cosy 'reality.' Today the 
hallmarks of Europe are austerity and retrenchment."75
The potential for eclipse of the Nine's "civilian power" increased during the 
Nixon years as the primary responsibility for detente moved definitively away from 
European capitals and toward Washington. This was partly the product of the strategic 
arms limitation talks (SALT) negotiations which came to dominate the detente process; 
it was the result also of the US administration's intention to reduce the risks of differ­
entiated detente which had emerged in the 1960s and which, according to Kissinger, 
would endanger Alliance unity and compromise the US' policy of linkage diplomacy 
with the Soviet Union. "Hence, even at the height of detente, any suggestion of a 
[West] Europe-[East] Europe dialogue was viewed with apprehension in Washington. 
Quite apart from ill-concealed fears that West Germany might be 'drawn to the East,' 
the renewed interest in better relations with the Eastern bloc states also had a competi­
tive commercial aspect. American multinationals began to realise the potential impor­
tance of the new market openings in the East and some feared that their European 
(specifically West German) rivals might take advantage of the new political climate to 
get in first."76 For Chancellor Willy Brandt and President de Gaulle of France, on the 
other hand, detente was a distinctly European concept which would (according to their 
respective objectives) reduce tensions over Germany and Berlin and promote a unified 
continent from the Atlantic to the Urals. The result would be to deny any US-Soviet
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condominium the opportunity of presiding over a permanently divided Europe. Before 
the start of substantive US-Soviet contacts in the 1960s, allied leaders had conceived of 
Europe as a bridge between East and West, hence de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in 1966 
and Brandt's Ostpolitik (which included a proposal to renounce the use of force and 
accept the status quo in central Europe). Brandt in particular believed that Europe 
could have an independent role to play in detente, and that it "can be Europe's oppor­
tunity in a world which, as has been proven, cannot be ruled by Washington or 
Moscow alone."77 While Brandt did not intend detente as a code for anti-American­
ism, the reasons for Europe to promote it were unambiguously to lessen the need for 
US interference in Europe as well as minimise the threat from the Warsaw Pact.
These were thoughts directly contradictory to Kissinger's view that detente be 
based ultimately on Alliance unity. Nixon stated the American position on this clearly 
in February 1971: "Our principal objective should be to harmonise our policies and 
ensure that our efforts for detente are complementary. A differentiated detente would 
be illusory. It would cause strains among allies. It would turn the desire for detente 
into an instrument of political warfare."78 The concerns of the Nixon administration 
about the Alliance implications of these initiatives, and the fact that only US leverage 
could resolve the tensions over Berlin despite the progress made by Bonn's diplomacy, 
led increasingly to the US's assuming control of the detente process.
As a result, asserting US primacy over European efforts to promote detente 
became a genuine cause of European concern and of Alliance malaise. There was a 
philosophical difference underlying this: "Brandt viewed detente as a continuing self- 
perpetuating peace process in Europe based on the recognition of the status quo but 
Kissinger conceived detente as a policy for managing the fundamentally irresolvable 
East-West conflict under new international conditions"79. Whereas for the Americans, 
detente meant legitimising the superpower status quo, for the Europeans, and in partic­
ular the Germans, it meant exploring to what extent a new relationship was possible 
with the East. While Pompidou and most other West European leaders were similarly
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to cultivate their own relationship with Brezhnev, they had less of a stake in inter- 
German relations than Bonn. The Ostpolitik was the most sustained approach, and 
therefore the most potentially damaging to US interests. It explains the reservations 
which Nixon and Kissinger had about Brandt80 and why the US conduct of policy on 
detente was subject to such critical treatment both on its merits (ie its contribution to 
creating stability) and for its sometimes scant regard for the unity of the Alliance inter­
ests on which Kissinger professed to rely in his negotiations with Moscow. European 
capitals were mindful of the difficulty that, as far as Europe was concerned, "detente 
between the superpowers can be seen as the prelude to two possible outcomes: disen­
gagement or condominium."81
American domination of detente was regarded negatively in Europe, not just for 
the suspicion that, in this "race for Moscow," the US was unfairly handicapping 
Europe or would fail to take account of European interests. European detente, as 
opposed to the wider US-Soviet relationship, continued to play only a small role in 
American calculations between 1972 and 1975 because, for the most part, the Nixon 
administration remained sceptical about its making any meaningful progress. SALT, 
bilateral US-Soviet relations and Vietnam received higher priority, since Europe was 
the stable area of potential superpower conflict. The priority was on superpower nego­
tiations; the very fact that other East-West negotiations were taking place appeared to 
be sufficient in itself, with no serious efforts to bring about their conclusion unless as a 
result of well-targeted pressure from either Moscow or West European capitals.
The central role of the Alliance
The Year of Europe initiative accentuated the underlying conflict between 
European procrastination and US pressure for change. This difference in approach was 
reflected in the US prescription for how best to restructure the transatlantic bargain. 
The one-ball-of-wax mentality (that all problems were linked and could be resolved as 
a package, an outlook associated with the former treasury secretary John Connally,
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notably in a speech in Munich in March 1971) was that Europe was entitled only to the 
American protection for which it was willing to pay. As much as Kissinger had origi­
nally distanced himself from the approach on the grounds that it was counterproduc­
tive, the globalisation of issues became in 1973 a systematic part of US policy toward 
Europe in trying to solve simultaneously problems in the trade, monetary and defence 
areas. But while Kissinger's Year of Europe address in April 1973 referred to the 
"reality of linkage", whether acknowledged or not, linkage was regarded in Europe as 
a US assault on the Community82. As well as this resistance to what was perceived as 
an attempt to exploit areas of relative Community weakness, the Nine were institution­
ally unsuited to examining issues on this basis. Linking defence to economic issues - 
while central to the US's meeting its desiderata - virtually guaranteed an uncooperative 
European response which would prevent an early conclusion, on US terms, of the 
dialogue. This offer to cooperate on the two concrete proposals advanced by the US in 
1973 - a new Atlantic Charter, and creation of a common energy policy (including the 
joint development of nuclear power to reduce the West's dependency on Middle East­
ern oil) - continually ran up against the institutional rigidities of the Nine. This was 
aside from the fact that the US was looking to the Alliance to resolve matters which, 
on the basis of past practice if not in fact, were technically outside the Alliance's 
remit. Moreover, it came at a time when many of the members of the Nine were least 
disposed to follow a US lead, a situation described by Kissinger as deadlock resulting 
from the fact that "Europe's body clock was out of phase with ours... We sought crea­
tive tasks that would transcend our domestic traumas... our allies had no such compul­
sions.. . and felt they had enough on their plates.1,83
During 1973/4, however, the US administration, with Congressional support, 
increasingly saw linkage as the best means to assert US interests in the face of the 
allies' obduracy. Although potentially damaging if exploited too ruthlessly, linkage 
allowed the US the option of exercising force majeur for as long as there was a contin­
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uing requirement for US security guarantees in Europe84. That they did so through 
NATO reflected the view that not only was this the institution which maximised US 
influence in Europe, but also that there was no other comparable international forum in 
which the US could initiate and control debate. It was true that the institutional ten­
sions within the Alliance were a product not just of the systemic contradictions identi­
fied by Kissinger and others, but also of the lack of a high-level forum in which effec­
tive dialogue was possible. The problem was that Alliance channels were becoming 
overworked as all the tensions between North America and West Europe were placed 
automatically in an Alliance context. This was done as a way to bring bigger issues to 
bear on what were - to Kissinger - technical niceties in many cases, and because of an 
absence of suitable alternatives where ready-made channels of communication and 
consultation were available. Hitherto, the Alliance had been careful to avoid any dupli­
cation of the functions of other international organisations (GATT, the IMF, the 
OECD) which had been established to promote international economic cooperation, 
and in which NATO members already played a major part. But now the international 
mechanisms of GATT and the IMF - as discussions in 1973/4 were to demonstrate - 
were too slow-moving and cumbersome and, because of the international secretariats 
which staffed them, were not amenable to resolution of regional rather than interna­
tional issues which went beyond a specific subject area. The OECD was insufficiently 
operationally-orientated and required all decisions to be taken unanimously (although it 
did oversee the new energy agency, which remained the sole institutional legacy of the 
Year of Europe).
Hence the US administration's newfound - and less than convincing - attachment 
to Article 2 of the Washington Treaty (whereby NATO countries "will seek to elimi­
nate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic 
collaboration between any or all of them") as the means to stimulate discussion of trade 
and monetary disputes in Alliance fora. There was already a respectable body of opin­
ion supporting such Alliance involvement in the economic sphere, dating from the
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report of the Committee of Three in 1956, which recommended that consultation take 
place wherever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance were involved, par­
ticularly those "which affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a 
whole."85 While neither the Year of Europe itself, nor the Ottawa Declaration signed 
in June 1974, effectively met this recommendation, it was a lacuna filled in time by the 
Group of Seven mechanism which could respond quickly to focused political issues. It 
also was to have short chains of command and, as a result, received closer ministerial 
attention. In 1973, however, the Atlantic Alliance, faute de mieux, was Washington's 
chosen instrument to resolve what were superficially technical issues but which in 
practice went to the heart of American-European cooperation.
The success of US linkage diplomacy within the Alliance was piecemeal. There 
was linkage explicitly in the Jackson-Nunn amendment passed in the autumn of 1973 
and designed to head off pressure for unilateral US force reductions by establishing a 
clear link between the level of US forces and European (that is, German) offset 
payments, but this was not administration-inspired, and the Ottawa declaration, while 
containing reference to economic cooperation, was not a document reflecting linkage. 
The "reality" remained therefore an element of power-play, not a principle which the 
European allies were prepared to see dignified in Alliance language. While linkage still 
worked to US advantage in 1973, it could not itself alter the fact that the separate 
Alliance issues worked to different timetables. Security and defence issues remained 
perforce in tandem, but economic issues were no closer to the mainstream of Alliance 
discussion at the Brussels NATO summit in June 1974 than they had been when Kiss­
inger launched his initiative in April 1973. By that criterion alone, the US administra­
tion failed to change the terms of Atlantic debate. The US initiative had been framed in 
too wide a context, it was too easily knocked off course, and had become too quickly a 
source of genuine Alliance irritation for Kissinger to pursue to the end all the objec­
tives with which he had begun. As the following chapters explain, however, it
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achieved much else in effectively forcing the Nine to face up to Alliance responsibili­
ties, to restore the Alliance to its accustomed role as the principal forum for transatlan­
tic cooperation.
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ions (a sentiment intensified in 1973/4 as a result of Watergate).
In the event, and despite N ixon's declared intention4 in 1968 to devote more 
ime to Europe, for most of the first Nixon administration Alliance problems were on 
tie back-burner. Washington remained preoccupied with its relations with Moscow 
which, however, perforce touched on or encouraged progress on detente in Europe, 
otably settlement of the FRG/GDR border issue and of the occupying powers' rights 
i Berlin); Vietnam; the dollar crisis; and Nixon's re-election. Alliance issues were 
eferred until after 1972, to be regarded as a part of the unfinished business of reas- 
5ssing the US's role in the multipolar world.
By the late summer of 1972, the phrase "Year of Europe" began appearing in the 
ress and was being used among American officials to signal the adm in istration 's  
itention to devote more time to the Alliance5. Although Nixon used the term publicly 
>r the first time in a press conference on 31 January 1973, he had already indicated in 
i  interview  for Newsweek6 in August 1972 that his second term would pay more 
tention to the US's friends and allies "especially Western Europe... our relations with 
lr allies could be one of the most serious problems in a second term."
Kissinger expanded on this in Munich on 16 September 1972, giving rise to the 
;pectation that Nixon, if re-elected, would undertake a European initiative, probably 
tour of capitals. During the course of his discussions in Western Europe, Kissinger 
id he had conveyed Nixon's conviction that "whatever progress we were making in 
ir dealings with other nations, similar and preferably greater progress has to be made 
European-A m erican rela tionsh ips... as soon as his schedule was less pressed by 
•mestic exigencies, he [Nixon] hoped to resume most intense consultations... on how 
put the relationship on a new, even more dynamic and constructive basis consistent 
th the change in the international situation ... our intention is to develop a pro- 
amme for an Atlantic partnership in close cooperation with our European friends."7
Chapter 3 
Opening diplomatic moves: 
a model of Alliance mismanagement
Origins o f the Year of Europe
Kissinger's account1 of the period either side of the announcement of the Year of 
Europe explains the detailed US-European exchanges with the intention to support the 
thesis that the Year o f Europe was a failure for European, rather than A m erican, 
diplomacy. The following does not seek to replicate that account, though significant 
diplomatic exchanges are cited where they have been highlighted or corroborated by 
personal interviews with others (such as Lords Home, Soames and Cromer) who were 
involved at the time. Instead, the purpose here is to draw out the reasons for European 
reluctance to respond as the US would have wished. It shows the American failure to 
realise that, just when the Nine were beginning to engage seriously in foreign policy
cooperation of their own, an Alliance initiative would only aggravate the trauma of
• . •
August 1971.
From the start, the US administration's intention of "evoking the ideas of others 
and together considering problems that meet common needs,"2 as stated by Nixon in 
February 1971, met with scepticism among European leaders. Although one of the 
Nixon doctrine's motives was to Europe's advantage - reconciling Congress and public 
opinion to retention of US forces in Europe - this was also the most problematic policy 
area, given increasing Congressional pressure for reductions in US military commit­
ments overseas. Although the doctrine was intended to "assuage domestic opposition... 
through a limited military retrenchment yet at the same time remain politically engaged 
throughout the globe,"3 even in 1969/70 there was concern in Europe about whether 




Although American thinking took into account some long-standing positions in 
Europe, one of the hardest aspects of the Year of Europe to identify is the extent to 
which there was a feeling in the Alliance of genuine neglect beyond a general common 
wish to try harder in non-specific ways. Certainly, on a rhetorical level, Nixon spoke 
of neglect. Vietnam, the state of detente and the shock of the US's unilateral economic 
actions in August 1971 had produced a feeling that events had moved on around the 
Alliance. Bonn had favoured for some time, and certainly after August 1971, an 
intensification of US-European ties. London had also been supportive, as Heath had 
told Nixon at their summit meeting in Bermuda in December 1971. Yet, early Euro­
pean responses to the suggestions of an intensified Atlantic dialogue were only mildly 
encouraging, reflecting doubts about the timing and whether it could be anything other 
than a US attempt to influence the Nine.
European caution in 1973 also reflected the fact that future trade and monetary 
relations with the US (and particularly the trade implications of enlargement and 
doubts on the degree to which the Community should agree a closer monetary coopera­
tion in advance of international reform) had been one of the many issues in dispute 
within the Nine in the preparations for the Paris summit of Community leaders in 
October 1972. The holding of the summit had remained in doubt until a few weeks 
before as a result of difficulties over French ideas for a political secretariat based in 
Paris, and over the strength of commitment to economic and monetary union on the 
part of France's partners. French concerns about the need for closer cooperation were, 
Paris argued, justified by Nixon's New Economic Policy of 1971 and the US economic 
agenda for 1973. Sir Christopher Soames, former vice president of the European 
Commission, (in a private interview) ascribed US interest in a Year of Europe almost 
entirely to economic concerns: the coincidence of large US balance-of-payments defi­
cits with British entry into the Community (and with it the extension of the Communi­
ty's preferential arrangements to Anglophone Africa, the European Free Trade Associ­
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ation countries - EFTANs - and others)8. Soames's visit to Washington in February 
1973 confirmed for him that these were Washington's real priorities to be resolved in 
the Atlantic area. This same view determined both the Nine's unwillingness to be 
rolled over by domestically-inspired American grievances, and the concern in West 
Europe generally that, despite Kissinger's disclaimers, larger Alliance concerns were 
not guiding his policy.
Far from dealing with a more coherent economic entity in 1973, however, US 
pressure exacerbated the Community's internal differences over the priority to be given 
to economic and monetary union. Community discussion of the degree of future 
cooperation was underlain by the wider question of future relations with the US. 
Although paragraph 12 of the Paris summit communique of 20 October 1972 had 
referred only to the Community's determination to maintain a "constructive dialogue 
with the United States, Japan, Canada and its other industrialised trade partners using 
the most appropriate methods,"9 the Commission and some of the Nine (notably the 
Federal Republic, Belgium, and the Netherlands) had been prepared to go further in 
institutionalising a dialogue between the Community and the US. The French position 
remained opposed to this, as it had throughout the run-up to the summit10.
As a result of this pre-summit skirmishing, Pompidou had refused to go beyond 
recognising the need for "constructive discussions" with the US, and only provided this 
was accompanied by references to the other industrialised countries. All this was with 
tacit British support, given Heath's scepticism about the practicality of formalising 
links between the US and Europe because of the diversity of transatlantic relations. Sir 
Thomas Brimelow, political director at the Foreign Office in London, explained later 
(in private conversation) that for most of 1973 - given the nature of the discussions in 
the run-up to the Paris summit - there had been thought given in London to the idea of 
establishing some sort of collective machinery between the US and Europe. The idea 
was ruled out in view of French opposition and apparent US indifference. As a result,
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the summit, while reaffirming the aim of their intensified political cooperation to be 
that of dealing "with problems of common interest and, where possible, to formulate 
common medium- and long-term positions" (paragraph 14) and reaffirming also the 
importance of a close relationship with the US, "took no steps to provide a framework 
for transatlantic dialogue." In this way "the Paris Communique reflected a basic 
ambivalence about the future direction of the EEC."11 Although this did not go as far 
as Washington and some in the EEC had wished, it nonetheless indicated that the 
Community recognised the need to address external relations, even while accommodat­
ing new members. For instance, paragraph vii discussed the compatibility of an en­
larged EEC and other allegiances: "The construction of Europe will allow it, in con­
formity with its ultimate political objectives, to affirm its personality while remaining 
faithful to its traditional friendships and to the alliances of its member states."
Nixon's initial response was to welcome "the Community's declared intention to 
maintain a constructive, forthcoming dialogue with us." In reaffirming a commitment 
to reform of the international economic system, he said, "we will be prepared to take 
bold action with our European partners." Nonetheless the communique had not been 
as forthcoming as Nixon had wanted. If he had hoped for the summit to issue an invita­
tion for him to visit Europe in 197312, this was not realised.
French policy and initial French views
As Kissinger recognised13, the means by which a transatlantic dialogue might 
actually assist European unity (by forcing Europe to speak with one voice) served only 
to land the US in the middle of the decade-old dispute between France, which insisted 
on leadership in Europe, and countries like Belgium which insisted on formal equality, 
with Germany manoeuvring uneasily between the different conceptions. French objec­
tives in 1973 were what they had always been and have been since: to establish itself 
as the principal American interlocutor in Europe, in recognition of French status as the 
leading European power. It meant opposing US-Soviet cooperation where this was to 
the detriment of West European (and specifically French) interests; keeping a close eye
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on German diplomacy and the implications of growing German economic and political 
influence within the EEC; and resisting the tendency for the Nine to cooperate more 
closely on foreign policy unless at French orchestration. (Such was the case in the 
Euro-Arab dialogue in spring 1974, and even here activity a neuf was pursued by Paris 
only because French diplomacy in the Middle East was so controversial for European 
allies and Washington).
In 1973, Paris faced a US administration disposed to "do something" in Europe 
and disposed also to take French advice, particularly the requirement for greater high- 
level contact among the main players. US preference for bilateral discussions rather 
than talks with the emergent Community was also to French liking, provided this 
denoted preferential French access to Washington decision-making, not US divide-and- 
rule in Europe. In 1973, Pompidou also had to contemplate the implications of British 
entry into the Community which, while a counterweight to rising German influence, 
was not necessarily to French long-term advantage despite Heath's painstaking (and 
increasingly anti-American) efforts to demonstrate the UK's new-found European 
concerns. (Heath's efforts were notable above all when there was US pressure on 
London to contribute more positively to the Year of Europe initiative after it had gone 
down so badly in Paris. In fact, both Heath and Pompidou were aggrieved at the lack 
of consultation about an initiative which they had assumed to be partly of their 
making.)
Furthermore, even assuming helpful British cooperation in a Community context, 
there were the com plications to consider of detente and German unwillingness 
(matched by French unwillingness) to have its diplomatic freedom of action con­
strained by the need for a coordinated Western policy or the need to seek Atlantic 
consensus in advance. The prospect of freewheeling German diplomacy in action in 
Moscow and East European capitals produced uneasiness throughout the Alliance14, 
no more so than in Paris and Washington. While Paris was in active competition with
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Bonn and Washington to capitalise on diplomatic and economic opportunities arising 
from detente (partly to try to outflank Brandt's Ostpolitik) in the very early 1970s, the 
French had also regarded moving closer to the US as a counterweight to what appeared 
to be German semi-detachedness from the Alliance.
Something of this low-key, even conciliatory, attitude toward Washington re­
mained in 1973. The desire remained to be courted at the highest level and to make 
decisions about Europe in an inner circle of leaders (US, Soviet, and more reluctantly 
British and German). But the advance of US-Soviet detente on the political-strategic 
front, and the unavoidability of the many very serious difficulties in the Atlantic rela­
tionship arising from economic and trade problems, produced a new edge to French 
diplomacy. In Community terms, this centred on the need to proceed with monetary 
union (in accordance with the timetable agreed at the Paris summit in October 1972) as 
a way to tie down Germany and stress particular Community obligations as opposed to 
those of NATO and the rival charms of detente. In NATO terms, it meant renewed 
defensiveness about American-led attempts to adapt the Alliance, particularly in ways 
regarded as damaging to the European Community (by opening it up to more direct US 
pressure on the pace and direction of closer integration) and as potentially challenging 
French claims to leadership in Europe.
The one person with whom this more aggressive policy toward the US and the 
more pressured policy toward Germany in 1973 became associated was the French 
foreign minister Michel Jobert, Kissinger's villain of the piece. He assumed this posi­
tion partly because Pompidou, on whom Kissinger claims to have counted as an ally in 
the Year of Europe, was already ailing by 1973 and "more resentful of heavy-handed 
[American] tactics than he would have been had he been vouchsafed a longer perspec­
tiv e ."15 Nonetheless Jobert was chosen by Pompidou himself after the March 1973 
elections in France, having been plucked from Pompidou's personal cabinet in the 
Elysee - where Pompidou referred to him as "mon Kissinger a moi" - to be foreign 
minister in order to give to French foreign policy an impetus which had been lacking
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for years, and to revitalise the Quai d'Orsay. Given Pompidou's failing health, Jobert 
was the chief interpreter of the president's wishes and the man to give cohesion to the 
first four years of foreign policy under Pompidou's presidency and Jobert's unassum­
ing predecessor Maurice Schumann, a policy which had no single notable achievement 
other than having provided the stimulus for British entry to the EEC. It had, for in­
stance, conspicuously failed to take clear positions on the competing priorities of 
French foreign policy: Atlanticism, European union, and French independence. Job­
ert's mission (said the French permanent representative to NATO, Francois de Rose) 
was to challenge German ascendancy in the European Community and in Europe, and 
create renewed defences against unwanted American interference in West Europe and 
Kissinger's appetite for power16.
Because Alliance diplomacy had become so personalised, partly as a result of 
Kissinger's preferred means of working and the effect of weakened presidents in the 
US and France, the respective temperaments of Kissinger and Jobert were crucial to 
Alliance management. To the extent that Ostpolitik was so specifically associated with 
Chancellor Brandt, the same was true of Washington's relations with Bonn. That is not 
to say that a country's interests and policy can be equated solely with the temperaments 
and preferences of a few personalities; but for the period from April 1973 to April 
1974, that was more or less the case, with unique opportunities to be exploited by the 
protagonists. Kissinger's subsequent lamentation that Jobert double-crossed him over 
the Year of Europe is revealing, therefore. Kissinger had trusted Jobert because he 
thought he was dealing with a France which he believed to be tractable, and that he 
could both trust Jobert as Pompidou's chosen man and also outmanoeuvre him on 
personal diplomacy, of which Kissinger regarded himself as the arch-exponent.
Events to a degree played into Jobert's hands. On coming to office he was pre­
sented with the new Atlantic Charter proposal in April 1973 and then the consequences 
of the agreement in June 1973 between Brezhnev and Nixon on prevention of nuclear
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war. Both came without consultation - Paris claimed - and were consistent with a string 
of US moves in foreign policy for which the European allies were partially or wholly 
unsighted (e.g., SALT 1 and secretary of state Rogers's peace efforts in the Middle 
East in 1969-70). Throughout 1973, Jobert was to bewail Europe's humiliation and 
state of virtual disarmament, hence his moves (see chapter 5) to enliven European 
defence cooperation so as to underline French concern at American (and Russian) 
complicity in world events in which, by right, Europe should be involved. Jobert's 
ideas for greater European military independence were advanced seriously in the latter 
half of 1973. They were taken as less important outside of France. While having some 
political-military meaning in the context of deteriorating Alliance relationships, Job­
ert's  ideas went against the need to stay alongside the US when differences were 
appearing in the Franco-German axis, a need which always betrayed the perpetual 
contradiction in French policy toward the Atlantic Alliance, within which US military 
guarantees would continue but, unless circumstances specifically required, without any 
accompanying rights to political influence. This principle of basing Europe's involve­
ment in the Alliance on a non-reciprocal US military protection effectively went back 
to the state of US-European relations 1948-52, when only the US was in any sense in a 
position to take responsibility for the defence of Europe.
Kissinger ascribed17 most of the Atlantic tensions during the Year of Europe to 
Jobert's virulent anti-Americanism. "Jobert was turning the Year of Europe into a 
wrestling match. Whatever contingency he discussed became an attack on our purposes 
or a reason for stalling. He ascribed to us motives of nearly paranoid deviousness, the 
very articulation of which destroyed the significance of any reply." Likewise, Alfred 
Grosser cites18 two reasons for the hardening of French diplomatic style after 1972: 
"Pompidou's terrible illness, which hardened him, and Jobert's rise to the highest 
echelons, which did not exactly arouse an inferiority complex in him." While Edward 
Heath had a high regard for Jobert's intellect, Lord Home, British foreign secretary 
1970 to 1974, has said he and others could not warm to Jobert. It is undeniable that
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Jobert took every opportunity to exploit Atlantic division where others sought common 
ground.
The French regarded the Paris communique as a statement on economic rela­
tions, not an overture to political discussions. Even French support for a constructive 
economic dialogue had important caveats, as expressed by Pompidou to the summit. 
"Our links with that great country [the US] are so close that it would be absurd to 
conceive of a Europe constructed in opposition to it. But the very closeness of these 
links requires that Europe also affirm its individual personality in regard to the United 
States... Europe has to speak with one voice... Western Europe... must not, and 
cannot, sever its links with the United States. But neither must it refrain from assert­
ing its existence as an original reality."19 Instead of what Brandt had hoped would be 
a positive response to Nixon's call to "dynamise" relations at a political level, the 
French referred only to an economic dialogue within which the Community would 
assert itself. The full significance of Pompidou's qualifications to any over-arching 
review of Atlantic relations was not, however, immediately obvious in December 
1972. Instead, in response to the suggestion of a summit of Atlantic leaders - put to 
Pompidou when he was in Paris on 8 December - Kissinger described the reaction of 
the French president as "avuncularly encouraging."20
This impression was reinforced a week later in an interview in The New York 
Times on 13 December in which Pompidou appeared to endorse an Atlantic dialogue: 
in a tour d'horizon of Atlantic relations, he touched on possible superpower condomin­
ium in Europe, a hypothesis which, although denied by Washington and Moscow, was 
hard for West Europe to discard entirely. Noting close consultation between techni­
cians on monetary and trade questions, the president recognised that "all nations natu­
rally live with their own domestic problems and are suspicious about what other na­
tions are doing." He declared himself to be in favour of consultations at the highest 
level "to clarify Atlantic trade, monetary and political questions; the main thing is to
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get a better political understanding... questions of money and trade, important as they 
are, are secondary to the larger political and philosophical questions... " Therefore, 
insisting on his main point (Reston writes), "there was to be more cooperation and, 
before that, more consultation. Consultation on technical questions of money and trade 
is not enough... Heads of State have to go beyond this to the larger question of pur­
pose, and be willing to engage in such a discussion if others are."21
These contradictory signals, Kissinger claimed, sowed the seeds of subsequent 
misunderstanding. He was later to write that "the ill-fated Year of Europe was born in 
the office of the President of the French Republic. "22 Pompidou's point about the 
need for high-level evaluation of the political issues to supersede the work of techni­
cians used precisely the vocabulary deployed by Kissinger in introducing his new 
Atlantic Charter initiative. On the other hand, the French had argued for a restricted 
dialogue at the Paris Council. Whether or not Kissinger misread the signs, and it is not 
easy to see how he could have done so, given Pompidou's forthcoming language, he 
allowed himself to be misled even once it was clear that Pompidou would be the sever­
est critic of the US administration's initiative and the architect of an uncompromising 
European stand against what, at many stages during the Year of Europe, were seen as 
American attempts to cow the EEC into submission. This was true above all of Michel 
Jobert, who became the hammer of Washington's Alliance diplomacy and of those 
European governments susceptible to American diplomatic pressure.
Preparing the ground
The confusion which the US designation of 1973 as the Year of Europe generat­
ed within the Alliance during 1973-74 was foreshadowed by contusion surrounding the 
preparation of this period of Atlantic re-examination. Even after the US administra­
tion's views were articulated, much was left unexplained and therefore open to inter­
pretation. From the start, both sides acknowledged that the agenda of trade and mone­
tary issues before them was complex and potentially divisive. Hence the Kissinger
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rationale to lay down political ground rules. His problem was that these very ground 
rules could themselves become a source of dispute, distracting attention from the 
substantive issues which required urgent action. Nixon's wish to have a "highly visi­
ble" dialogue made it inevitable that problems in that dialogue would be equally public. 
Clearly "nothing less than the whole fabric of post-war Atlantic relations was going to 
be up for critical re-examination."23
The prospect of a difficult period of reappraisal was almost all that was clear in 
the opening months of the US initiative. By April 1973, the press were already report­
ing the derailment of the Year of Europe, notably the cancellation of Nixon's visit to 
Europe in the spring and its replacement by visits to Washington by the main European 
players. European (particularly German, but not British) criticism of the US bombing 
of North Vietnam in December 1972 had been received with irritation in Washington, 
as Nixon confirmed to Heath when they met in February 1973. The White House 
denial on 11 January - confirmed in the president's Foreign Policy Report on 31 Janu­
ary - that there were plans to visit Europe in the first half of 1973, suggested that 
indeed problems had already arisen about when to launch the initiative.
What Kissinger described as the exploratory phase of his initiative24 produced 
more disinformation than hard evidence that Europe would support the sort of concep­
tual approach which he intended. The ground appears to have been prepared inade­
quately, and the result was that when US plans were eventually clarified by Kissinger 
in April 1973 and by Nixon in May, the Europeans were unsighted on what intentions 
genuinely underlay them. The most widely-held view was that the administration was 
reverting to the Connally-style linkage of 1971. For that reason, "the trauma in US- 
European relations that followed makes the Year of Europe initiative a good case study 
of American misperceptions and unanticipated allied reactions."25 The inadequate 
preparations for launching such a major initiative were an object lesson in the limits of 
consultation. The assumption that consultation alone would be a sufficient means of 
resolving really quite fundamental problems was an error repeated throughout 1973.
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In the absence of political will, consultation proved to be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for improved Alliance management. Furthermore, by running the exercise 
from the White House, Kissinger deprived himself of expertise in other agencies in 
Washington, and took on a wide-ranging, complex task without adequate diplomatic 
resources.
Lack of consultation: 
the British experience
Evidence of how little the Europeans were really taken into Kissinger's confi­
dence was given in the particular case of the UK's failure to respond as supportively as 
Kissinger had anticipated following officials' discussions in early 1973. It was a 
portent of the situation remarked on by Kissinger in the Arab-Israeli war later in the 
year, that those countries most consulted had cooperated least. British support for US 
ideas was important if France were to be persuaded that wrecking tactics were not the 
most appropriate response. And yet, Kissinger's secrecy, by making confidential 
exchanges in advance of the US's adopting a public position more difficult, made it 
harder for key allies to explain collectively to Washington what the real problems 
were. As a result, for instance, Heath became increasingly supportive of a coherent 
European response, using the US initiative to test a European identity in world affairs.
Soames saw the problem as initially one of personalities (mainly Heath and 
Kissinger), plus the fact that the Charter proposal was so manifestly unsuited to the 
workings of the Alliance and its requirements in 1973. Soames (in a private interview) 
attributed Kissinger's blind spot to the fact that the US had all the power but did not 
understand interdependence despite its professing to do so. Hence Europe's desire for 
a clear international identity, even if this could conflict with US policy. Soames also 
described Heath as a man who believed one had to be anti-American in order to be 
pro-Europe. "To pass the EEC breathalyser Heath believed it was necessary to have 
plenty of anti-American blood in his veins."
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Lord Home made the same point, and saw significant differences between him­
self and Heath in how the UK presented its European credentials without too much 
regard for US sensitivities. Home's position was important throughout this period. An 
instinctive Atlanticist, he described himself as a moderating influence - when possible - 
on Heath's pro-French sympathies. Part of this was owed undoubtedly to difficult rela­
tions with his opposite number, Michel Jobert, toward whom he barely concealed his 
frustration. The point is made by Kissinger: "Home... was one of the nicest and most 
decent men... For him Atlantic partnership was a moral necessity; unlike his prime 
minister, he did not see Britain's European vocation as requiring the loosening of 
transatlantic ties built up over three decades."26 Home saw his role at the Washington 
Energy Conference in 1974 as crucial (see chapter 6) in isolating Jobert and preventing 
a French veto on transatlantic cooperation on energy; but he recognised the limitations, 
particularly when events and US actions were open to an anti-European interpretation.
Home was not blindly Atlanticist: he was critical of US over-reaction in the 
Middle East in October 1973, and committed also to closer EEC ties with the Arab 
world. The Nine's declaration of 6 November, which stoked the fires of US resent­
ment, drew very much on his own ideas about a European role. He blamed Kissinger 
for miscalculating the European need and for starting the Alliance problems in 1973 by 
seeking the charter ("adult nations do not behave like that"27) particularly since it was 
so obviously contrived and would only heighten European suspicions that the US was 
manoeuvring them into a pre-designed niche in foreign policy making. As regards an 
Atlantic Charter, Home said it would have appealed to Macmillan but not to Heath. 
Doubts about how hard the UK should work to assist the US effort were coloured by 
Home's own misgivings on how much store Kissinger set by the charter, and he be­
lieved Kissinger would have no difficulty in dropping the issue once it ran into difficul­
ties. He saw Kissinger as a Euro-sceptic, an accessory to Nixon's Alliance convic­
tions.
Heath's discussions in Washington in February 1973 were followed up by regu­
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lar exchanges involving Sir Burke Trend (cabinet secretary) and Sir Thomas Brimelow 
(political director at the Foreign Office) throughout the spring of 1973. These included 
discussions with Kissinger on 19 April at which a detailed analysis of the key Alliance 
problems was handed over by the UK side, in return for which Kissinger informed 
them that an announcement of administration policy was impending. The Foreign 
Office was nonetheless taken by surprise by the substance of Kissinger's proposals four 
days later, and was in no position to offer immediate diplomatic support28. British 
officials involved believed a note of (domestically-inspired) urgency had influenced the 
timing of the initiative, just as the first which London had heard of a possible visit to 
Europe by Nixon later in the year had been remarks to the press by the president on 15 
April, when he referred to "a grand tour" in the autumn.
According to Lord Greenhill, permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, 1969- 
7329, Heath was irritated that Kissinger had not revealed his intentions despite the 
apparent closeness of consultations in the run-up to the initiative. Greenhill's view was 
that the US, having said it wanted to prepare the ground thoroughly with London, 
launched the initiative before the preparations had really begun. The surprise element 
of the speech made more difficult US attempts to reconcile Heath to the Year of 
Europe. From then on, he regarded it as a way to revise NATO to Washington's 
liking. Kissinger, having specifically sought bilateral rather than multilateral channels 
to conduct the initiative, had gone against what he had asked for. He described 
Heath's attitude as one in which "for some Europeans - especially for France - the fact 
of European unity was inseparable from the manner in which it came about. They did 
not want unity to emerge from an American initiative. [For Heath] it raised the hateful 
prospect of having to choose between Paris and Washington, which he believed had 
aborted his negotiations for British entry into Europe in 1963. He preemptively opted 
for Paris before a choice was even demanded."30 As a result, Britain's willingness to 
provide the help which Heath had volunteered in February 1973 never materialised.
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Heath's acerbity was reflected in an interview seventeen years later in which he 
said of Kissinger; "He created the Year of Europe, which never of course came about, 
without any discussions with us [on the basis of] a special relationship or with anybody 
else. He just declared he was going to have a Year of Europe. Well, we didn't want a 
Year of Europe. I said to him... 'Who are you to propose that there should be a Year 
of Europe? You're not part of Europe. '"31 In the same series of interviews, Kissing­
er emphasised that "we did not submit anything to Europe without first having dis­
cussed it with the Heath government." Kissinger's assumption is that Heath was 
determined to avoid any "whiff of Anglo-American collusion"; mistakenly the US took 
"silence as consent and counted on the British as supporters in what we took to be the 
common task of strengthening Alliance unity."32
Despite disclaimers, the evidence strongly suggests that having requested Euro­
pean contributions and cooperation, Kissinger had in the end gone ahead on his own. 
Lord Cromer, the UK ambassador to Washington at this time, recalled receiving no 
prior information about the speech, and certainly no advance sight of the text. Jobert 
records33 that he knew nothing of Kissinger's speech until the day before, other than 
that the US were expecting a positive European response. He claims that Kissinger had 
subsequently told him that the speech (which Jobert described as a careless expose of 
US geo-politics) had been prepared hurriedly in response to domestic pressures. "The 
rawness of the idea succeeded in arousing hostility in West Europe and a cold determi­
nation not to associate with such a maladroit gesture in the form which Kissinger had 
proposed." US prescriptions for Alliance reform moved from the private to the public 
domain without warning. Hence the ineffectiveness of Kissinger's preparations and the 
hesitant European response.
The US proposals: 
Kissinger and Nixon set the agenda
The proposition put forward by Kissinger to the Associated Press annual lunch­
eon in New York on 23 April was that the Atlantic nations should develop jointly a set
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of principles to define and revitalise relations. He outlined the US's conceptual ap­
proach, calling for a fresh act of creation, equal to that undertaken by the post-war 
generation of leaders. He looked for an early and positive response from the Euro­
peans as a whole. The main points were:
- "the political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by 
reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purposes of trading one off against 
the other";
- trade and monetary negotiations "must engage the top political leaders for they 
require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the 
experts, there will be no framework for the generous solutions or mutual conces­
sions essential to preserve a vital Atlantic partnership";
- by the time the president travelled to Europe "towards the end of the year" a 
new Atlantic Charter would have been worked out setting the goals for the fu­
ture.
Kissinger then outlined what he termed as a six-point American contribution to 
this process of revitalisation:
- the US would continue to support European unity "based on the principle of 
partnership, we will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to be 
met in a spirit of reciprocity";
- the US would continue efforts to relax tensions with the Communist world, 
welcoming "participation of friends" amid a constructive East-West dialogue;
- recognising European nervousness about detente ("all the more insidious for 
rarely being made explicit") the US "will never consciously injure the interests of 
its friends in Europe and Asia. We expect in return that their policies will take 
seriously our interests and responsibilities";
- the US would work cooperatively on new common problems such as the energy 
shortage: "this could be an area of competition: it should be an area of collabora­
tion";
- Japan must be brought in to ensure the Atlantic Community did not become an 
exclusive club;
- the US would not withdraw forces from Europe unilaterally. "In turn we expect 
from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defence. "34
Specific economic issues addressed by Kissinger included the importance of the
GATT round talks, and US reservations about EEC agricultural policy and trading
agreements. Alluding to problems of Alliance defence "in radically different strategic
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conditions," he called for a review of NATO strategy which would ensure consistency 
between actual force and "flexible response" and so achieve a "credible, substantial 
and rational" defence posture. In particular he noted deficiencies in conventional 
defences, for instance NATO's numerical inferiority on the Norwegian flank and 
Germany's failure to raise divisional strength above 65% of the figure recommended 
by SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; unresolved doctrinal ques­
tions concerning tactical nuclear weapons; and the need to rationalise the Alliance's 
logistical structure (the most important issue being the concentration of the US Seventh 
Army - the second largest on the Central Front - in southern Germany rather than in 
the north where a Soviet attack was most plausible).
None of this was inherently objectionable or problematic. Given the complexity 
of the issues to be addressed, a reappraisal of political relations and a renewed com­
mitment to the Alliance at the highest level was not unreasonable. From the start, 
however, other issues appeared - in European eyes - to have been revealed; notably 
there was suspicion that Kissinger wished to pursue his personalised diplomatic tech­
niques in new or ad hoc fora which might turn out to be prototypical for handling 
future Alliance consultation. Although Kissinger hinted that the charter might require 
new Atlantic institutions, he also made the point that the Alliance's institutional weak­
nesses were a "technical question," less important than agreeing common objectives. 
Nonetheless, because the allies dealt with each other "regionally and even competitive­
ly in economic matters, on an integrated basis in defence, and as nation states in 
diplomacy," institutional arrangements were no longer in harmony "and sometimes 
obstruct each other." Therefore the Atlantic nations "must find a solution for the 
management of their diversity... "
As seen from Europe, the main problems with Kissinger's declaratory approach 
to Alliance issues were:
- over-arching declarations tended not to be the way to resolve specific prob­
lems. The "hortatory rather than dynamic" approach was a blunt instrument.
Smart also makes the point that concrete suggestions about how to achieve an
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Alliance were absent. It suggested megaphone diplomacy rather than the inten­
tion to identify jointly problems and solutions35;
- the declaratory exercise would divert attention from the substantive issues 
facing the Alliance;
- the charter might tempt the US not to come to terms with the greater economic 
and political coherence to which the Community aspired. For some Community 
member states, the charter smacked of US paternalism, of the US still thinking in 
terms of a coherent "West" based on US military strength.
There was also a problem of timing. The implication that the charter should be 
completed in time to allow arrangements to go ahead for Nixon's proposed visit to 
Europe reinforced the European view that the deadline was dictated by domestic US 
concerns rather than the wish to take careful stock of how the Atlantic relationship had 
changed, particularly the greater significance of the EEC Nine within it. As Watergate 
concerns intensified - on 17 April Nixon was obliged to allow his White House staff to 
give evidence to the Senate Investigatory Committee, and Nixon himself was accused 
in the press for the first time on 23 April - Kissinger appeared to envisage something 
much more eye-catching than a lengthy period of thorough Alliance re-examination. As 
a result, the envisaged timetable made the Year of Europe "little more than a steeple­
chase of conferences and deadlines"36 with the obvious implication for Alliance capi­
tals that the exercise was designed to impress a domestic audience and not to take full 
account of the real shift in the balance of Alliance influence.
Two points in the April speech also directly influenced the political exchanges 
arising immediately from it: linkage, and how European unity fitted into the new 
Alliance concept. The "reality" of linkage of which Kissinger had spoken was an issue 
that was to damn the idea of a charter approach. It aggravated the EEC's sensitivities 
not only as regards US intentions but also about their own institutional rigidities and 
resulting inability to conduct a "globalised" negotiation. Furthermore, linkage carried 
with it associations of the disregard for Alliance interests shown by the US in August 
1971. Linkage "does not appeal to Europeans who see in it a method of exerting 
permanent pressure in economic negotiations, where no European retreat can bring any
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assurance that it will be the last."37 Although not articulated explicitly in April 1973, 
linkage of troops to trade issues eroded European confidence in the US's broader 
commitment to Europe; it was not seen as a substitute for detailed negotiation of prob­
lems in existing fora.
US insensitivity was evinced by Kissinger's description of a Europe which, in its 
economic relations, had increasingly stressed its regional personality whereas the US 
had to be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. Similarly, 
in political relations, whereas the US had global interests and responsibilities, those of 
West Europe were only regional (a statement he was later38 to characterise as descrip­
tive rather than prescriptive). So there was no clear agreement about how the Alliance 
would operate in defence of its interests out of the European theatre. The Kissinger 
view was simply that the Alliance needed to consider how widely its interests extend­
ed, but this failed to recognise how the force of circumstances might affect interpreta­
tion of Alliance obligations. The US had claimed throughout that Vietnam should have 
been a NATO interest; in 1956, some Europeans, in the face of US opposition, had 
regarded the Middle East as an area of proper NATO concern (a position reversed in 
October 1973)39.
While pledging US support for European unification, therefore, Kissinger failed 
to explain how the Nine would sustain an identity within the open international eco­
nomic order which the US sought without, for example, agricultural cooperation and 
close trading ties to Africa and the Mediterranean. At a time of renewed European 
impetus and commitment to achieve closer union by 1980, Kissinger was subordinating 
the goal of European unity to Atlantic solidarity. Indeed, Kissinger made this point 
explicitly:
"for us, European unity is what it has always been: not an end in itself but a 
means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European 
unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership. "40
Such language implied only conditional US support for European unity. It was a 
challenge to the Community to accept that its greater economic weight in the trans­
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atlantic dialogue did not alter its role in the Alliance. A Europe speaking with one 
voice was now seen as unnecessary if it said the same as the US, and dangerous if it 
did not. It created a situation in which, for Europe, future Alliance obligations such as 
those highlighted by Kissinger would invariably be set against the opportunities for 
greater European cohesion which might arise out of any given situation or crisis.
Kissinger's pointed references to European regionalism and to linkage made it 
difficult for the Nine (either individually or collectively) to decide how to respond 
immediately. "The Kissinger project is enough to send Europeans into the deepest of 
agonies, for nowhere are the Europeans' problems more apparent than when talk turns 
to a world role for this divided Community."41 Rather than an invitation jointly to re­
fashion relations, Kissinger's overture looked more like an initiative to reassert US 
authority within NATO. Lord Home's recommendation to the Prime Minister was that 
it looked both confusing and potentially sinister42. The ambiguity about Kissinger's 
real intentions underlying the speech only encouraged Europe to stall politely. Only 
with greater clarification could Europe start to form an opinion on the US initiative.
Partial clarification came in May with Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to Con­
gress. It made the point that 1973 was the Year of Europe "not because we regarded 
Europe as less important in the past or because we expect to overcome the problems in 
the Atlantic Community in any single year." But after 1969, "new trends affecting 
America's relations with Europe were already evident... both sides of the Atlantic had 
to recognise that a new balance of power in the world would challenge our unity... 
Can the principle of Alliance unity in defence and security be reconciled with the 
European Community's increasingly regional economic policies?"43 While containing 
no reference to a possible trip to Europe or to a new Atlantic Charter, Nixon did 
expand on US desiderata in the key alliance areas. In defence relations, these included 
a multilateral scheme for burden-sharing, NATO force improvements, and revision of 
NATO strategy in the light of any agreement on MBFR. On economics, Nixon went
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on to say, the Community tended to stress regional autonomy while the US stressed an 
open international system. Militarily, adjustment to the reality of nearly equal strategic 
balance with the Soviet Union was needed. Politically "we had not developed new 
principles to reconcile national objectives with demands for a unified Western policy 
[on detente]". The prospect of greater European unity required the US to take stock. 
"We assumed perhaps too uncritically that our basic interests would be assured by a 
long history of cooperation, by our common cultures and our political similarities." A 
comprehensive European-American dialogue was needed. The message was that each 
partner would need to subordinate a degree of individual regional autonomy to the 
pursuit of common objectives.
Initial reactions
Official reaction in European capitals was extremely cautious. French concerns 
about American tactics which appeared to link economic negotiation to a continued US 
military presence in Europe at its existing level were inevitably increased by the 
imprecision of what Kissinger meant by a new Atlantic Charter. The high-level politi­
cal reappraisal which Pompidou appeared to have endorsed in December 1972 had 
anticipated a dialogue of greater equality, given the enhanced negotiating power of the 
European Nine in the technical discussions which both he and Kissinger feared would 
drive the Alliance relations unless properly directed. Instead, Kissinger's comments 
were cast as the more familiar assertion of greater US influence and responsibilities, 
and the demand that Europe either foot the bill or suffer the consequences. The first 
comment of Pompidou was that France would examine the proposals "in the spirit 
which has always been ours, that of faithfulness to the Alliance in the context of re­
spect of our independence.,l44
British reactions were mixed and sounded a note of caution. The Foreign Office 
described it as an "important speech with a constructive intent," and made it clear that 
it would study Kissinger's proposals with their European partners. This unwillingness
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to be drawn was repeated when Kissinger passed through London in early May. Before 
offering any undertakings about the thoughts contained in Kissinger's proposals, the 
UK took the position that it would need discussions with other Community partners 
(notably Pompidou, whom Heath was scheduled to meet at the end of May).
Lord Home illustrated some of the UK's problems with the Kissinger initiative in 
a speech45 in Dunblane on 27 April. While welcoming the US's reaffirmation of its 
commitment to European defence and its support for European unification, he ex­
pressed concern that American haste could create turmoil in the Community and 
NATO. He warned against taking linkage too far ("established institutions are already 
working on most of the issues: the time-scales of their discussions differ") and attached 
importance to a collective response from the Community. "The Community has al­
ready demonstrated that its dynamism and sense of direction is strong. What is needed 
now is that its political cohesion should grow apace... " He stressed that Kissinger's 
proposals should not deflect Community timetables and that it was unrealistic to expect 
Community policies to coincide always with US views. "In an ideal world we would 
have chosen a different time-scale. We would have preferred that the new Community 
of Nine had the time to shake down and find its way towards common positions with 
greater deliberation." Coming from such a staunch Atlanticist, it was a frankly down­
beat assessment, and was noted as such in Washington.46
Although Brandt's impending visit to Washington gave the impression that there 
would be a constructive German response, the most quoted view in Bonn was that of 
Herbert Wehner, deputy chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, speaking in 
Stockholm on 26 April 1973, who described it as "an outline for a monster. I do not 
think Kissinger knows himself what he is trying to achieve." Likewise Soames, speak­
ing for the European Commission, was quoted as being of the view that "some critics 
may feel that too much was being handed down on tab lets of stone from the 
mountain. "47
Initial press comment focused on the presentation and the strong likelihood that
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the speech was a domestic stunt rather than a serious foreign policy initiative. David 
Watt in the Financial Times criticised the over-commercialistic approach, and suggest­
ed Kissinger focus on "quiet specifics and leave the unsettling realm of general exhor­
tation." While agreeing with Kissinger's emphasis on political relations, Watt suggest­
ed the lack of detail indicated that the US had "still not fully grasped what is needed, 
the difficulty of this task, or the nature of the Europeans' feelings which lie in the way 
of agreement. The Kissinger approach was one of proceeding from generalities to 
specifics. Far better to build up specifics from some agreed perception of need rather 
than become bogged down in specifics."48 The domestic economic context - for 
example, the administration's faltering anti-inflation programme - was also cited49 
among Nixon's problems, as well as his weakened prestige, an issue alluded to by 
Kissinger in saying that much would depend on how seriously foreign governments 
continued to take the president.
Traditional Gaullist themes were recalled in the French press. Le Monde com­
mented that the condescending American welcome of the European contribution to the 
East-West dialogue confirmed US intentions to keep control of that dialogue. It was 
necessary to establish the framework of European unity in order to deter the excesses 
of the US's interference50. French anxiety about increased US influence in the deci­
sion-making machinery of the Nine reflected in part its lack of confidence in the ability 
of its Community partners to resist the American incitement for action. Le Monde was 
thus to write:
"In proposing a global negotiation on relations among the US, Europe and Japan, 
President Nixon makes light of the existing institutions, none of which encom­
passes all aspects of the problem... It remains to be seen whether Europe can 
best find its own individuality through opposition to the US, as Paris still appears 
to believe, or by continuing to go along with the US, as Bonn believes."51
Le Figaro made the same point: "There is no doubt that London and Bonn will
show themselves to be favourable to this proposition which reunites the thoughts of the
British and German governments," and recalled the habitual French distrust of an
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Alliance "that could appear a bit like that between the wolf and the sheep, because of 
the specific weight of the main partner."52
This tone was in contrast to comment in the American press which saw "the 
seeds of a new Marshall Plan."53 But James Reston added that if the speech had been 
intended as a definitive statement of policy wherein Kissinger, like Marshall, laid out 
the problems facing the West and appealed for European assistance, the circumstances 
of the clarion call were singularly inappropriate. Kissinger had put a harder question to 
Europe than had Marshall. Rather than asking a weak Europe to cooperate to receive 
US aid, Kissinger was asking a strong Europe to take difficult decisions or else face 
the consequences of a spirit of retrenchment, nationalism and protectionism in Ameri­
ca. Reston also warned of the effect of Watergate on the initiative (the US "must not 
be surprised if the atmosphere in Washington affects the way that the Europeans inter­
pret this new overture and whether to reject it as a diversionary tactic").
Uncertainty in Europe's response was not evident, however, when Brandt visited 
Washington in late April. Recalling his advocacy of a US-European dialogue at the 
October 1972 summit ("Again and again in the last few years, I have called the subject 
of a regular dialogue between the West European community and America the key to 
our relations") Brandt, writing in The New York Times, recommended that the US 
regard the Europe of the Nine as if it were already one single partner54. He stressed 
the importance "of finding the highest working level possible for the discussion be­
tween the President... and the states... of Europe who wish to participate,"55 and 
raised also the possibility of a multilateral "super" summit to augment the series of 
bilateral summits which US officials originally had in mind. Brandt's support was not 
entirely unqualified, however. He avoided any reference to a new Atlantic Charter 
(which the German press interpreted as a diplomatic gain given the context of the first 
Atlantic Charter) and echoed Home's warning on linkage, recognising that while these 
issues were interdependent (a position still far beyond that of France) their handling 
should not be mixed up56.
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Apart from such minor issues as German reaction to the tactless US reference to 
an Atlantic Charter, and Bonn's obvious unease about the increasing closeness of the 
American relationship with the Soviet Union, the flames of US resentment were stoked 
principally by Britain and France. William Cromwell writes57, "The European reac­
tion to Kissinger's address crystallised around French and British resistance to linking 
trade, monetary and security issues in a single forum and declaration." Such an al­
liance of Franco-British interests against a US initiative was supporting evidence for 
Kissinger that the Year of Europe would be difficult to carry forward on the basis of 
support from the Germans and the minor NATO allies. It showed that the US had 
failed to lay the foundations with sufficient firmness.
Brandt's responsiveness to the Year of Europe proposal was not well-received by 
France. The Elysee ruled out such a global approach to the Alliance. More specifical­
ly, Brandt's ideas for a multilateral summit (floated without prior discussion in Europe) 
went against the French view that Europe should not fall into line automatically with 
US plans to institutionalise US-EEC relations. The prospect of such a multilateral US- 
Community summit in the autumn of 1973 was effectively eliminated by the Pompi- 
dou-Heath discussions in Paris on 22 May, at which Pompidou completely excluded 
any US-EEC summit, and was reluctant to agree to any examination of Alliance rela­
tionships, whether as part of work in existing fora or not.
Despite the expectation that Heath would seek to moderate French views (on the 
basis of Home's talks in Bonn the preceding week which agreed the need to respond 
constructively to Kissinger's ideas), the two agreed that substantial progress on the 
Alliance's trade issues, including adequate time for the Community to agree its own 
positions, should be a condition for considering such a summit. Although not ruled out 
entirely - and certainly not on the British side - a summit was regarded as premature 
and dependent on clarification of US intentions. Instead of a charter and a summit in 
the autumn providing the basis for resolving Alliance problems, the UK and France
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sought progress on substance before a summit could be contemplated. Kissinger's 
willingness to agree to this at Reykjavik suggested that he himself had no fixed idea on 
how his initiative would turn out in the end. But the muted European response to it (as 
a result of European deference to French concerns) was to lead Kissinger to write that, 
by May 1973 "prudence would have caused us to postpone our initiative."58
Reykjavik summit, 31 May - 1 June
The omens for the Nixon-Pompidou talks in Reykjavik were poor ("the best thing 
that can be expected... is that relations between Europe and the US do not actually get 
worse"59). That no major disagreement on Alliance issues resulted was attributable 
principally to the fact that US goals for the summit were procedural60: how to discuss 
a declaration of principles rather than the substance of any declaration. Seeking to gain 
at least minimal French agreement, the US modified its position and public expecta­
tions about US objectives altered. For instance, in his press conference of 29 May, 
Kissinger indicated he did not expect detailed agreement in Iceland. He still insisted 
that "over the past twenty years there have grown up a series of institutions in various 
fields whose manner of operation is not necessarily compatible," and made clear that, 
"briefly stated, the purpose is to adapt the Atlantic relationship to the conditions of the 
1970s and 1980s, to see which of the institutions that were formed in the 1940s and 
1950s need redefinition. The basic intention is to see whether we can define where... 
to go over the next ten years in the field of defence and the field of foreign policy, and 
to determine their relationship to each other." He did, however, go some way to ac­
cepting the French point that the Alliance should not seek a "coordinated negotiation" 
while each issue was dealt with separately at each level.
More telling was abandonment of reference to a new Atlantic Charter in favour 
of a much less ringing "declaration of principles." Again Kissinger did not see this 
omission as a reversal. Despite the salience of the charter proposal a month earlier, 
Kissinger was now apparently indifferent: "whether it is called a charter or some other
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document... is not an issue over which we should spend a great deal of time."61 Dilu­
tion of his earlier ideas again implied that they had been less than well thought out in 
the first place. "We never said we knew what the common objective is, only that we 
want to attempt to define it."62 On Anglo-French coolness toward a multilateral 
summit, Kissinger was also keen not to provoke apparently contrary positions. "It has 
never been put forward as a principal American objective"; it was precisely the Ameri­
can position that a summit meeting should be decided in the light of progress in de­
fence and trade negotiations.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's adviser both at the National Security Council 
and then in the State Department, described63 the administration's policy at this time 
as in a state of virtual free-fall, the priority being to keep the Year of Europe initiative 
alive, even in the absence of any realistic prospect of making early progress. Despite 
the US's limited objectives, the Reykjavik meeting generated only further confusion 
between US and French positions. The French opposed any Atlantic declaration and 
any multilateral discussion of Atlantic problems even through existing channels such as 
the North Atlantic Council (where the Kissinger proposal had been discussed briefly 
for the first time on 11 May, with agreement to seek clarification of what the Ameri­
cans really required of the allies). Ad hoc multilateral talks or the establishment of new 
channels were especially to be avoided, even on a Big Four format (usually a preferred 
French way of circumventing Alliance solidarity64). Discussion of Alliance reorganisa­
tion, according to French prescription, was thus to be confined to bilateral contacts, 
the least effective route in terms of how the US could project its influence on NATO 
(as opposed to Community) issues.
Reykjavik was also important in allowing both sides to put their cards on the 
table. The relevance of the immediate origins of Alliance difficulties (August 1971) to 
discussion in 1973 was not lost on either side. In return for American agreement in 
principle on the need for reform of the international monetary system, the French 
agreed to talk further about redefining Atlantic relations. But despite what Kissinger
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claimed to have been agreed about a meeting of NATO deputy foreign ministers in 
July (an idea already put forward by Nixon in April 1969), subsequent denials by 
France made clear this was not the case. According to Home, Pompidou had given 
general agreement to remarks by Kissinger on taking forward Alliance discussions in 
this way, but had not signed up to the specific proposal for such a multilateral session.
French insistence on solely bilateral channels in NATO - compared with its 
collective approach to US-Nine contacts - obliged Kissinger to take a longer-term view 
of the process of agreeing an Atlantic declaration. Multilateral discussions would be 
confined to much wider fora such as GATT, while bilateral talks (any one of which 
could in theory derail the initiative) would continue until multilateral discussion was 
justified - the position agreed by Heath and Pompidou in mid-May. Kissinger was far 
from sanguine at the prospects. Such an exhaustive round of bilateral meetings was a 
"procedural monstrosity... with no central focus and without any specific proposal."65 
France could continually delay bilateral progress, and were the US to table in existing 
fora any draft proposal, it would be accused of organising Europe against France and 
of seeking to dominate the NATO review process. The positions taken by France at 
Reykjavik confirmed its determination both to prevent progress on the initiative and, if 
it could not do so, to dissociate France from any conclusions which might be reached.
Conclusions of the first few weeks
For Kissinger, the initial six weeks of the Atlantic dialogue were highly unsatis­
factory. There was no European interlocutor, no agreed forum for discussion, and no 
draft document. Within a further six weeks, events were to slip out of his control. 
Because the US had invited Europe to organise a response rather than table US pre­
scriptions on 23 April 1973, the exercise had always been potentially hostage either to 
European prevarication or to a response which was framed in terms of a more autono­
mous Community within the fifteen members of NATO. Furthermore, by making a 
declaration a precondition of any Nixon visit to Europe, such a visit was now impaled
91
Chapter 3
procedurally. These constituted a double jeopardy for the administration, plus the fact 
that the Atlantic declaration would now take second place to the Nine's efforts to work 
out a formula which described its own identity. It was a prospect which the declaration 
idea had been designed, if not necessarily to avoid, certainly to neutralise, with the 
intention of making any such identity (whether written or not) more presentational than 
substantive66.
In advocating one general document, Kissinger had been directing his remarks to 
the fourteen NATO allies, with the US in a position to ensure progress through the 
normal multilateral and bilateral channels in Brussels. Washington's ability to divide 
and rule within the Nine required careful handling, however. It was to diminish as the 
underlying US objectives looked to make the EEC the victim of the Atlantic relation­
ship's variable geometry, undermining areas of Community competence, and outflank­
ing the Nine by addressing itself to the Alliance as a whole. At the same time, Kissing­
er underestimated the potential of the Nine to thwart this. "Kissinger had expected to 
be able to exploit his talent for bilateral manipulation, negotiating separately with nine 
(or fifteen) different foreign ministries on the basis of an American draft, playing one 
off against the other until a final document evolved."67 In practice this was to prove 
increasingly difficult as US and European immediate interests diverged throughout 
1973.
For France, there was no question of acquiescing in any schemes which might 
blur the Community's existence as separate from the wider Atlantic framework. Equal­
ly it could not accept the US's arresting - intentionally or not - the process of greater 
economic and political cohesion by confining the Community to little more than a 
generalised free trade area. By emphasising European cohesion, France could more or 
less impose its own terms for acceding to any EEC-US dialogue, while respecting (as it 
professed to do in the Atlantic forum in deference to the consensus there) those who 
did not want European identity to be framed in terms incompatible with the Alliance.
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But, because the walls between the Community and NATO were in practice fluid if 
doctrinally rigid, France could influence the dialogue only for as long as it could 
compete successfully with US influence over the other Community members. De Rose 
described68 the process as one in which France - having at one stage spoken for the 
Community consensus - overplayed its hand. Opposition to the declaration became for 
Jobert a matter of principle. From July 1973 to February 1974 events went France's 
way. Particularly during the October 1973 Middle East war and the immediate after- 
math, disaffection with the US become the basis of European cohesion. Thereafter, 
French diplomacy came badly unstuck.
Despite these undercurrents, the reference which had been made in the October 
1972 communique to a "distinct entity" was throughout taken by Kissinger to be no 
more than a vague aspiration. The US problem was, however, that even traditionally 
reliable Alliance partners were unwilling to pressure the French. The commitment of 
Heath and Brandt to Europe, and the circumstances in which they would acquiesce in 
French designs, was underestimated in Washington. Lord Home confirmed that, after 
the meeting of the Nine foreign ministers on 10 June (at which it was agreed that a re­
sponse to the US initiative would be deferred until July, and that the nine individual 
member states should avoid bilateral discussions with the US on the issue of US-Nine 
relations in the meantime), there was a definite shift in the emphasis of British policy 
toward European cohesion as a precondition for transatlantic cooperation. Kissinger 
commented later: "Heath was an unusual British leader in that he did not really value 
the American relationship... he was eager to demonstrate to the Europeans that he did 
not have a special relationship with the United States and, therefore, he went out of his 
way to reject any attempts to work with him on a special basis."69 Though this did not 
apply to Home and British officials, certainly Heath was unlikely to offer much help to 
the US. Even Home was unforthcoming at the NATO spring ministerial meeting in 
Copenhagen on 14-15 June 1974: "Let us proceed carefully, holding to what is good, 
improving what needs to be improved." Walter Scheel, the German foreign minister,
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supported by the Dutch, was more responsive, however, suggesting work begin on a 
draft declaration. In fact, earlier French inflexibility was tempered slightly in the 
Alliance forum70, and the meeting did agree to examine the Alliance relationship, but 
no-one was committed in advance to producing a declaration. Permanent representa­
tives were to examine only defence issues, working "without prejudice to continuing 
negotiation in other forums." It was agreed, much to French satisfaction, that NATO 
was an inappropriate forum for the entire US initiative. Rogers, expressing a wish not 
to get impeded by purely procedural issues, welcomed talks in any forum and was 
content with the communique's reference to reaffirming the "principles and objectives 
of the Alliance."
Although a fraction of what Kissinger had intended in April, this was nonetheless 
the most positive response to date. Joseph Luns, NATO secretary general, described 
the meeting as "broadly underwriting the position of the US," avoiding public disa­
greement on how to carry forward the administration's proposals. For France, the 
results of the NATO ministerial meeting were also satisfactory. Kissinger's maximalist 
position of conducting within NATO multilateral meetings at several levels had been 
put in abeyance in return for French acquiescence to NATO's studying revision of the 
Alliance (a limited retreat from Pompidou's position at Reykjavik). Such a minimal 
concession was enough to keep the Kissinger exercise moving forward and the French 
involved, but not much more.
Subsequent bilateral consultations throughout June and July provided evidence 
that the French tougher line persisted despite the Copenhagen meeting, an indication of 
French suspicion of US policy toward Europe in the light of agreements at the Nixon- 
Brezhnev summit in June 1973. Jobert's meetings with Kissinger on 8 and 29 June 
were marked by an absence of progress on the idea of a joint declaration, despite the 
texts which Kissinger had passed to Jobert. The Franco-German summit at the end of 
June confirmed their differences about an Atlantic summit, as well as a divergence of
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views over MBFR and international monetary reform.
In contrast to Jobert's discussions there, Scheel's visit to Washington in mid-July 
produced broad agreement on what a declaration should include, and on the desirability 
of a NATO summit at some stage (although Scheel expressed the view that a separate 
US-EEC declaration would be required, in deference to French concern to avoid link­
age of issues within NATO). Sir Donald Logan, at the time deputy permanent repre­
sentative to NATO, recalls the Germans' reporting afterwards that Nixon had insisted 
on an ad hoc summit involving the Alliance plus Ireland if he came to Europe, and that 
a declaration of "historical impact" should be issued to balance the conclusions of the 
CSCE summit (still envisaged for 1973). Such a declaration would also counter the 
growing belief that progress in US diplomacy was possible only with Moscow. The 
Germans also reported that the US administration was prepared to live with a European 
personality, but they warned that any Atlantic declaration would be killed off if the 
Europeans tried to negotiate it through established bureaucratic channels rather than at 
a political level throughout.
The Nine foreign ministers meet in Copenhagen, 23 July
Aside from US-related issues, the July meeting of the Nine's foreign ministers 
was significant in taking forward the Paris summit remit on intensifying institutional 
arrangements for political cooperation. Following on to the 1970 Davignon report on 
foreign policy cooperation, and drafted in the light of the agreement at Paris to in­
crease the frequency of ministerial meetings, the Copenhagen report of July 1973 set 
out many of the features of cooperation which have since become commonplace: 
frequent meetings of foreign ministers and political correspondents; cooperation in 
third countries; and a more rapid Community-wide communications network. In the 
months immediately after the Copenhagen meeting, the report proved to be the institu­
tional context of the Nine's decision to proceed with developing an identity71.
This was therefore a meeting which with hindsight had a decisive influence on
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the Year of Europe, codifying the sort of more intensive foreign policy cooperation to 
which the EEC would aspire in 1973 and beyond. It was agreed that, following up 
agreement on 20 June to develop a common position, the Nine would produce a draft 
declaration on US-EEC relations, and if Nixon did visit Europe, the Nine would be 
prepared to receive him, albeit in a way to be decided. In as far as this signalled the 
start of a possible US-EEC dialogue, however, the positive signs were weakened by 
the decision to undertake parallel work on a European identity (albeit one which - 
despite Jobert's opposition - would include a political evaluation of US-Community 
relations), and by the potentially far-reaching proposal to consult within the Nine 
before member states took a position on any major foreign policy issue.
French conditions for EEC involvement in a declaration were clear. Despite the 
Nine's agreement to produce a draft identity and declaration on Atlantic relations by 
their September meeting, Jobert was insistent that the Nine should not be pressured by 
the US. "There is plenty of time. This is a long-term matter, and in forming its own 
identity Europe must act independently of America. It is not necessary for the EEC to 
rush ahead to break its own identity simply because it is going to have contacts with 
the Americans."72 An identity as a precondition to more effective European political 
cooperation would be a guarantee of sorts that the US would not be able to stifle a 
more assertive Community. It would help to demonstrate that the Nine had a concerted 
foreign policy not just toward the US but to the world. Special links with the US would 
be excluded in favour of an all-encompassing definition.73
The Nine's decision to produce its own draft in September not only prevented 
any substantive work in Brussels on a NATO declaration until then, but also separated 
the Kissinger initiative into two elements, a declaration covering US ties to NATO, 
another for US-Nine relations. This subdivision, made without consultation with the 
US, was a compromise between the wish to press ahead with addressing relations 
across the board with the US, and the need to secure French approval by adoption of a 
cautious approach which prevented Washington's dictating the terms of the dialogue.
96
Opening diplomatic moves
The result was a minimalist response to the US, but as Scheel later explained to Kiss­
inger, it was as much as consensus would permit, given that France was not prepared 
to allow the Nine to invent an effective system of political cooperation solely at Ameri­
ca's bidding. With hindsight, more important was paragraph 10 of the Copenhagen 
report enjoining member states not to take a definitive stand on any foreign policy 
question (which in practice meant relations with the US) without consultation. Such an 
arrangement could be as strong only as its most recalcitrant member: but Kissinger saw 
an inherent danger that at times of greatest Alliance acrimony or when consultation 
was most needed, the Nine might seek common ground among themselves in resisting 
action on NATO channels.
The decision by the Nine to give priority to a US-EEC text, and to produce such 
a text in accordance with their own time-scale for ministerial meetings, produced the 
outcome which was most unwelcome to Washington: it deprived the Americans of the 
ability to exploit their strong (linkage-related) bargaining position, and took away the 
initiative from Kissinger. Lord Home particularly recalls Kissinger's criticism (again 
overestimating British influence in the Nine) of the British for agreeing to a separate 
exercise in the Nine, and for failing to put forward a draft declaration in order to set 
work in hand in either or both bodies. Kissinger claimed that the agreement between 
Nixon and Heath at their February summit to pursue US-Alliance objectives had not 
been honoured74. In response to the decisions at Copenhagen, Nixon, in a letter to 
Brandt, indicated his disappointment with the allied response to date and its having 
been based on discussions among the Nine, the contents of which had not been dis­
closed to Washington even by the UK; the unacceptability of the procedure for cooper­
ation envisaged by the Nine; and America's decision to do nothing either bilaterally or 
multilaterally until after the September meeting of the Nine75.
The Nine's declaration: September 1973
Out of this uncertainty, the Copenhagen meeting of the Nine foreign ministers on
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10-11 September produced a qualified success for Kissinger: movement in responding 
to the US initiative, albeit heavily qualified procedurally and substantively by French 
reluctance. Three papers were agreed:
- a draft definition of European identity based on French, British and Irish texts. 
The identity, to be kept under continual review (and therefore not to be regarded 
as solely a contribution to the Year of Europe) was designed initially to reflect 
three elements: the cohesion of the Nine; its external relations; and the dynamic 
character of the European Community. Knut Borge Andersen, Danish foreign 
minister, characterised it as the basis of a constructive dialogue with the US;
- a list of ten issues for discussion with the US including monetary, trade and 
economic issues, cooperation on science and technology, East-West trade, rela­
tions with the Third World, and international relations generally (with particular 
reference to the Nine's cooperation within the CSCE). The notable omission 
was, predictably, defence;
- a draft of US-Nine relations, largely a British text with French influence, with 
NATO-related issues excluded. Its form was a political preamble drawing on the 
Identity followed by an expansion of the ten issues where cooperation was to be 
intensified. Although the political elements had been completed, COREPER (the 
EC's Comite des Representants Permanents) still had to finalise passages cover­
ing economic relations, particularly trade.
The intention was for this draft to be presented to US officials at the end of 
September and taken forward in discussion between Kissinger and Andersen, as chair­
man of the Council of Ministers. There was no reference to any meeting between EEC 
ministers and Nixon, and nothing about a presidential visit to Europe.
This dialogue would be the first time the Nine had used a single spokesman in 
order to organise relations with a third country. It was, said Home a "completely new 
kind of diplomacy," albeit agreed on the understanding that Andersen had powers only 
to inform and note US comments but not to negotiate. For Kissinger, this created a 
situation in which Europe had responded to the Year of Europe initiative with a proce­
dure in which "those who talked with us were not empowered to negotiate, while those 
who did have authority would not talk to us."76 It confirmed his suspicions of the 
potential for the Community to become introspective, protectionist in both economic 
and foreign policy. "Instead of revitalising consultations, we were invited to a bureau­
cratic exercise that stifled it," said Kissinger. Conducting the dialogue through the
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presidency put at risk the political rationale of the Year of Europe, particularly since 
Andersen had been instructed to propose to Kissinger that the future negotiations on 
the draft declaration take place at the political director level, so abandoning one of the 
principal purposes of the Year of Europe of ensuring a high-level review of the overall 
relationship. "No document symbolising a new era could possibly emerge from such a 
process... the political directors are civil servants: they cannot make political deci­
sions."77
A further procedural obstacle to negotiation on the basis of the EEC draft was its 
publication in the New York Times78. (In private conversation, the main players, Lord 
Cromer apart, assumed the disclosure was by the US administration.) From then on 
amendments to it would be publicly accountable on a win-or-lose basis. Sonnenfeldt 
argues that the US had no real incentive for the leak since it would make it more diffi­
cult to reconcile US and European views. On the other hand, exposure of the European 
text would enable Kissinger to explain why his April initiative had failed to make any 
real progress79.
On substance, not only did the separation of the declaration idea into two deprive 
the original initiative of its political force, but also on the basis of the Nine's propos­
als, the European minimalist contribution was highly unlikely to meet US require­
ments. Kissinger regarded the text purely as a summary of the Community's October 
1972 communique and its mandate for the GATT talks (as indeed was the case, as 
Soames claimed to have forewarned in March 1973). The US was being asked to 
recognise the Community as "a distinct entity"; there was no mention of interdepend­
ence or Atlantic partnership or to the need to strengthen them. The absence of any 
reference to defence was "the most conspicuous way in which the Copenhagen text 
failed to come up to Kissinger's expectations."80 Privately, Kissinger was quoted as 
saying "How can you expect me to accept this?"81 Publicly he affirmed the importance 
of the Nine's document. "The United States recognises that this first attempt by Europe
99
Chapter 3
to speak with one voice on a political matter in trans-Atlantic relationships is an event 
of the greatest significance... [the Copenhagen meeting would be seen] as one of the 
decisive events of the post-war period." He reserved the US "right to its own opinion" 
about the draft, however. Further, while asserting concern "to produce documents of 
historic significance," Kissinger acknowledged a Nixon visit to be unlikely in 1973, 
with the disclaimer that it "was not an end in itself."82
Discussion of the US-Nine and NATO declaration begins
Kissinger's agreement to continue the US-Nine declaration at political director 
level led to the Nine's meeting with Walter Stoessel, assistant secretary for European 
affairs at the State Department, in Washington on 29 September when the latter pre­
sented US amendments to the Nine's draft83. In describing the draft as "very thin," 
the US pressed the issue of Atlantic partnership and interdependence and called for the 
development of "consultative and cooperative arrangements for the joint management 
of economic and political problems." Hence paragraph 6:
"... relationships in all spheres are mutually interdependent... challenges and 
opportunities of the future can be most effectively met jointly by policies and 
actions based on a spirit of partnership";
and paragraph 13
"The Nine and the US will develop their mutual relations in a spirit of close and 
equal partnership, thereby contributing more effectively to a more effective 
Atlantic community."
The US was insisting that a defining characteristic of the Nine be a closer coop­
eration with the US than with any other country. Stoessel made the point that Kissing­
er had not proposed a US-Nine declaration, but if there was to be one, it would need to 
address the political and economic issues which the NATO declaration would not. It 
was not enough for the eight Community members inside NATO to define themselves 
individually as partners of the US, and not do so collectively in a draft of US-Nine 
relations. The Nine could not define themselves as part of a special relationship in the 
military, but not political, realm. Against this, France argued that to reaffirm close
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links with the US inside NATO was merely to recognise the existing reality. To 
undertake a parallel declaration in the Nine reaffirming a similar special relationship 
would, in the circumstances of the Community's enlargement, be a new departure. 
Militarily, the Soviet Union was the threat to the Nine, elsewhere it was the US who 
were most likely to stifle a European personality.
After five months, formal multilateral dialogue between the Nine and US had 
begun. Little more could be said, however. On 11 October the Nine political directors 
met to consider US revisions, and on 18 October they met Stoessel in Copenhagen to 
inform him that the US amendments had been rejected.
In comparison, progress with the NATO declaration, though no less difficult, 
was marginally more productive. The US draft, passed to the British and French in 
June and presented to NATO in July, had covered economic and political issues. It was 
rejected on 9 August. Britain then submitted an innocuous draft, drawing on earlier 
drafts from the Federal Republic and the Netherlands. On 16 August the US was 
reported to have circulated further "rough and tentative" ideas bilaterally to Alliance 
members. A Canadian draft tabled in September showed that the non-EEC members of 
NATO were of the view that non-defence issues should be included in the deliberations 
of the Fifteen. The draft covered economic and political issues with a broad political 
introduction focusing in particular on the Alliance's democratic ideals, a view the 
Canadians were to insist be reflected in the Ottawa declaration the following year, 
which, if taken literally, had implications for continued Greek and Portuguese mem­
bership84.
The result was that by mid-September little concrete work had been done, an 
impasse resolved only with the Nine's decision to produce two declarations. With that 
distinction agreed, France tabled a draft NATO declaration on 3 October limited to 
defence issues. Unlike the Canadian draft, the French text (entirely the work of 
Francois de Rose, undertaken, he says, as a personal favour to Kissinger, albeit with
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Jobert's full knowledge) made no mention of economic issues or burden-sharing. 
While affirming French support of the US military role ("there is no alternative to the 
security provided by US nuclear forces, whether they are based in the US or Europe"), 
it also referred to a possible European defence role. Nonetheless, given de Rose's 
sta tus, it was greeted by K issinger as "a very m ajor advance in the NATO 
discussions," despite its lack of political content. Indeed, according to Sir Donald 
Logan, it was only with the French draft that any enthusiasm emerged for trying to 
make a success of the process85.
This more promising phase was ended by the war in the Middle East, after which 
the tone and substance of the Alliance discussion changed from a largely theoretical 
exercise in imaginative drafting to a more intensified need to reconcile divergent posi­
tions, first in policy discussions and then on paper. European concern that they were 
being asked to support a policy on which they had not been consulted competed with 
Kissinger's counter-claims that Europe had acted "as if the Alliance did not exist."86 
At France's suggestion, drafting of the Alliance declaration stopped on 26 October 
ostensibly to allow delegations to refer back to capitals. Work restarted on 14 Novem­
ber 1973 when Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel passed through Brussels en route to Copenha­
gen for talks with the political directors of the Nine. France tabled a new declara­
tion87 of principles which referred to a "just sharing" of Alliance costs and the need to 
remove the sources of economic conflict among the allies. This draft, however, dif­
fered little from the October draft in its analysis of Europe's security. The US-Soviet 
nuclear declaration of 22 June 1973 and the inference of superpower condominium 
remained an obsession with Jobert, and the French draft referred to Europe's defence 
as "gradually taking on a dimension of its own." While still reliant on the US, the 
French text referred in paragraph 8 to the prospect that the evolution of the EEC 
should "in due course favourably affect the contribution that its member nations, which 
are at the same time members of the Atlantic alliance, make toward defence." The 
reference therefore to a just sharing of costs was indicative more of a warning that
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superpower detente might necessitate a separate European defence dimension. Al­
though there were references to "one and indivisible" and to "common goals," these 
were predicated on there being a separate US-Nine formula, and so restricted entirely 
to the security context.
End-of-year prospects
By the end of 1973 it was clear that American and European attitudes to the 
Alliance's robustness and future evolution were fundamentally different. The US saw 
the need for major changes to preserve Western political and military solidarity at a 
time of reduced US-Soviet tension and of US disenchantment domestically with foreign 
commitments. The Europeans understood the rationale for change but feared the 
financial implications of what Washington wanted, and the prospect of such changes' 
undermining European unity and self-confidence. As a result, the status quo suited 
their interests much better than any policy designed to change it. European capitals 
sought to confine change to the minimum needed to retain US military support for 
Europe, while keeping open their own options on a more unified and so influential 
Community. At odds in Europe was what constituted minimal change. The French 
were disposed to change nothing in response to US pressure. Germany was more flexi­
ble until it came to changes in NATO military strategy and increases in their own 
ground forces. The UK felt most sympathy for US wishes, but neither wished to meet 
the cost nor believed others would do so. It was, in short, a recipe for paralysis.
There were lessons already to be drawn about the frankness of diplomatic ex­
changes up to then. Although disagreement had probably been inevitable, high-level 
discussions were too brief to get to the heart of complex problems. Rather than the 
retention of bilateral contacts between Washington and individual European capitals, as 
Kissinger would have hoped, there seemed to be a need for a more systematic and 
methodical approach to US-European relations precisely along the lines of what had 
been proposed by the Nine foreign ministers in July 1973, to which Kissinger attribut­
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ed directly so much of the blame for his initiative's problems. These trends were still 
heavily encoded in the autumn of 1973. The degree of resistance in the Nine to reaf­
firming Alliance objectives was such that, as Kissinger later acknowledged, "it took us 
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Trade and monetary negotiations
A  snapshot o f  1973
Increasing economic and monetary difficulties between Europe and the US were 
among the principal driving forces behind the US administration's policy in the early 
1970s of reviewing the overall Alliance relationship, particularly how well the relation­
ship served US domestic economic objectives. One means for the resolution of these 
difficulties was the technical negotiations at official level, to which Pompidou and 
Kissinger had already referred in their discussions in December 1972 as being inade­
quate for the Alliance's wider political purpose. These negotiations continued under 
their own momentum in the absence of any agreement on what might be a better alter­
native, and although not discussed in Kissinger's account, they became a decisive 
factor in the handling of the diplomacy of the Year of Europe. They did so by influ­
encing the willingness of either side to give ground on issues on which the European 
Nine were in a stronger position Vis a Yis tlje US than elsewhere. At a time when 
economic considerations underlay the state of the Alliance, the impasse over the costs 
and benefits of interdependence impinged directly on such issues as the future of US 
forces in Europe.
The emphasis in negotiations and an attempt to find quick solutions was on trade 
where the problems did lend themselves to a solution as part of overall Alliance 
management. Progress within the sort of timescale envisaged by Kissinger may have 
proved possible, but the first attempts at international monetary reform in the new 
world of floating exchange rates were less amenable to inclusion in a political package. 
Monetary negotiations were a factor behind the separate discussion on off-setting the 
costs of US military commitment to Europe and funding economic stability in the wake 
of the energy crisis. Negotiators and those seeking to give political impetus to the
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monetary negotiations were continually left behind by the pace of developments as the 
old regime collapsed under intensified - and in the case of oil prices, new - strains.
For the US, the perspective was of greater European economic strength, and 
therefore of a correspondingly greater capacity to bear the burdens of Alliance defence 
and the international free trade system. This was combined with the domestic impera­
tive of the strong feeling both in the administration and in Congress that the interna­
tional economic framework of the first post-war generation and the interdependence of 
the Atlantic economic relationship was not working in the US's interests. The interna­
tional monetary system was no longer based on fixed parities, and the international 
trading system was no longer characterised by the principle of non-discrimination. 
The twin pillars of the post-war economic system had become less able to sustain 
changed economic conditions, both internationally and particularly between North 
America and West Europe. Restoring or reforming them was not an undertaking which 
the US was willing to face alone given that it was the US which regarded itself as the 
principal casualty of change1. The popular American belief, said Alastair Buchan, was 
that "they had become the economic sick man of the West while still being required to 
carry the major share of its defence burdens."2 Raymond Vernon, in describing the US 
as a rogue elephant in the Atlantic forest, ascribed US policy to the mistaken belief that 
the vulnerability of the economy to outside pressures signified economic weakness and 
therefore a requirement to seek redress3. It supported also the apparent effect of inten­
sified international relations, the "loss of control" factor. The new tasks for govern­
ment made it more difficult to accept "the intrusions of international economic integra­
tion on national economic policy."4 Aspirations for greater control and for increased 
interdependence went hand in hand.
The background to trade relations in 1973
The relatively low profile of economic issues in the 1950s and 1960s (the "dual 
track", whereby international economic issues in the West were largely immune from
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competing political pressures) and the general acceptance of the view that trade con­
cessions should be negotiated for their own sake and not bargained against other 
elements of the Atlantic relationship reflected the success of the GATT and Bretton 
Woods system and of US policy to accelerate European recovery. From the Marshall 
plan, through support for the ideas of Schumann, De Gasperi and Monnet, up to the 
Kennedy Grand Design, the US had supported greater economic cooperation in Europe 
as complementary to the security provided by the Alliance. As its partners began to 
rival the US, however, and interdependence meant that "high" and "low" politics 
became more tightly intertwined, the political and economic consequences of this blank 
cheque became increasingly difficult for the US administration to justify5.
The Kennedy round, by sharply reducing world tariffs, had revealed the impor­
tance of non-tariff barriers as a surreptitious means to restrict imports. Against US 
accusations of a protectionist EEC there were European counter-claims for elimination 
of such American non-tariff barriers as "voluntary restraints" (import quotas) on cer­
tain products, the "American selling price" for certain chemicals, and the "Buy Ameri­
can Act" (concerning US government procurements), as well as export subsidies to US 
companies. Because the Kennedy round had focused essentially on industrial products, 
it also threw into relief the importance of trying to achieve a further liberalisation of 
agricultural trade. By 1971, for the first time since 1893, not merely the overall bal­
ance of payments but also the underlying US trade balance was in deficit. European 
and Japanese imports were penetrating what had been thought of, as recently as the 
early 1960s, as the very citadels of US industrial power: steel, automobiles, electronics 
and consumer durables. By 1971, more than a million American jobs had been alleged­
ly "exported" in the preceding five years6. The position had become untenable given 
apparently declining US economic prospects and the political fall-out from Vietnam. 
With the UK's entry into the Community assured, unqualified US support for an en­
larged Community which could erode the US's trading position came to an abrupt end.
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Although it is normal practice in the 1990s, the shock for the Community was 
that Nixon's policy of 15 August 1971 had explicitly put US interests first. After an 
attitude of discreet encouragement for greater integration in the 1960s, the US now 
counted the costs - and sought compensation - for the results of that integration7. 
French proposals for a Community summit in 1972 - eventually delayed until October - 
were tabled in August 1971 as a direct response to the Nixon economic package. It was 
a summit designed to persuade the Nine to agree to a timetable for European Union by 
1980. This would allow it to defend itself against American dollar diplomacy and 
against the American ability to influence the pace of Community exchange rates and 
economic cooperation by virtue of the importance of the dollar and US markets to the 
European Nine. French determination to secure member states' agreement to a collec­
tive response to the US dollar offensive and a common front in international economic 
negotiations was regarded as the Community's most appropriate response to the new 
US economic challenge. Although, in the event, the Paris summit conclusions were 
not drafted in anti-American terms, and indeed referred to the need for constructive 
discussions, the English response to the Year of Europe was directly rooted in the 
president's initiative of 1971 and the Community's resulting commitment to European 
Union.
The effect as the linkage between economic, political and security issues became 
closer in the late 1960s and early 1970s was that, as US economic difficulties in­
creased, other parts of the Alliance relationship suffered8. In the US the situation was 
one in which "unemployment, inflation and worry about the balance of payments 
stimulate policies that pay no regard to the interests of foreigners. Between the close 
of the Kennedy round in 1967 (which resulted in an average tariff reduction of 35%) 
and the ending of dollar convertibility in 1971, American presidents did not treat for­
eign economic policy as a matter of first political importance except in crises... the 
neglect gave way to an approach in which an appreciation of political significance is 




Three issues dominated the trade negotiations in 1973/74:
- the preparations for the GATT round, which - unlike previous tariff-reducing 
rounds - would be approached in the US with the specific intention of protecting 
the US trading position;
- the implications of the boom in primary commodity prices and the sharp escala­
tion in the price of oil (alongside accelerating inflation which averaged 12% in 
industrial countries in the first half of 1974);
- the mini-GATT talks under Article 24(6) whereby the US sought compensation 
for the altered tariff levels of the new Community members and for its devalua­
tions. It was this - parochial to the Alliance - which dominated much of the 
discussion, reflecting directly the problem of how an enlarged EEC would be 
able to formulate an external trade policy consistent with Atlantic ties. The diffi­
culty of finding common ground did not augur well for the broader GATT talks.
An unexpected element in this agenda was the commodity boom which changed 
the context of economic discussions. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) variable 
levies on meat and dairy products became largely irrelevant as world prices continued 
to rise. Export controls as a means to guarantee domestic supply, but at a cost of 
generating inflationary pressures overseas, were deployed on two notable occasions in 
1973 by the US (for soybeans) and, more spectacularly, they became a political 
weapon for Arab oil producers seeking diplomatic support from the West. In their 
different ways the US and Arab actions had far-reaching political and economic impli­
cations for the Alliance. Furthermore, because GATT had been largely concerned 
with reducing tariff barriers, handling export controls in 1973 was something for 
which it was less well equipped. GATT explicitly forbade such controls except in 
times of world shortage, but institutional management of export controls had never 
effectively existed, which meant that the Europeans had little recourse to rules of 
international trade in seeking effective redress.
As much as global inflation encouraged the use of export controls as a means to 
insulate the domestic economy, so the increased political content of economic policy­
making strongly reinforced use of such a tool. The US economic offensive of August- 
December 1971 and the Arab oil boycott of October 1973-March 1974 demonstrated
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that linkage of economic and security issues was real and not just potential. For 
Washington also, controls on soya were illustrative of the results of a "loss of control". 
There was a price to be paid: US restrictions on supply were an irritant to Atlantic 
relations. They suggested that the US commitment to freer trade under the Tokyo 
round was heavily qualified, and reinforced the concern that the US in its Alliance 
diplomacy was motivated primarily by the determination to secure concessions from 
Europe in order to redress a trading relationship which was now regarded as inade­
quate. This, plus the fact that negotiations within GATT and the IMF were unsuited to 
resolving the politicised Atlantic economic disputes, meant that the objectives which 
the US had been optimistically seeking as part of Kissinger's Year of Europe initiative 
were to be frustrated. To say that "NATO is suffering from an identity crisis exacer­
bated not only by detente but by the emerging dominance of economic issues in Atlan­
tic relations"10 was no more than a statement of fact. But when Kissinger went on to 
compare European regionalism with the US's wider commitments in the monetary and 
trade system and "the gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major 
economic disputes which must be ended and be replaced by a determined commitment 
on both sides of the Atlantic to find cooperative solutions," this heightened the EEC's 
defensiveness. It saw "redefinition" as the culmination of a decade of US criticism of 
the Community's main economic achievements - the customs union and the Common 
Agricultural Policy.
Monetary turmoil: 
the end of the December 1971 Smithsonian agreement
With the increasing divergence of US domestic economic policy and the policies 
required to sustain the dollar's value on the currency markets, US determination to 
preserve the dollar's status was seen, particularly in France, as a way for America to 
retain authority over Europe and the other main trading partners11. The decisions of 
August 1971, designed to protect the US's external account and end the pressure on the
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dollar (by suspending dollar convertibility and imposing a 10% import surcharge), had 
made the dollar the central issue of international monetary reform. The effect had been 
to signal the vulnerability of its continuity role as a reserve currency in a world of 
fixed exchange rates. The December 1971 Smithsonian agreement on dollar devalua­
tion was the first step to end an era dating from 1934 in which a fixed price for the 
dollar had been the basis of the international monetary system. Unlike its counterparts 
in Europe and Japan, the US showed growing support for an end to the post-war Bret- 
ton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange-rates, and its replacement by a 
system of permanently and cleanly floating currencies12. The protectionist lobby in 
Washington believed that devaluation of the dollar, while itself not sufficient to protect 
US jobs or correct the trade deficit, would at least force the US's trading partners to 
take its concerns seriously, although in due course new rules would be required. 
Without these, the benefits of a stronger dollar in 1973 would be dissipated by compet­
itive depreciation of European currencies, as a result of the continuing asymmetrical 
pressures inherent in the system13.
The evidence for this was the fact that the dollar devaluation of 1971 and prom­
ises of trade and monetary reform had not given the US the manoeuvrability it required 
to restore its external account. The most immediate problem remained European reluc­
tance to allow the US to devalue the dollar by what the administration regarded as a 
sufficient amount to correct the trade deficit14. The large volume of dollars held 
overseas made intervention in support of a particular dollar value highly problematic, 
despite the wider currency margins agreed at Smithsonian. As a result15, strains in the 
system re-emerged in the second half of 1972 (starting with the sterling float in June 
1972) and by January 1973 had led to a two-tier arrangement for the lira and the float­
ing of the Swiss franc. In that month also, the US trade figures for 1972 revealed the 
worst-ever deficit ($6-9 billion, treble the 1971 deficit). The figures for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, on the other hand, showed a trade surplus for 1972, up 25% on 
that for 1971.
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Hence the agreements negotiated by Paul Volcker, under-secretary for monetary 
affairs at the US Treasury, for the second dollar devaluation, by 10% against the 
special drawing rights (SDR) and the floating of the yen which brought about the end 
of the Smithsonian Agreement on 12 February 197316. This was followed by the 
decision of six of the Community member states to float their currencies jointly against 
the dollar, bringing about an end to the regime of fixed exchange rates on 13 March 
1973. The 10% dollar devaluation was accompanied by further US demands that in 
the future the US be given a "fair shake" in trade questions and by hints that, although 
the US would seek to support the dollar at the March 1973 parity, a further dollar 
devaluation might be needed. In this context, the Europeans' apprehension about 
Kissinger's message to Europe the following month that a joint reappraisal of the 
Alliance was now essential was understandable.
The new realities of monetary cooperation
The currency crisis in late 1972/early 1973 undermined the working assumptions 
of 1972 about the shape of the future monetary system17. In the wake of the first 
dollar devaluation it had appeared possible that IMF rules could be redrafted to permit 
small but frequent changes in parities. For instance, at the annual IMF/World Bank 
meeting in September 1972, the US had proposed a formula whereby a country which 
was continually in trade deficit would lose its access to special drawing rights. A coun­
try with disproportionate reserves "could," said George Shultz, US Treasury Secre­
tary, "lose its right to demand conversion, unless it undertook at least limited devalua­
tion or other acceptable measures of adjustment."18 Nixon's Foreign Policy Report of 
May 1973 drew attention to this adjustment mechanism as having "important foreign 
policy implications." A system was envisaged in which the EEC currencies and those 
of the other leading industrialised countries would be adjusted - frequently if necessary 
- in an orderly way under the superintendence of a strengthened IMF. This prescription
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had looked increasingly dated once the currency crisis of early 1973 had showed that 
capital flows were exceeding in volume the ability of central banks to absorb them. As 
Robert Triffin observed at the time, "Foreign central banks could not be expected to 
commit themselves indefinitely to abandon control of their money-printing presses to 
the vagaries of unpredictable US deficits. Over the three years 1970-72, their direct 
accumulation of dollar balances as reserves ($45*5 billion) financed 85 % of the US 
budgetary deficits ($53-6 billion)..." The crucial decision in the monetary discussions 
of 1973/4 was the Community's joint float against the dollar in March 1973, since this 
"adjusts realistically the institutional exchange rate system to the facts of life."19
In the monetary field, therefore, the fundamental issue was an ideological one: 
international order (stable exchange rates and increased powers for the IMF) versus 
sovereign flexibility (floating exchange rates). Whereas most US experts favoured the 
former, Europeans were divided between the proponents of "law and order" and those 
advocating "anarchy." Hence US priorities were for automatic currency changes to 
maintain a stable balance of payments and for phasing out gold in favour of SDRs, 
whereas most Europeans opposed the use of objective indicators (such as the level of 
national reserves) as the trigger to currency changes, and pressed for general converti­
bility of currencies, including the dollar, while opposing the demonetisation of gold.
An essential element of the Smithsonian package had been the commitment made 
by America's partners to start the process of monetary reform in 1972 and to begin 
multilateral trade negotiations in 1973. The US believed its monetary problems result­
ed from an inequitable trading system and a monetary system in which there was less 
pressure on surplus countries than on deficit countries to adjust policy and so restore 
equilibrium. Hence Nixon described the "strong action" of August 1971 as the prelim­
inary to "thoroughgoing reform," in which the trade element would play the major 
part. The EEC had, however, little interest in any multilateral negotiation on trade 
which might compromise its objectives of enlargement and resulting internal adjust­
ment. As well as the possibility of the negotiability of CAP with GATT, there were
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intra-Community divisions between France and Germany over the feasibility of a move 
toward new tariffs, with France arguing for the sanctity of the common external tariff 
(CXT) as the cement of European enterprises and the factor which gave substance to 
the Community's preferential agreements with third countries. Soames made the point 
to the European Parliament on 4 April 197320 that "we must bear in mind that trade is 
one of the few matters on which at present the Community can, and indeed must, 
speak with one voice. And it is therefore through negotiations of this character that the 
Community can develop its personality and make its political impact and contribution 
to world affairs." For Soames, the chief concerns were the CXT's necessity for the 
Community's identity, fear of Japanese competition, and the need to preserve the 
EEC's competitiveness against a depreciating dollar. Furthermore the EEC's interest 
lay in monetary reform which replaced, rather than restored, the dollar as the centre of 
the monetary system, either by using a new numeraire like SDRs or by a return to 
gold. Only this would allow greater economic and monetary cooperation in Europe to 
be divorced from the vagaries of the dollar rate.
Despite these different priorities, joint declarations were submitted to GATT in 
February 1972 in which the US, the EEC and Japan undertook to initiate and actively 
support multilateral and comprehensive negotiations within the GATT framework in
1973. Any such negotiations, the declarations stated, would be conducted on the prin­
ciple of "mutual advantage and mutual commitment to overall reciprocity."
Europe's nervousness that the US would use the dollar's decisive role in the 
international monetary system to secure trade concessions was one argument against 
linkage of Alliance issues and an argument for ending the dollar's centrality. Theirs 
was the perception of US policy as "animated by cunning and fear. "21 There were 
different views within the Community, however. Pompidou's conviction, for instance, 
had always been that Europe could not be genuinely independent until it had a common 
monetary policy which reduced its dependence on the dollar. Preparations for the
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October 1972 summit had shown that other member states had different priorities such 
as the need for political union to precede closer economic and monetary cooperation, 
Despite the agreement to narrow intra-Community exchange rate margins in early 
1972, the French suspicion remained that other member states did not take monetary 
union as seriously as Paris. The floating of sterling in June 1972 and German insist­
ence on parallel progress on the much longer-term objective of economic union and its 
opposition to joint Community rules for control of capital inflows were cases in point. 
French proposals for a significant increase in the price of gold so as to give it a greater 
role (in intra-Community transactions at least) and become the quickest way to end 
European dependency on the dollar were also opposed, notably by the Federal Repub­
lic which - like the US - wanted to reduce the role of gold and increase that of SDRs.
While these polarised views on money and trade demonstrated to Kissinger the 
need for a new "commitment of political will" to take economic matters out of the 
hands of technicians, he underestimated the difficulty of reaching solutions to the 
Alliance's trade relations, and the role of technicians in unravelling the complexity of 
trade issues. It is a fair criticism that Kissinger's economic blind spot (such as his 
much-quoted criticism22 of the primacy of economics in international relations) pre­
vented a full appreciation of the importance of such issues. Kissinger's handling of the 
Soviet Union and China had only reinforced his views that agreement in detail and at 
the highest level was the quickest way to reach detailed solutions. It was a blind spot 
which, said C F Bergsten, made Kissinger an anachronism23. Furthermore, the con­
straints of Community competence in certain areas were a factor against blurring of 
political/economic/defence issues. For France, especially, such distinctions were 
emblematic of the respective status of national sovereignty and collective decision­
making.
Trade: the consequences of enlargement: 
Article 24(6) and GATT
Despite improvements in the US trade position compared with 1972, 1973 was
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the year when Washington began to apply real pressure on the Community. Although 
it was with Japan and Canada that the US ran an adverse balance of trade (hence Kiss­
inger's wish to include Japan in his new Atlantic Charter), America's frustrations were 
directed toward Europe as the economic superpower in the making. Structural prob­
lems arising from the proliferation of discriminatory trade agreements with another 50 
countries, the workings of the CAP, and enlargement coincided with US concerns 
about its trade imbalance and an overvalued dollar. Yet the improbability of progress 
in monetary reform applied equally to multilateral trade negotiations. In previous trade 
talks since 1945 the US had taken the initiatives and sanctioned the progress as conces­
sionaire rather than demandeur. In the early 1970s, US balance of payments difficul­
ties provided the impetus to the negotiations24.
Separate from the multilateral trade round were the compensation negotiations, 
which began in March 1973. These were carried out under Article 24 paragraph 6 of 
GATT which provided for evaluation and eventually compensation for GATT countries 
affected by EEC enlargement, and as far as Washington was concerned its preferential 
free trade area arrangements with the six EFTANs and preferential links with most 
countries on the rim of the Mediterranean basin25. Article 24(6) was cited in the joint 
US-EEC declaration of February 1972 which stated that "the US reaffirmed its right to 
seek compensation for any trade discrimination which might arise from the enlarge­
ment of the EEC in 1973," specifically UK adoption of the Common Agriculture 
Policy26.
Although the principle of the US's right to trade concessions had been accepted, 
these negotiations came at a time of damaging internal disputes about the CAP's fu­
ture, notably French (that is, the agriculture minister Chirac's) resistance to German 
demands to reduce the agricultural budget. The EEC's initial response to US claims, 
presented to GATT on 2 January 1973, was uncompromising. When there were six 
members, said the EEC, agricultural imports had risen 51% in the periods 1961-63 and
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1969-71, and 40% on average throughout. Comparable figures for the three entrants 
had risen on average 13%. Where any losses were suffered in agriculture, these would 
be balanced by gains made in manufactured goods as the three entrants reduced these 
duties in line with the Common External Tariff. Community officials argued, further­
more, that of the US trade deficit of $6 billion in 1972, $4 billion was accounted for by 
Japan, $1-5 billion by Canada and only $500,000 by the Community27.
The American counter-argument was that losses in agriculture could not be set 
against gains in another entirely different sector unless there was overall agreement 
evaluating gains and losses product by product. William Pearce, deputy special repre­
sentative for trade negotiations, estimated that the three new entrants would have 
imported 10 million tons of grain a year, equal to a rise of 50% in five years, had they 
stayed outside the EEC. Under the CAP, he said, the three would now become net 
grain exporters. The US was particularly concerned at reduced opportunities in the 
UK market. Furthermore, the US claim had legal justification since the UK, by entry 
into the EEC, had unbound the zero tariffs on cereals fixed in the Kennedy round.
On 22 July 1973 the European Commission shifted its position partly under 
duress following Shultz's testimony to the US Ways and Means Committee in May that 
there would be no return to fixed exchange rates, no dollar convertibility, and no SDR 
extension until the Article 24(6) compensation talks were completed. The European 
Commission now recommended that at least five countries - Malaysia, Poland, Austra­
lia, Brazil and Canada - be offered compensation. The commission also proposed 
tariff concessions on 30 items ranging from plywood, apples, pears, palm oil and 
coffee to tractors. Although these amounted to only about one quarter of the Commu­
nity's tariff positions, France insisted that this offer be final, with no specific compen­
sation for the US.
This did not meet US demands. It would benefit indirectly from some of the 
tariff concessions via most-favoured-nation status, but there was no progress on cereals 
other than a vague promise of an international agreement. Frustration at European
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intransigence only added to the disarray in US policy already affected by Watergate 
and on the defensive over the US export ban on soybeans. Following US rejection of 
the EEC's July offer, the 24(6) talks went into abeyance for over six months, with 
movement discouraged by divisions elsewhere in the Alliance, but stalled also as a 
result of the wide differences in both sides' negotiating positions and uncertainty about 
whether the GATT round itself would collapse before it had started. William Eberle, 
the special representative for trade negotiations, visiting Brussels in early October, 
characterised the July offer as "a good beginning," but he made clear his hope to see a 
revised offer if only to influence Congressional opinion toward the pending trade 
bill28.
According to Soames, the deterioration of Alliance relations in the autumn of
1973, plus US administration threats of reprisals against the EEC, did encourage the 
Commission to seek new ways to satisfy those countries demanding compensation. 
These efforts were hindered, however, on 1 November when France and Italy decided 
that even the modest offer made in July conceded too much and that the 30-item offer 
should be reduced. Nonetheless, the Commission repeated its offer and presented it to 
the Council of Ministers in early November when some progress was made29. Italy 
and France, however, again argued that the list be reduced, with particular concern for 
certain products such as citrus fruits. Ireland also opposed concessions on frozen beef. 
Soames insisted that he could not negotiate in Geneva on anything less than the full 
list, and on 10 December the Council approved a list of 30 products.
The expectation was that the US would reject it, as was duly the case in January
1974. In March, Eberle warned the Nine that the US administration was prepared to 
consider retaliation with consequent damage to the GATT multilateral round. Had the 
administration accepted the EEC offer, Congress would be unlikely to pass the trade 
bill without protection clauses directed against the EEC. If the administration refused 
the EEC offer there would be little alternative to trade retaliation. As it was, the trade
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bill went before the Senate Finance Committee in early 1974 in the knowledge that the 
EEC offer amounted to only one tenth of the $1 billion compensation which the US 
demanded. The US wanted improved offers on most of the EEC's 30 product list and 
insisted on some offer on cereals, which had been excluded from the December pack­
age. France insisted that the latter was final. Soames's mandate was tightly drawn as a 
result30.
Resolution of the compensation talks
Resolution came through Community concessions, agreeing to concede some 
ground largely by overriding French intransigence and in the knowledge that domestic 
pressure made impossible any real flexibility in the US's negotiating position. Soames 
took the view that this was a victory for common sense and the desire to solve the 
problem, not simply the result of a fortuitous change of government in Paris. In April, 
the Commission revised its offer and the UK, Netherlands, Denmark and the Federal 
Republic were disposed to agree so as to put an end to the compensation talks. It was 
a view which France eventually accepted, despite Italian resistance to substantial tariff 
cuts on items of which it was an important producer, such as tobacco and oranges. A 
contributory factor in Community acquiescence to US demands was the latter's ability 
to exploit EEC divisions, for instance by leaking in March 1974 details of a contingen­
cy list of products on which they were thinking of increasing tariffs if agreement was 
not reached in the 24(6) talks31. The US denied sharp practice, insisting that it had 
made a significant concession to the EEC a few weeks earlier in agreeing to refer US 
demands on cereals to the multilateral GATT round itself rather than seek a solution in 
bilateral negotiation with the EEC. The US also claimed that it had shown sensitivity 
to European concerns in agreeing concessions on oranges and tobacco - two farm 
products which, they argued, were not essential to the EEC or the CAP. As the US 
saw it, reciprocal European concessions were crucial if the trade bill were to secure 
passage through Congress.
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The Article 24(6) talks were concluded on 31 May 1974. The EEC agreed to 
grant tariff concessions (with effect from 1 January 1975) of 2-3% on products includ­
ing tobacco, citrus, kraft paper. The total loss of EEC revenue was estimated to be in 
the order of $30 million, a third of the US's original sum but three times the value of 
the EEC offer of July 1973. The agreement, approved by the Council of Ministers on 
22 July 1974, contained an agreement to disagree on cereals, the resolution of which 
would be left to the GATT negotiations.
Resolution of these talks removed a long-running problem in the trade relation­
ship. It was the sole American success in trade discussions at the time. Soames was 
later dismissive of the results as anything more than a US domestic lobby exercise. He 
believed Kissinger had no interest whatsoever in them, and doubted they made any 
contribution to the closing diplomatic moves in the Year of Europe. Nevertheless, 
agreement on trade compensation assumed a disproportionate importance. Despite the 
minor revision of EEC tariffs ultimately involved, it could be presented by both sides 
as a genuine stimulus to European-American relations.
The mini-GATT talks also demonstrated both the problem of leaving important 
strands of the Atlantic relationship in the hands of technicians, and the hazards of 
seeking to bypass these channels with politically-inspired fixes. The talks had been 
interpreted by the EEC as a US assault on the economic union, despite US disclaimers; 
hence EEC obduracy. In April 1973, Kissinger had said that the US approached the 
scheduled economic negotiations "not as a test of strength but as a test of joint states­
manship." The 24(6) talks were precisely that trial of strength between an embattled 
US and an emerging EEC which the Year of Europe had sought to avoid, or at least to 
ensure their conclusion on largely American terms.
The multilateral GATT round: 
the US domestic context
A similar struggle characterised the process of initiating the multilateral Tokyo
125
Chapter 4
round trade talks, with governments guided more by domestic pressures than the wider 
Atlantic interest in an early solution. In the end, because of difficulties with Congress, 
US enthusiasm for new GATT talks was not matched by its ability to present a negoti­
ating stance in time for the start of substantive talks as part of the Year of Europe. 
The compensation talks were therefore to be the only element of economic linkage 
agreed as part of the US-Alliance initiative.
The thinking behind Nixon's new economic policy of August 1971 and behind 
the economic negotiations of 1973 had been influenced strongly by the report of the 
Williams Commission in July 1971. Appointed in 1970, the commission had as its two 
major themes concern at the growing volume of imports (linked to the rising trend of 
US corporations establishing operations outside of the USA) and the US's failure to 
benefit as much as expected from the 1964-7 Kennedy round. The report's Programme 
fo r  Action31 argued that the US "continues to have a compelling interest in preserving 
the multilateral trade and payments system." The US's trading partners would need to 
play a larger role in ensuring the survival of an open trading system. Areas requiring 
attention in the long term were reform of the monetary system; agriculture; public 
procurement policies; tariffs and export subsidies. Tariffs were not an immediate 
priority, not because they were regarded as unimportant (elimination of tariffs within 
25 years was proposed as a US goal) but because the US considered them to be less of 
a barrier to expanding world (that is, US) trade than inadequacies in the monetary 
system and the restrictiveness of the EEC's trade policies.
Therefore freer trade in industrial goods, while important, was not itself seen as 
an instant remedy to the US current account deficit33. On agriculture, the Flannigan 
report (commissioned by the Agricultural Committee in 1972) took a harder line and 
recommended in January 1973 that the US withdraw from GATT should negotiations 
fail to secure the potential gains in agriculture. As for the Williams Commission, this 
in part reflected US failure to secure significant advantage in agriculture from the 
Kennedy round, despite the warnings from Congress at the time that satisfaction on
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agriculture (where the US had a decisive competitive edge) was essential to the round's 
success. The sense of grievance was reinforced in 1973 by an Agricultural Depart­
ment projection that US farm exports would rise sharply in 1980 from $9,000 million 
to $18,500 million simply if obstacles to free trade were removed (although imports of 
dairy products would increase 500% under those circumstances, hence strong protec­
tionism in the dairy sector).
Competing pressures in the US domestic lobby are important to understanding 
the constraints placed on US negotiators and the difficulty of reaching a compromise 
between the US and the EEC. The most serious challenge to combining liberalisation 
with "protective measures" was the Burke-Hartke bill, first tabled in 1971. Advocat­
ing the unilateral imposition of a new regime of comprehensive and automatic import 
quotas, it was regarded as indicative of growing American protectionism in all parts of 
the Washington establishment. The administration was forced to take account of these 
feelings. In his international economic report to Congress on 20 March 197334, Nixon 
accused West Europe and Japan of pursuing a self-centred "surplus syndrome" and 
promised to protect sectors hit by unfair competition so as to ensure a "fair shake" for 
the US. (Two weeks earlier, a joint House-Senate committee had advised retaliation 
against aggressive exporting countries.) The administration's trade bill35 presented to 
Congress on 10 April 1973 incorporated protective measures to demonstrate to Con­
gress that their concerns were taken seriously. With the underlying aim of the GATT 
talks styled in the bill as the move from trade confrontation toward trade negotiation, 
the administration committed itself to freer international trade including abolition of 
tariffs, tempered with the requirement for authority (under section 122 of the bill) to 
propose protectionist measures and particularly use of temporary import surcharges 
against unfair overseas practices. With such protective measures the US would have 
the power to negotiate "a more open and equitable, world trading system." However, 
despite the trade bill's  stress on the need for fairness, the US expected its trading
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partners to produce more giving than taking. The contrast with the mood of 1962 was 
drawn by Bergsten, "The Administration's trade bill, which would have been regarded 
as drastically protectionist a decade ago, now represents the liberal wing of the Con­
gressional debate."36
The EEC's response to US pressure
The agreement37 at the October 1972 summit for the Community to produce its 
negotiating mandate by July 1973 and aim for completion of the GATT round in 1975 
was intended (by the British delegation above all) to meet US criticism  that the 
Community was introspective in trading policies and to head off protectionism in 
Congress (although the French had favoured waiting for the US mandate to be agreed 
before the Community declared its own hand). US hopes that the UK would be able to 
overturn Community policies, and particularly the CAP, were always optimistic, but 
while the UK, as much as the US, wanted EEC prices harmonised with world prices 
for budgetary reasons (so as to reduce EEC grain output in favour of cattle and beef 
production), Heath had already warned Nixon in February 1973 that the CAP would be 
non-negotiable. Even the fairly modest changes to the CAP proposed by the Commis­
sion in autumn 1973 were stillborn, partly as a result of the uncertainty in commodity 
markets which encouraged the view that agriculture remain a protected sector. Uni­
lateral US restrictions on soybean exports in the summer of 1973 reinforced this. 
Chirac was implacably opposed to reform; the CAP was the cornerstone of French 
participation in the EEC and France maintained a substantial trade surplus in agricul­
tural products - $1 billion in 1970 - primarily due to Community preferences and high 
prices. Even Ertl, the German agriculture minister, doubted the time was suitable to 
amend the CAP to allow greater access to US imports.
On 4 April 1973 Soames presented two proposals38. The first was on future 
negotiations with 44 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries designed to replace the 
earlier Yaounde and Arusha agreements and bring into an EC framework the "associa-
128
Trade and monetary negotiations
ble" members of the British Commonwealth and the remaining Black African states. It 
explained how tariff preferences could be reduced without "detracting from the advan­
tages enjoyed by countries with which the EEC has special relations." The Commis­
sion sought to head off US concerns by the argument that the preferential arrangements 
were not a vital part of EEC policy. Visiting Washington in February 1973, Soames 
had promised that preferential deals would not be expanded, while insisting that, 
because the volume of trade involved was so small, US interests were not prejudiced 
by the EEC's arrangements with Africa and the Mediterranean.
The other Commission memorandum was a 27-page draft negotiating mandate 
for the GATT round, the main points of which were:
- the CAP would be modified not by free trade in agriculture but by international 
agreements and fixed prices;
- there would be a code of conduct for export subsidies, so restricting dumping;
- while the common external tariff would be defended against US and Japanese 
pressure for eventual free trade in industrial goods, substantial tariff reductions 
would be proposed on the basis of tariff harmonisation rather than cuts across the 
board or the linear reductions of the Kennedy round. Tariff reductions would 
therefore depend on the initial level of the tariff, so affecting higher tariffs 
(which were mainly American, the relative peaks of whose tariff structure had 
remained despite the average 35 % reductions of the Kennedy round) more than 
lower tariffs (only 0-2% of EEC tariffs were over 25% compared to 4% of US 
tariffs, and the EEC had the lowest average industrial tariff rate)39;
- non-tariff barriers would be handled sector by sector.
The GATT memorandum40 was considered by EEC foreign ministers for the 
first time in mid-May. For the UK, the Federal Republic and others the stress was 
placed on the Atlantic implications of how the Community framed its negotiating 
stance and the need to send the right signal to Washington. Jobert, however, insisted 
that, despite US pressure, the CAP was non-negotiable; trade talks could begin only 
when there were fixed exchange rates and dollar convertibility; and the Community 
should rebut ideas that the GATT round's purpose was to assist the US balance of 
payments. The Commission's proposal to make agriculture the central issue of the 
GATT negotiations had been justified by Soames as essential if the negotiations were
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to succeed. The Commission argued that although the principles of the CAP could not 
be negotiable, latitude was possible since inclusion of agriculture in GATT did not 
necessarily involve altering the CAP. The French position (supported by Italy) re­
mained, however, that sweeping revision of the Commission guidelines was required if 
the GATT negotiations were not to threaten the Community's identity. They demand­
ed that the CAP be protected and that moves to erode the common external tariff 
through any moves to zero tariffs be resisted41. As a result, when the Council of 
Ministers next met on 4 June, the amended Commission document42 had stiffened the 
language on the CAP, and affirmed the continued autonomy of each party's policy­
making and the need for other parties (meaning the US) to reciprocate agricultural 
concessions. The link between trade and monetary issues, however, became increas­
ingly problematic as the EEC's discussion continued. The Commission's position was 
"adequate parallelism," that is, the start of trade talks would not depend on the conclu­
sion of monetary reform, but progress would depend on the state of negotiations and 
the prospect of a return to dollar convertibility in particular. France wanted this 
strengthened by agreement that monetary progress be continually reviewed, and a text 
which left no ambiguity in the Community's determination to preserve the CAP and 
external tariff.
The final position adopted on 26 June 1974 set out the Community's approach to 
the formal opening session of the round in September and to negotiations thereafter. It 
included the changes in the Commission paper for which France and Ireland had 
argued (although Soames said the changes were of wording rather than substance43); 
for example, deletion of a paragraph referring to the need for structural reform of 
agriculture and of references to a code of good conduct for export subsidies. The 
Community would, however, offer to negotiate with other major exporters arrange­
ments for concerted self-discipline in world markets. For some products, such as 
wheat, sugar, rice and processed milk products, the EEC would propose international 
agreements which would include maximum and minimum prices. They would be
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accompanied by measures to stabilise markets, possibly changes in the way import 
levies were applied - they might, for example, be altered less frequently. But this 
would not imply alterations in the system itself. While it was suggested that agriculture 
could be included in trade talks, one of the main points of the EEC's position was to 
emphasise that neither the "principles" nor "mechanisms" of the CAP were negotiable. 
This went nowhere near far enough to meeting US requirements.
US objectives were also frustrated elsewhere. The Nine were prepared to agree 
to tariff harmonisation only for industrial products, deleting Commission references to 
the possibility of zero tariffs. In the non-tariff sector, where ministers agreed that for 
the Tokyo round at least, elimination of all barriers was unrealistic, the initial EEC 
aim was to concentrate only on barriers which most hindered trade. Finally, on trade 
and monetary linkage it was agreed that the Community's final approval of the GATT 
round would depend on the state of monetary negotiations.
In the end the Tokyo ministerial meeting was able to agree a reasonably uncon- 
troversial start to the GATT round, particularly in heading off a Franco-American 
disagreement. Trade (particularly issues such as identifying and reducing non-trade 
barriers, and handling agriculture) was too complicated and too much a prey to other 
pressures to be amenable to the sort of politically-inspired and Atlantic-oriented time­
table proposed by Kissinger. As the Senate Committee under Russell Long noted: "in 
two or more years that have transpired since the Trade Reform Act was conceived by 
the Executive branch there have been two official devaluations of the American dollar, 
a new international system (or non system) of fluctuating exchange rates, and an 
energy crisis that threatens the economies of the world as well as the political cohesion 
of the major nations. It is a totally new ball game which was not envisaged in the 
planning and conception of the Trade Reform Act."44
The failure to make any significant progress in the trade element of the Year of 
Europe was in fact in no small part due to the failure of the US to agree a trading
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mandate, without which serious discussion could not begin in GATT. The US under­
mined its own initiative for an early and thorough examination of Alliance trade. The 
stalemate was exacerbated by the administration's withdrawal of the trade bill from 
Congress in December 1973 in response to passage in the House of Representatives of 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking US-Soviet trade to the Soviet record on human 
rights. The administration believed the amendment would damage US-Soviet detente 
and possibly renew tensions in the Middle East. This, combined with the reversals in 
US trade policy on agriculture exports and the decision in the light of Arab oil export 
restrictions to begin importing foreign oil (reversing a policy of 15 years' standing) to 
protect US prices, changed the focus of the trade debate. The original timing had 
envisaged passage of the trade bill in Congress by early 1974, leaving about eighteen 
months for actual negotiation in Geneva. Instead it was to be six months after the 
signing of the Ottawa declaration in June 1974 before the US was even in a position to 
negotiate on the GATT round.
Strains in international agricultural trade
Contrary to the EEC's and Committee of Twenty's assertions that fixed but ad­
justable exchange rates were necessary for international stability and expansion of 
trade, the US could point to the growth of world trade in 1973 as proof of the desira­
bility of floating. In the first quarter of 1973, trade rose at an annual rate of 24% 
higher than in 1972: fixed rates, said US officials, would have torn the system apart45. 
The more encouraging evidence for the US was the change in the external balance 
from a $6-5 billion trade deficit in 1972 to a $1-5 billion trade surplus in 1973, due 
principally to an increase of nearly $8 billion in agricultural exports. OECD trade 
grew by 30% in the first half of 1973 after an 18% rise in 1972 (the latter itself being 
the steepest rise in a decade). The US was benefiting from the boom and its trade 
account grew stronger throughout 1973. In the first nine months of 1973 it showed a 
$153 million surplus compared with a deficit in 1972 of $5 billion for the same period.
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This reversal was the context of US attempts to confirm a fairer trading system 
in the GATT rules: temporary relief was by itself insufficient. The US Department of 
Commerce attributed the US's improved trade balance in the early part of 1973 to:
- increased foreign demand for US goods because of inflation, particularly in
Europe;
- the dollar's depreciation and resulting improvement in price competitiveness;
- high demand for US goods because of world shortages46.
The last was to have a destabilising impact in 1973 by shifting temporarily the 
focus of trade controls from imports to exports, and it became a further source of 
recrimination within the Alliance.
The period since 1972 was marked by an extraordinary succession of increases in 
prices of primary commodities. The most notable was that of oil, which tripled in price 
from September 1973 to January 1974. While no other commodity price-rise involved 
a trade magnitude as large as that of oil, some commodities (zinc, rice, wheat and free- 
market sugar) were subject to price increases comparable to or greater than that of oil. 
Foods were most subject to sustained upward movement, reflecting critical deficiencies 
in supplies for some major products and the emergence of pronounced demand-supply 
changes. The origins of an element of the commodity boom47 reflected what were 
seen in Europe at the time as changed US priorities: a desire to consolidate trading 
links with the Soviet Union at the expense if necessary of traditional trading partners. 
The boom was fuelled in 1972/73 by the US sale of wheat to the USSR at below 
market price. In July 1972, shortly after the Moscow summit, negotiations were con­
cluded which allowed the Soviet Union to purchase one quarter of the year's wheat 
crop (almost 19 million tons) at a cost of $1-1 billion. Initially it appeared that the US 
had successfully rid itself of much of its chronic grain surplus, but partly as a result of 
these large Soviet grain purchases, inflationary pressure on the international wheat 
market raised the possibility of export controls. On the world market, demand exceed­
ed supply by 8%. Although 1973 was a record harvest, world demand was rising at
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2-5% a year because of growing world population and the increasing demand for 
animal feed. There were also domestic implications. Again, initially the US looked 
capable of benefiting from this increased demand48, but the sharply increased price of 
wheat had an adverse effect on the administration's anti-inflation programme. Con­
sumers in the US blamed increased food problems on the wheat deal. Senator Henry 
Jackson called it "one of the most notorious government foul-ups in American histo­
ry."49
Problems with soya
While the US rejected controls on wheat, the likely effect of prospective short­
ages elsewhere in the international economy was damaging, particularly as regards 
soybeans (mainly for use as cattle feedstuff), of which the US supplied two-thirds of 
the West's needs (and 90% of Japan's)50. Community imports of soybeans and soya 
oil cake had increased 200% between 1963 and 1971 so that Europe relied almost 
exclusively on the US for soya supplies, accounting for 50% of US soya exports. 
Rising world demand and a Sino-US agreement on soya supplies, however, had created 
serious shortages in the US by 1973, with resulting inflationary pressures. On 19 
June, the House Banking Committee approved legislation giving Nixon some of the 
powers he had sought to limit exports as part of the administration's anti-inflation 
programme. These powers were to accompany a two-month price freeze. The admin­
istration was thus manoeuvring into a position where it could impose controls, under 
the terms agreed by Congress, in the event of domestic scarcity or abnormal foreign 
buying. It was the former which was to apply in the case of soybeans51.
As a result, a total embargo on all US soya exports was announced on 27 June, 
to last until November 1973 (later amended to September), by which time the next 
harvest would be ready. The embargo itself was not an immediately serious problem in 
Europe, since most of the supplies for 1973 had been shipped. It was a fair point 
made by the US that despite the embargo, they were still exporting soya to the
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Community at record levels. But, apart from the medium- and long-term effects of the 
embargo on 1974 meat supplies and on long-term livestock breeding, there was a polit­
ical problem: whether EEC and Japanese agriculture and food supplies could continue 
to rely on a product that the US - in breach of GATT - could declare to be unavailable.
The US embargo was a foreign-policy disaster in the context of the Year of 
Europe and the preparations for the GATT round. The fact that the administration was 
then forced to reverse its policy only added to confusion about its motives. The con­
trols also had an inwardness which proved relevant to how the Europeans responded. 
For years the US had regarded the soybean as a key commodity both to prise open the 
CAP and to redress the US-Japanese trade imbalance. The soybean, the fastest-rising 
US export to the EEC because it entered without a levy, was an example for Washing­
ton of how well US agriculture would do in the absence of Community restrictions on 
trade. This was at the heart of American arguments against the CAP. While US agri­
cultural exports had indeed increased 150% from 1958 to 1974, in items covered by 
the CAP, its exports had declined by 15% since 1966, and risen by 70% for those 
products not covered52. Hence Washington had always been quick to discourage the 
EEC from taking action to try to change the position53. The Community, on the other 
hand, drew the obvious lesson from its vulnerability in 1974 in products not covered 
by the CAP's variable import levy system.
The effects of the price increases for soya54 (from $123 a bushel to $600), and 
criticism of the measures even within the administration as unnecessary and counter­
productive, forced it to adopt almost immediately a more conciliatory policy on export 
controls. On 2 July a licensing system was introduced which honoured all soybean 
contracts for half of their volume, and 40% of soya oil cake commitments. Against 
this, the US licensing system was extended three days later to other feedstuff products: 
linseed oil, sunflower and most other edible oils, animal fats and livestock protein 
feeds55. Export controls on these were removed in October 1973 (leaving unanswered
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the question of why they had been imposed in the first place). Nonetheless, the under­
tones of US trade policy were an extremely unfavourable context for any consideration 
of GATT negotiations involving CAP reform. Meeting the short-term need to stop 
food price rises compromised the long-term objective of international agreement on 
agricultural products. Neither the US nor EEC believed, in any case, that they were 
required to make concessions to the other. The Commission's response in particular to 
the brief soybean embargo was given by Pierre Lardinois, the agricultural commis­
sioner, who asserted during talks in Washington on 19 July that the American consum­
er had been spoiled by cheap food and that the US authorities ought to have "the guts" 
to stick by their country's international commitments.
The Community's problem was a lack of substitutes. At the meeting of Commu­
nity agricultural m inisters on 17 July there was fierce discussion about how the 
Community should respond, Chirac demanding immediate action to find substitutes for 
US supplies. The counter-argum ent was that it would take a generation for the 
Community to be in a position to do so. The subsequent proposal to subsidise EEC 
soybean production was as much a result of an economic requirement as a desire to 
avoid further treatment as a "second-class customer." Alfred Grosser's view, reflect­
ing particular French reliance on soybean imports (90% of French requirements was 
met by the US), was that the American action "looked like a declaration of war or at 
least a cynical demonstration of an economic dominance which permitted all manner of 
extortion"56.
Monetary reform
Despite US expectation at the start of the Year of Europe that it would be one of 
the two salient negotiations in 1973, the Nairobi meeting of finance ministers on 24 
September was as unproductive as the Tokyo session of GATT. The reason was the 
inability of the Committee of Twenty (properly called the Committee of the Board of 
Governors on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues, the
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C20), which was established in July 1972, to keep up with the speed at which the 
monetary order unravelled. Although the Group of Ten had agreed in December 1971 
that reform of the monetary system should be promptly undertaken, nine months had 
elapsed before the C20 convened (as a result of the US's deliberately holding back 
from presenting proposals aimed at reform of the system). As a result, the demise of 
the Smithsonian agreement, the dollar float, and a joint European float were the varia­
bles to be addressed by monetary negotiations in 1973. Force of events meant they 
were resolved more by the workings of the international market than by new and 
binding rules. As events overwhelmed the C20's work, so they overtook the prospect 
of progress at Nairobi on long-term reform of the system. Negotiators were "caught 
preparing for the last war instead of the next."57
In July 1973, following a meeting in Washington, the C20 had claimed to be 
close to formulating proposals based on broad areas of agreement. The Bretton Woods 
framework was to be retained on the basis of "stable but adjustable" parities. There 
would be no immediate return to full convertibility of all primary reserve assets until 
an adjustment mechanism was produced and the dollar overhang neutralised more effi­
ciently. Thereafter SDRs were to be the new principal reserve asset; their yield was to 
be increased sufficiently to make them attractive to hold but not so attractive as to 
make countries reluctant to part with them when in deficit. SDR allocations were to be 
"adequate but not excessive."
Major disagreements were unresolved, however. The adjustment procedure was 
a prime issue for debate, principally on whether the trigger for currency changes 
should be reserve indicators or a more general assessment of the currency's resilience 
at a certain parity. On dollar convertibility, the issue was whether reserve currencies 
should be required to settle external deficits either fully or partially in reserve assets. 
The role of gold in the new system was an issue of considerable importance, particular­
ly for the French, who saw an increased role for gold as the only way to end the dol­
lar's  overbearing influence. All parties agreed that gold should be sold on the free
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market; this had been confirmed in November 1973, so ending the Washington ar­
rangements of March 1968. The question was whether the official gold price should be 
abolished. The US believed the ability to sell gold (but not buy) would reduce gold's 
immobilisation and restore some of its former role. Sales of gold would take place 
between authorities at a low official gold price. Against this it was argued that the low 
official price for official transactions was a source of immobility, because no money 
authority would sell gold at $42 an ounce while the market price was so much higher 
($100 in the second quarter of 1973, rising to $160 in the corresponding quarter of 
1974). Others in the C20 therefore wanted to end the official price, so cutting the 
gold-SDR link and allowing transactions of gold between authorities to take place at a 
market-related price.
In the aftermath of the oil crisis in late 1973 there was considerable pressure 
from France and Italy to reach a common EEC position on gold by the end of May 
1974, adopting the second of these options58. The French idea was for a solution to 
liquidity problems among the Nine by revaluing the price of gold solely for transac­
tions between central banks of the European Community. The possible logic was, 
according to Ian Davidson, that whereas the US had lost interest in gold convertibility, 
the Europeans had not. To have a bigger say in the control of the international mone­
tary system, including the gold price, "their obvious course is to take the issue out of 
the hands of Congress by fixing a new gold price themselves."59 The UK and Germa­
ny, who held only 15% of reserves in gold, opposed this, fearing a unilateral EEC 
move on gold which would undermine an international solution to phase out gold as an 
official reserve. In the end, the US largely accommodated this view at the C20 meet­
ing in June 1974, agreeing to the continuing use of gold as collateral at a price differ­
ent from the official gold price. While this potentially opposed union by central banks 
to use their gold holdings and encourage international liquidity, signs of considerable 
reticence remained, either because the sales would revive the gold price, or in the
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expectation that the market price might rise even further above the official price.
Although the oil crisis undermined the outline for reform drawn up in July 1973, 
overall uncertainty, as well as particular differences between the US and France, 
prevented progress at the Nairobi ministerial conference. The Economist60 styled the 
parties' refusal to debate vital issues and concentrate instead on the C20's so-called 
reform as "flaccid vengeance." Alastair Buchan described the Nairobi conference as 
suggesting "that the major Western powers still preferred to live with short-term 
expedients rather than tackle the fundamental shortcomings of the Bretton Woods 
system." The C20 preparations in 1973 were marked by a reluctance to admit that 
fixed but adjustable parities could no longer cope with changed conditions. Paul 
Volcker's testimony to the House of Representatives sub-committee61 confirmed that 
while a more flexible and accessible mechanism was required, with provision for float­
ing, the regime should be one of "stable but adjustable" parities. Fixed parities would 
remain the central element of the system. With substance still a matter of divided 
opinions62 the ministerial meeting in Nairobi focused principally on procedural points, 
setting a deadline of 31 July 1974 for completion by the Committee of Twenty of a 
basic agreement on reform. The truth was that, despite its work, the real impetus for 
reform came only with the oil crisis and its implications. The fragmentary reforms 
produced in June 1974 - although still interim - proved to be a considerable advance on 
the state of affairs in Nairobi in September 1973.
The Committee of Twenty's report
The C20 presented its final report to the IMF in June 1974. While its work 
concluded without agreement on the accompanying "Outline of Reform"63 for a new 
international monetary system, the final report - more an interim "programme of 
immediate action" - was agreed. The outline of reform envisaged enlarging the scope 
of international surveillance and management, establishing a correspondingly larger 
role for the IMF. There would be more effective and symmetrical adjustment proce­
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dures which, while leaving the choice of particular policies to each country, would 
ensure that appropriate action was taken where necessary through a process of assess­
ment supported by reserve indicators and graduated pressures. The new system would 
promote the better management of global liquidity and the avoidance of uncontrolled 
growth of reserve currency balances. The SDR was to become the principal reserve 
asset, defined against a basket of 16 currencies which were to be weighted (with the 
dollar accounting for 33% and the DM for 12-5%).
The mini-reforms for the transition period were of greater immediate signifi­
cance, designed to bring exchange-rate policies within the framework of a system 
based on international agreement. These included the establishment of an interim 
committee of the board of governors; the strengthening of fund procedures for closer 
consultation and surveillance of the adjustment process; the adoption of guidelines for 
the management of floating rates; the creation of an oil facility to recycle petrodollars; 
and the reinforcement of the presumption against trade restriction for balance of 
payments purposes. As the sum total of nearly three years of effort to reform interna­
tional monetary relations, the C20 report amounted to little, but (particularly after the 
currency turmoil of the oil crisis) placing renewed faith in the philosophy of the previ­
ous system was the line of least resistance. Nevertheless, the guidelines for floating did 
take into account:
- that national policies should not be subject to greater constraints than was 
necessary in the international interest;
- that a degree of uncertainty continued to attach to any estimate of medium-term 
exchange rates;
- that official intervention to stabilise short-term exchange rates was not only 
necessary but desirable in order to encourage exchange stability.
In specific transatlantic terms, there was to be only limited success in diversify­
ing the means of providing international liquidity and removing the centrality of the 
dollar as a reserve currency. Circumstances had changed within the Atlantic Communi­
ty since Bretton Woods, but not sufficiently to end the dollar's role as the major inter­
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national currency. With renewed uncertainty and the recovery of the dollar's value 
after the devaluations of December 1971 and February 1973, the dollar remained the 
major world currency in the absence of a credible alternative64. Rather than construct 
a new system, floating exchange rates - technically in contravention of the original 
IMF Articles - were recognised at the Jamaica Conference in 1976. Benjamin Cohen 
concludes from this that "on the specific technical issues which, over the years have 
truly agitated governments - rules for exchange intervention by central banks, the 
consolidation of the dollar overhang - no significant progress was made... Reform was 
purely cosmetic."65
Conclusions
June 1974 was a time of overall stabilisation in Atlantic relations. Conclusion of 
the trade compensation talks and the C20 report coincided with the Ottawa declaration 
and its endorsement at the Brussels NATO summit as the final act of the Year of 
Europe. Although the economic climate had improved in 1973, however, the concrete 
gains made in this area of the Atlantic relationship were limited. Notable in the 
Ottawa declaration was its failure to act on those passages of the Kissinger and Nixon 
speeches of spring 1973 which had emphasised the need to resolve economic problems 
as a precondition of a healthier Alliance: substantive prose on economic and political 
issues had been consigned to the separate US-EEC declaration which was never to be 
signed.
The strains in the Alliance meant that eye-catching declarations were largely 
irrelevant to finding answers to deep-seated problems in the international monetary and 
trading system. Cajoling those principally involved was not the way best to ensure 
progress. The US administration's attempt to package together all the Alliance's prob­
lems in 1973/4 appeared to be high-handed, and was to prove counterproductive. 
Furthermore, it demonstrated (as Kissinger was well aware in reopening the debate in 
April 1973) that Article 2 of the treaty could not be stretched in present circumstances
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as far as Washington would have liked. A self-contained Alliance solution to economic 
divergencies was not negotiable, therefore; but US ideas had had echoes elsewhere, 
notably in the texts adopted by the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1972. These 
recommended better use of "the existing institutional machinery within NATO so as to 
solve the economic problems" of the Alliance, including regular attendance by Alliance 
economic ministers at ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council and special 
sessions of permanent representatives devoted to economic affairs66. This was useful 
in principle, but open to interpretation as reinforcing US supremacy in political-mili­
tary areas of the Alliance to the economic domain. For the same reason, while espous­
ing the virtues of a renewed commitment to the Alliance, the administration sowed the 
seeds of confusion and, at times, hostility. Stanley Hoffman, writing about "American 
solutionism" as an approach to international relations, described the administration's 
method as follows:
"Despite fits of petulance evoked by such limits and resistances, and attempts at 
reasserting American interests and preferences by unilateral means - such as 
Nixon in 1971, Reagan in his first term - it has become obvious that the frustra­
tions of multilateral cooperation in institutions that are not a mere copy of those 
dominated by the US during and just after the war cannot be avoided, and that 
bursts of unilateral action - whether in Central America, or against terrorism, or 
in the world economy - are more satisfying for wounded egos than for order in 
the world."67
Economic problems accumulated and became aggravated because no adequate 
forum for trade discussions existed within the Alliance. According to Gasteyger many 
of the problems were institutional because "faced with a mountain of problems and 
issues, one looks in vain for the appropriate mechanisms and organisations which could 
help tackle or even solve them. Nothing of that sort exists either at an Atlantic or 
European level, in spite, or perhaps just because, of the multitude of specialised bodies 
spread all over the area. For lack of an overall framework within which these prob­
lems could be handled, they are referred to the traditional, mostly outdated and always 
time-consuming negotiations of ad hoc, bi-, tri- and multi-lateral meetings..."68
The absence of the institutional machinery in 1973 to manage the Community's
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interdependence with the US as integral to its own development was a weakness in the 
Alliance framework69. It bears comparison to the summitry instituted two years later. 
The Group of Seven framework allowed the high-level discussion of economic and 
political issues which Kissinger had sought for the Western industrialised countries. 
The first of the economic summits vindicated the view in 1973 that there had been a 
serious institutional weakness and that only a political input at the highest level could 
end the vicious cycle of transatlantic suspicions leading to a breakdown of cooperation. 
The agreements at the Rambouillet summit in 1975 were based on the shared need to 
address world energy shortages and global inflation. The need for such cooperation 
was perhaps more obvious in 1975 than during the Year of Europe: the international 
economic difficulties of 1973 had led, by 1975, to recognition of shared interests and 
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(19) Robert Triffin in "The international monetary chaos and the way out", Journal o f Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 12 no 1, September 1973.
(20) Reprinted in The World Today, Vol. 29 No 5, May 1973: "The EEC's external relations."
(21) Raymond Vernon: "Rogue Elephant in the Forest" in Foreign Affairs, April 1973, loc cit.
(22) Kissinger in The Troubled Partnership, loc cit, p. 332.
(23) Paul Lewis in the Financial Times, 20 March 1973, and C Fred Bergsten ("Mr Kissinger: No Economic 
Superstar") in The New York Times, 12 December 1973, make this point. John Pinder, "America and Europe: A 
Fair Bargain the Coming Negotiations" in The World Today, July 1973, p. 298, makes the valid point about 
Kissinger's approach, based on "his cheerful ignorance of the subject. The Community has, contrary to his belief, 
more global economic (and hence, to an extent, diplomatic) interests than the US; and, with its lower external 
tariff, generalised preferences, and larger aid budgets, grounds to claim that it has a more liberal external econom­
ic policy."
(24) The US support for a new trade round was first announced publicly following the Azores summit with 
Pompidou in December 1971 (although it had first been proposed earlier that year by Australia, Canada and 
Sweden among others).
(25) In permitting exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination (e.g. customs unions, free-trade areas and 
border trade), GATT Article 24 provides that duties and other restrictions established by a customs union or free- 
trade area against non-members shall not be greater than those existing prior to its creation. Article 24 would also
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facilitate creation of an Atlantic Free Trade Area as advocated, for instance, at the Twentieth Session of the North 
Atlantic Council in London, 11-16 November 1974, Recommendation 39 (p. 10 of Texts Adopted).
(26) Following enlargement, the EEC faced similar claims from 50 countries claiming losses in the individual 
product markets of the three new member states.
(27) See IMF Annual Report 1973, Washington, DC, 1973, pp. 15-18.
(28) Interview with William Eberle in the Vhshington Post, 3 August 1973.
(29) Notably significant tariff and quota reductions to be offered on Canadian cheddar, tractors, earth-shifters, 
wood pulp and apples. See The Economist, 10 November: "Counting the pineapple chunks".
(30) "The road to retaliation", in The Economist, 2 March, 1974.
(31) See The Economist, 4 May, 1974. Prominent items included cheese, wine, and perfumes (affecting France) 
and Scotch whisky (the UK's biggest dollar earner). The US made clear that they would begin retaliation after 
June 1974, ie six months after the three new Community members had signed up to the second stage of harmoni­
sation with the Common External Tariff.
(32) See "United States International Economic Policy" in An Interdependent VTorld Report to the President 
submitted by the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy (Williams Report), Washington, 
USGPO, 1971. Caroline Miles: "US Trading Policy in the 1970s: The Report of the Williams Commission" in 
The W>rld Today, Vol. 28, No 3, March 1972, gives the background to this and to the domestic pressures affect­
ing the US negotiating mandate.
(33) In 1964 the US trade surplus had been $6-4 billion; in 1972 there was a $6 5 billion deficit: exports had 
hardly moved while imports had doubled in dollar value. Now particularly, the US had suffered directly as a 
result of the growth in trade in the early 1970s, averaging 8% from 1971-72 and \2Vi%  from 1972-73 (see IMF 
Annual Report 1974, loc cit, pp. 13-15).
(34) The International Economic Report o f the President, Document No. ASI-74, loc cit.
(35) Summarised in the Senate Finance Committee's Summary and Analysis o f HR 10710 - The Trade Reform Act 
o f 1973, 26 February 1974, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. CIS 74/S 362-7. The primary goals of 
the Trade Bill were: 1. to open up the trading system; 2. to correct imbalances in the global monetary system 
including, punitive measures to force countries in surplus to revalue; 3. to ensure international trade was more 
equitable; 4. to protect US markets from disruptive import penetration, involving temporary quotas/surcharges 
plus increased adjustment assistance payments.
(36) Quoted from The Economist, 14 April, 1973: "Powers for trade peace or war".
(37) The final communique stated that, reaffirming the wish to act "together to cope with the growing world 
responsibilities incumbent on Europe", "to this end, the Community institutions are invited to decide not later than 
1 July 1973 on a global approach covering all aspects affecting trade. The Community hopes that an effort on the 
part of all partners will allow these negotiations to be completed in 1975."
(38) Memorandum to the Council and the Future Relations between the Community and the Countries in Africa, 
the Caribbean, the Indian and Pacific Oceans referred to in Protocol No 22 of the Act of Accession, COM (73) 
500/Fin, 4 April 1973, and the Development o f an Overall Approach to Trade in View o f the Coming Multilateral 
Negotiations in GATT, COM (73) 556, 4 April 1973.
(39) The US proposal for zero industrial tariffs, the Commission argued, would increase protection because of 
social implications, e.g. steel tariffs had been cut in the Kennedy round, yet trade in steel had declined because of 
voluntary restrictions between national steel federations to protect the US's competitive position.
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(40) See Sir Christopher Soames, The World Today, loc cit, for a statement on these proposals, and also John 
Pinder "America and Europe: a fair bargain in the coming negotiations" in The World Today, Vol. 29 no 7, July 
1973 for a more detailed analysis of the Community's approach and the themes in the memorandum on the GATT 
negotiations. See also C Gordon Bare: "Trade Policy and Atlantic Partnership: Prospects for New Negotiation" in 
Or bis, Winter 1974, which describes the respective US and European arguments and the diversity of views within 
the Nine (p. 1290). The French position was basically one of frank and long-standing reluctance to become in­
volved in a new GATT round (which it believed would compromise the Nine within a reinforced Atlantic trading 
bloc), and their determination to extract every last ounce of gain from it.
(41) The Financial Times, 16 May 1973: "French slam stance on trade". The Economist, "Nine voices or one", 9 
June 1973, described the French desire to move the Commission away from emphasising what the Community 
was prepared to do to stressing what it could not do.
(42) Development o f an Overall Approach to Trade in view o f the Coming Multilateral Negotiations in GATT: 
Amendments, COM (73) 556/2, 22 May 1973.
(43) Lord Soames in private conversation, April 1982.
(44) Quoted from the Senate Finance Committee, Summary and Analysis o f the Trade Reform Act o f 1973, loc cit,
p. 2.
(45) On the other hand, as Volcker argued, floating exchange rates were highly problematic in a downswing, 
hence the need for agreed rules of conduct to prevent competitive depreciation (Report o f  the Hearings o f  Sub­
committee on International Economics, November/December 1973).
(46) IMF Annual Report 1974, Washington, DC.
(47) H B Malgrem examines this factor in "Sources of Instability in the World trading System", Journal o f Inter­
national Affairs, Vol. 30 No 1, Spring/Summer 1976 loc cit, p. 10, and points to a coincidence of changed US 
priorities (as the domestic economy became more exposed to external pressures) with drought in Canada and 
Australia, a decline in Peruvian supplies of cattle feed, more trade with the Soviet Union, and phasing out of 
certain US agricultural support programmes, plus inflation globally.
(48) In August 1973 a Farm Bill was passed which Butz, the Secretary of Agriculture, described as "a turning 
point" in US farm policy in its commitment to reducing inflationary pressure through increased production and 
ending support payment to farmers. For the first time since 1945, the US was able (in January 1973) to end grain 
subsidies, putting further pressure on the EEC to do likewise.
(49) Quoted from Henry Kissinger: His Personality and Policies, ed. Dan Caldwell, Duke Press Policy Studies, 
Durham, NC, 1983, p. 120. Kissinger himself is inclined to agree, describing how the Soviet Union exploited the 
desire of US wheat producers to export as much as possible, helped by the fact that "the greed of the companies 
would obscure the extent of Soviet purchases until the contracts were signed." Subsequent US fears about inflation 
meant that "instead of our using our agricultural strength as leverage on the Soviets... we ask the Soviets to do us 
the favour of buying less than market conditions allowed." (Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, pp. 247-8)
(50) In 1972 the Community had imported 4-4 million tons of soya, worth $1-2 billion; in 1973 this had risen to 
5-4 million tons worth $2-7 billion. The soybean was not subject to a CAP levy because the EEC was unable to 
produce more than negligible quantities of its protein requirements (only 11 %).
(51) The figures for soybean production and exports are in the enclosure to the Secretary of Agriculture's letter of 
27 June to the Commerce Secretary; Appendix 4 of the Report of the Senate Sub-committee on Foreign Agricul­
tural Policy, "Export Control Policy", 30 July 1973, on which this section draws.
(52) International Economic Report o f the President, transmitted to Congress March 1973, USGPO, Washington, 
DC, 1973, p. 40.
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(53) With considerable prescience for both 1979 and the early 1990s, Kissinger had made quite clear in his Year 
of Europe statement on 23 April (USIS, 23 April 1973, loc cit) that "it is not right, proper or wise for the United 
States to make decisions about keeping troops in Europe on the basis of whether the Common Market treats 
soybeans fairly. But there is no way to prevent [this]."
(54) The Economist, 23 June 1973, predicted a 15-year meat shortage.
(55) See the Financial Times: "Nixon relaxes export ban on soybean", 6 July 1973.
(56) See Alfred Grosser: The Western Alliance (Papermac, MacMillan, London, 1980) p. 272. In the light of the 
EC discussion at the time, it is worth noting that the Financial Times (27 May 1992: "US set to spill beans on its 
EC oilseeds 'retaliation'") reported that "The Bush Administration is debating a list of $1 billion in sanctions it is 
threatening to impose... in retaliation for the EC's oilseeds regime which it claims has cost it billions in soybean 
sales. Between 1980-90, EC producers more than tripled production. At the same time, US exports of soybeans 
fell 63%." By 12 June 1992, the Financial Times editorial column was describing the situation as "The EC-US 
soybean war."
(57) See Cohen: Journal o f International Affairs, Spring/Summer 1976, loc cit, p. 41. See also "Making Floating 
Part of a Reformed Monetary System," Report o f the Subcommittee on International Economics o f the Joint 
Economic Committee, 9 January 1974, Document No J-842-2, based on the testimony of Paul Volcker and Arthur 
Bums. It argued that the experience of floating since March 1973 had demonstrated that markets could cope; that 
floating rates helped to contain inflationary pressures; and that a floating dollar would contribute most to interna­
tional stability by providing protection against capital flows.
(58) See The Economist, 13 April, 1974: "Will Europe go it alone on gold", which sets out well reactions to a 
paper by the EEC Monetary Committee explaining the options for narrowing the official and market prices of 
gold.
(59) Ian Davidson in The World Today, September 1973, loc cit, p. 381. The more plausible reasons, writes 
Davidson, were French designs to pool reserves as a step toward monetary union, and a wish to respond to Italian 
views.
(60) 29 September 1973
(61) Making floating part o f a reformed monetary system, Doc. J842-2, loc cit.
(62) Cohen, Journal o f International Affairs, Spring/Summer 1976, loc cit, p. 40, said negotiators focused on the 
problems of the 1960s - adjustment, liquidity and confidence - and not on the key to monetary reform - consisten­
cy of governments' economic and political objectives.
(63) See International Monetary Reform: Documents o f the Committee o f Twenty, Washington, 1974.
(64) This was because the dollar value quickly recovered in the light of the energy crisis. Whereas European 
currencies appreciated against the dollar by between 9% and 18% from early May to mid-July of 1973, from the 
end of October to January 1974 it firmed quite sharply, appreciating by 14% against most European currencies, 
resulting largely from the improved current account. Although they fluctuated subsequently, the effective rate in 
June 1974 was about that of April 1973: see IMF Annual Report 1974, Washington, DC, pp. 16-17. But the 
lesson for the EEC from the currency crisis was that "the Emperor had no clothes" unless monetary union were 
agreed early on. The French had long insisted on this, but their position was itself contradictory between desire 
for monetary union and reluctance to make concessions in national sovereignty.
(65) Cohen: Journal o f International Affairs, Spring/Summer 1976, loc cit, p. 39.
(66) See Recommendation 26 of Texts Adopted by the Eighteenth Annual Session o f the North Atlantic Alliance, 
Bonn, 19-24 November 1972, pp. 24-25.
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(67) Stanley Hoffman: America's role in a changing world, Adelphi Papers, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London, Winter 1990/91, p. 15.
(68) Curt Gasteyger: Europe and Alliance at the Crossroads, loc cit, p. 38.
(69) William Wallace in International Affairs, 1976, loc cit, p. 179: "To the brash outsider... the pattern of inter­
governmental relations among the industrial democracies of the Atlantic area may indeed look like one ball of 
wax. To the experienced insider, that pattern resembles an intricate and delicate honeycomb."
(70) Kissinger himself pointed out in November 1975 (speaking on "The Future of the Industrial Democracies" in 
Pittsburgh): "In 1973... we emphasised the need for a fresh common approach to the inter-related issues of poli­




Relative security and insecurity: 
intra-Alliance and East-West negotiations 
during the Year of Europe
Shared interests and more effective cooperation were tested severely by the 
strains created by the superpower dialogue. Although 1973 had been intended by the 
US administration to be a year in which European issues received greater attention, the 
priority given to detente with the USSR in 1969-72 and unfinished business with 
Moscow thereafter meant that the Alliance was not the only important issue on the US 
foreign policy agenda. American success in dominating the detente process, which 
Europe (and France, above all) regarded as the fruits of their own labours, and the 
implications of this for Alliance interests, had already begun to cause concern in 
Europe during the first Nixon administration. This was to increase in 1973 as the 
Europeans sought to protect their interests in the principal security negotiations, re­
straining what they believed to be a US president ever more vulnerable to pursuing 
eye-catching agreements in foreign policy.
But while the Europeans, with the assistance of sceptics in Congress1, were 
trying to put the brakes on certain elements of US-Soviet detente, there was at the 
same time a rising tide in Congress in favour of a firmer policy not only toward the 
Soviet Union but toward West Europe. The prospect of a superpower condominium 
coinciding with a possible reduction of American military presence on European soil 
was another factor producing mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic.
This chapter will review these developments to explain why security-related 
undercurrents to the Year of Europe were so damaging. It does not attempt to explain 
events comprehensively (and does not, for instance, touch on separate discussion about 
Alliance strategy2). Rather, it draws out those elements which impacted on Alliance 
discussions to show why responding to the Kissinger initiative for a stronger Alliance
150
Relative security and insecurity
was difficult for Europe when the US appeared to be working at cross purposes. It 
will briefly examine the main threads of discussion in the main negotiations, the 
Congressional debate at the time and the two salient occasions when one or both sides 
felt their interests to have been ignored in 1973.
The conclusion is that the timetable of security issues alone made 1973 the wrong 
moment to turn the Alliance upside down, even without the unforeseen impact of the 
Middle East war which exposed both European weakness in an area which they were 
prone to regard as their back yard, and the inadequacy of Alliance consultations in 
papering over these disagreements. While, with hindsight - and even to a large degree 
at the time - it was clear that the underlying security/defence relationship was not 
under serious threat, the strains in the core Atlantic element further suggested to both 
Americans pressing for change and Europeans nervous of precisely that, that a new
form of US-European relationship was becoming more likely. That nothing could be
* ' 1 ^ .» • • • • >
taken for granted was an uncomfortable message for both sides of the Atlantic. None­
theless, in 1974, in contrast with the 1990s, the impetus favoured consolidation, for all 
its shortcomings and procedural/practical uncertainties,
Congressional pressure to reduce troops in Europe
To what degree the Alliance would be changed by an era of negotiation was still 
an imponderable at the beginning of 1973. What was clear was that there was unprece­
dented pressure on US force levels in Europe. Kissinger's call for a "fresh act of 
creation" to shore up the Alliance against erosive forces in the coming intra-bloc and 
inter-bloc negotiating fora suggested that without change the Alliance risked obsoles­
cence, something truer in the 1990s than it was in 1973. The problem for NATO then 
was that, with the main focus of their discussions directed toward inter-bloc talks, any 
reorganisation would of necessity be deferred. The prospect in particular of agreed 
reductions of US forces in Europe was contingent on the unlikely conclusion of 
MBFR: for it to be sustainable, unilateralism in Congress needed to be contained.
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As the administration's position in Congress weakened3, largely as a result of 
Watergate, Nixon was forced to place the onus for shaping Congressional opinion on 
allies and adversaries. Despite the unevenness of administration policy toward Europe 
during his first years in office, Nixon remained the best sort of president that the 
Europeans could reasonably expect to work with at a time of reappraisal of American 
foreign policy, (particularly in comparison with what might have been under a 
McGovern administration whose electoral platform included withdrawal of 170,000 
troops from Europe). Throughout, Nixon remained a strong advocate of a continued 
US troop deployment in West Europe with no one-sided reductions. The Congression­
al mood did, however, perforce establish in terms of practical politics the linkage of 
issues which Kissinger reflected in his April 1973 speech. As seen from Europe, 
American concessions on MBFR, CSCE or SALT (for example, agreeing to the Soviet 
position on the inclusion of French and British nuclear forces) would inevitably 
damage West European interests. While Congress would not allow a sell-out of US 
interests, it might be less attentive to protecting Europe's interests where these were 
seen to obstruct accommodation of superpower concerns. The Europeans had only the 
administration to rely on not to give in to domestic vulnerability and accept a "quick 
fix" with Moscow.
There was concern in Europe also at the administration's focus on expense rather 
than on Europe's needs. Even the financial element was a matter of dispute: while 
redeployment of troops back in the US would eliminate foreign exchange costs, budge­
tary costs would rise which the Europeans would not be liable to offset. On economic 
grounds, therefore, continued deployment in Europe combined with increasing offset 
demands was the optimal US policy4. Against this, Mansfield argued that unilateral 
action was the "only practical method... Unilateral action on our part... could very 
well stimulate a similar independently arrived at response on the part of the Soviet 
Union."5
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The Nixon administration's main problem was its inability to influence all the 
factors determining the strength of feeling in Congress. The Soviet Union was unlike­
ly to stand in the way of unilateral US reductions, while the European allies preferred 
to rely on the impasse in the MBFR process to prevent the US from weakening the 
West's negotiating position, drawing on Nixon's earlier undertaking not to make US 
reductions except where they were reciprocated on the Soviet side6. Thus while the 
administration and Congress agreed on the need to extract a higher price from the 
Alliance for their security, the administration had no coherent strategy for drawing 
down what was increasingly seen as an open-ended commitment of US troops to 
Europe.
Although House amendments to the Military Procurement Authorisation Bill 
were defeated, there was considerably more difficulty in the Senate. On 26 Septem­
ber, Mansfield introduced an amendment for a 50% reduction in the US's global 
deployment by 1976, with a quarter of the cuts coming in the first year. All reductions 
were to be left to the administration's discretion (Congress only determining their 
size), allowing, for instance, withdrawals from Europe to be delayed until the final 
year, so giving time for Europe to compensate.
Prior to the Senate vote on the Mansfield amendment, however, a less radical 
attempt was made to reduce the US's military burdens, designed to head off support 
for Mansfield. The Jackson-Nunn amendment, adopted on 25 September 1973 by a 
vote of 84 to 5, required the administration to negotiate with NATO allies to offset the 
estimated $17 billion foreign exchange costs incurred by the US as a result of keeping 
forces in Europe rather than in the US. If the allies failed to meet the figure within 
twelve months, the US would reduce its forces in proportion to those costs left uncov­
ered. While the administration could accept the amendment (albeit taking away from 
the executive the decision about overseas deployments), for Europe the Jackson-Nunn 
amendment meant that US troops in Europe would be linked to European willingness
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to pay up under pressure rather than the US's own interest in forward deployment in 
Europe. Linkage had therefore been imposed; rather than as agreed by SACEUR and 
the Defence Planning Committee, the size of US forces would be determined by 
European willingness to pay and the success of a MBFR process with which Europe 
had little sympathy. Nonetheless, by establishing that the onus to avert US reductions 
lay with the allies, the amendment did induce greater (if still extremely reluctant) 
European cooperation in the stalled negotiations as well as weaken Mansfield's position 
in the Senate7, although this was not the immediate effect8.
Offset payments and the Jackson-Nunn amendment
Two separate but linked negotiations took place in the autumn 1973-spring 1974 
period: the renewal of the bilateral US-German offset agreement which had expired in 
June 1973, and the attempt to inaugurate a multilateral NATO framework for offsets. 
In meeting the terms of the Jackson-Nunn amendment the bilateral not multilateral 
negotiation proved to be pivotal, as it was also in helping bring about a reduction in 
Alliance tension in early 1974 by demonstrating that amidst considerable Alliance 
rancour, constructive negotiation was still possible. A multilateral arrangement did 
not, however, materialise, despite long-running discussions which pre-dated the Jack­
son-Nunn amendment.
Nixon had outlined the US aspiration as follows:
"As a general principle, we should move toward a lasting solution under which 
balance of payments consequences from stationing US forces in Europe will not 
be substantially different from those of maintaining the same forces in the United 
States. It is reasonable to expect the Alliance to examine this problem this year. 
Eliminating the periodic requirement to renegotiate a temporary arrangement 
with only one ally [West Germany] would strengthen the solidarity of the Al­
liance as a whole.
This had been the recommendation of a Congressional report of August 197210 
which advised that a return of US troops from Europe to the US would save only an 
insignificant amount of budget dollars but that the severe drain of the foreign exchange 
costs on the US's external account made essential an equalisation of burdens. It pro­
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posed the creation of a supra-national NATO common fund whereby members who 
paid nothing to the US and yet benefited from the US troop presence would contribute 
to the costs. At the June 1973 meeting of NATO defence ministers, the US proposed 
that NATO relieve the additional burden involved in stationing US forces in Europe by 
developing a multilateral programme directed primarily toward the balance of pay­
ments costs and only secondarily to incremental budgetary costs of that deployment. A 
staff report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations estimated these costs to be 
$25 billion and $440 million respectively11. At a NATO Council meeting of August 
1973, a study group was established by permanent representatives to encourage the 
formulation of multilateral arrangements for burden-sharing12. Despite these attempts, 
there was reluctance in Europe to move in this direction, stressing that American 
security interests were served by US forces in Europe and they were not just for the 
benefit of the Europeans; that Europe supplied the vast majority of NATO manpower 
on land, sea and air; and that money directed to lightening US burdens would come out 
of money otherwise spent on national defences.
Congressional comment, on the other hand, was favourable: "By stating the 
concern (of the US about the military burdens of NATO)... as the law of the land, the 
Jackson-Nunn amendment has accomplished, as nothing short of the force of the law 
could, the Congressional intent to impress upon NATO the seriousness that the Con­
gress and the American people place upon equalisation of the burden-sharing for the 
NATO A lliance."13 The amendment approved by the House-Senate conference ex­
tended the period for meeting US costs from 12 to 18 months. Thus the allies had 
until May 1975 to meet the foreign exchange and incremental budgetary costs incurred 
by the US during the financial year 1974. The amendment required a report from the 
president every 90 days on the progress in implementation. If US costs were not fully 
met in the 18-month period, troop reductions would begin six months later, sufficient 
time to allow Europe to make compensating increases in their own force commitments.
The May 1975 extension removed the likelihood of US unilateral troop cuts
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before then, frustrating any opportunities presented by detente and the passage of any 
troop reduction amendment in 1974. But Europe still argued that - in the wake of the 
oil crisis, the impending economic recession in Europe, and a healthier US external 
account - the circumstances underlying the Jackson-Nunn amendment no longer ap­
plied. If the main consideration behind it had been the improvement of the US balance 
of payments, then the $1-7 billion trade surplus for 1973 ended its rationale. There 
was sympathy for this view, expressed by one US official14 as: "There seems to be a 
feeling that we are scratching around for nickels and dimes and asking the Europeans 
to help us with a problem that doesn't even exist." The trade surplus by itself was not 
sufficient, however. The administration's report to Congress of 20 February 1974 
made clear: "We continue to stress the urgent need for Allied action to fulfil the inten­
tions declared at the December 1973 meeting of Defence Ministers, regardless of the 
evolving balance of payments position of the US and its Allies" in order to disabuse 
Congress of the idea that with the improvement in US balance of payments, the imper­
ative for action was lost.
The success of the US-German negotiations could not be taken for granted. By 
January 1974, with the first presidential progress report to Congress due the next 
month, nothing had taken place since the negotiations between the US and West 
Germany had broken down in November 1973. (Similarly the NATO talks had suf­
fered from the Alliance crisis as well as from a realisation that it was Europe, not the 
US, which would be experiencing balance of payments difficulties.) An exchange of 
notes between Nixon and Brandt in early February led to a resumption of the talks to 
try to remove the deadlock caused by German unwillingness to meet more than 40% of 
the $3*3 billion that the US was asking. Brandt was confident of agreement when 
German finance minister Schmidt went to Washington for talks with Shultz in the 
middle of March. In its Community role, Germany was already disposed to repair 
Atlantic relations. As Alliance recriminations increased, the offset talks were one
156
Relative security and insecurity
tangible way to begin that process. The agreement in principle reached on 19 March 
1974 was intended to pacify Congress as well as serve as the stimulus for other NATO 
nations to meet the rest of the deficit and so remove the prospect of force reductions 
from the Atlantic debate15. It also provided a legitimate opportunity for Nixon to 
retract some of his earlier remarks which had linked security to economic cooperation, 
and to adopt a conciliatory tone in his Houston address (see chapter 7). Though the 
agreement was presented as a US diplomatic victory and as signalling a more construc­
tive period in Atlantic bargaining, in fact the US had settled for an offset of only just 
over $2-2 billion for the period June 1973-7516.
With that, the prospect of US troop cuts under the Jackson-Nunn amendment and 
the Congressional assault of the autumn of 1973 disappeared. The amendment, seen 
by its sponsors as the only way to thwart the isolationists in Congress, was the closest 
that Congress was to come to imposing manpower reductions on the administration. By 
the time that Mansfield introduced his amendment in June 1974, conditions were less 
conducive to winning the support of those senators who had voted for cuts in 1973 on 
the grounds of expense or the changing security due to detente. By the middle of 
1974, the removal of the US's immediate economic grievances, and the jolt to detente 
delivered by Soviet policy during the Middle East war, had undermined the Mansfield 
position. In turn, disillusionment about detente, and Alliance reconciliation at the 
NATO Brussels summit in June 1974, encouraged a more conciliatory attitude toward 
the Europeans17.
Europe between the superpowers
A unified NATO stance in the MBFR talks (preparatory talks on which opened 
in Geneva in January 1973) was the other factor working against unilateral force cuts. 
That the talks would prevent unilateral US cuts had been the only incentive that Europe 
had for supporting the process. Underlying the Europeans' unease in September 1973 
was the concern that the US no longer linked its own security and that of West Europe.
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This was aggravated by the growing belief in Europe that the US was prepared to deal
over their heads with the Soviet Union on security matters. Indeed Bertram wrote;
"The main political task of MBFR over the past four years [that is, since 
NATO's proposal for such talks in June 1968] was to ensure that American 
forces in Europe would not be reduced unilaterally. It was devised and used by 
both the West European and the US Governments to this end, in providing the 
American Administration with an additional argument against those in the US 
Senate who favoured, for a variety of reasons, considerable cuts in the American 
troops in Europe."18
This view assumed continued administration opposition to such cuts, and yet 
throughout 1973 that opposition seemed to be less firm than before as the exigencies of 
Watergate began to force Nixon into seeking to accelerate the pace of both MBFR and 
CSCE. By relying on force reductions through MBFR in order to placate Congress, 
the administration was obliged to demonstrate its intention to achieve them. US vul­
nerability on the MBFR talks increased the possibility that it would permit a more 
flexible position in the CSCE talks as a quid pro quo, against the opposition of those 
European countries - particularly France and West Germany - which considered CSCE 
to be crucial to the success of their respective policies toward the East. The pressure 
on US foreign policy for results was therefore to create a serious misalignment in 
NATO's common position, reflecting the different ends that Europe and the US were 
pursuing with the Soviet Union19.
Divisions inside NATO on MBFR and CSCE
Although only the start of what was to become a long and unproductive negotia­
tion, in 1973 MBFR was an issue of real Alliance sensitivity. This was particularly so 
given that - with hindsight - the prospects of agreement, driven primarily by political 
rather than military considerations, were possibly never to be so good again. Differ­
ences inside the Alliance over the MBFR process had existed from the start. The 
West's declared aim in the talks was the same level of security at a lower level of 
defence expenditure. The Western approach to the negotiations was based on the 
premise that the Eastern side enjoyed clear advantages over NATO forces in geogra­
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phy, manpower, and the structure and equipment of its forces, and that these dispari­
ties were the principal threat to security in Central Europe20. A seemingly unobjec­
tionable principle, it was sufficiently open to interpretation as to be capable of raising 
severe conceptual and practical dilemmas given US scepticism about CSCE and Con­
gress's enthusiasm to make progress on force reductions. Only once it was accepted 
that there was to be no quick fix, and Soviet intentions had become more transparent 
during the resulting impasse, did European concerns subside.
The French position reflected the ambiguities inherent in its defence policy: 
support for continued US troops in Europe at the maximum level (viz. Pompidou's 
speech at the October 1972 summit of the European Community in Paris), combined 
with a suspicion that eventually the US would desert Europe in order to pursue inter­
ests which were at odds with Europe's. Given that MBFR presented only a negotiating 
check on that historically-determined trend and thus could be overridden when circum­
stances required, France did not see MBFR as worth preserving simply to stop unilat­
eral cuts. France believed that the US was determined to make some unilateral cuts 
either through direct Congressional pressure or by trying to "buy off" that pressure by 
limited pre-emptive cuts.
As seen from Paris, a mishandling of American withdrawals would permanently 
damage European interests by perpetuating Western Europe's military weakness inside 
the two-bloc division of Europe. Its antipathy to any multilateral negotiations (whether 
West-West or East-West) which might have the effect of dividing Europe according to 
military alliances was reinforced therefore by concern that imposed force ceilings on 
West European manpower would remove Europe's long-term freedom to adjust its 
forces to its security needs. Being outside of the military branch of NATO, France 
was not obliged to participate in the talks, and it had no intention of withdrawing any 
of its 50,000 troops in West Germany, irrespective of the outcome of negotiations.
Britain similarly feared that MBFR signalled a diminishing US interest in Eu­
rope. London's acceptance of the necessity of the talks reflected pessimism at the
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administration's ability to resist Congressional pressure and that, if that process were 
indeed unstoppable, it would be worthwhile trying to negotiate some reciprocal Soviet 
reductions. Bonn saw the talks as the way to apply cuts in the Bundeswehr. Its main 
concern was to ensure that MBFR covered not solely the US and Soviet forces. It was 
prepared to accept US-Soviet cuts in the first round only if the superpowers did not 
lose interest in MBFR thereafter. Countries like Germany, Belgium and the Nether­
lands wanted an assurance that the first round of cuts would lead almost automatically 
to the second (European) stage, whereas the US did not want the first round of reduc­
tions delayed by the need to agree a procedure for the next stage. US handling ignored 
the domestic political reality in Europe; once the US had made cuts with no likelihood 
of the Europeans' being able to do so, internal pressure on West European govern­
ments would produce force cuts in the West unmatched by the East European coun­
tries21 .
MBFR therefore reflected European distrust of the dynamics of detente. The 
increasing suspicion that superpower interests would decide the progress of MBFR was 
strengthened by their joint decision that the first round of talks would concern only US 
and Soviet troops, subsequently endorsed when NATO tabled its formal proposals in 
November 1973. The ability of the Soviet Union to exploit the Alliance's divisions was 
shown in the preparatory talks' discussion about the participation of Hungary and the 
neutral countries, during which a key concession was made. Western Europe had 
insisted all along that Hungarian forces be included in the calculation of ceiling levels. 
The US, however, concerned to avoid delays and to head off the Soviet counterpropos­
als that Italy in turn become part of the reduction area, did not attach the same impor­
tance to Hungarian involvement. On 13 March the issue of Hungary's status was 
"postponed", footnoted by a unilateral claim by the West to the right to raise the ques­
tion at some point in the future. The communique's reference to the effect that Hun­
gary's status could be changed was of only academic interest. What the US saw as a
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"time-saving compromise" was seen by Europe as a damaging concession.
A weakening of NATO's position on CSCE and also that on MBFR was shown 
by what Western Europe perceived to be the sacrifice of two essential bargaining posi­
tions in return for Soviet agreement to begin the talks in Vienna at the end of October 
1973, as agreed at the Washington summit of June 1973. They were agreement to 
accelerate progress of CSCE, and the dropping of the word "balanced" (to which the 
USSR objected because of the implication that the Warsaw Pact would make larger 
reductions than NATO) from the title MBFR. Kissinger dismissed this renewed 
European anxiety about American intentions toward MBFR:
"In the preparatory discussions in Vienna, there was some discussion about it 
[dropping the word "balanced"], but since it concerned entirely procedural 
matters, it has no substantive significance... What particular adjective one gives 
to describe it is really less important, but the substance of it will be that it must 
be balanced, and that it must reflect the principle... that no negotiation can 
succeed that attempts to give a unilateral advantage to one side or another... The 
future of force reductions in Europe will be determined by objectives. It will be 
determined by concrete programmes. It will not be determined by constant 
insinuations of some dark American design."22
But a dark American design was exactly what the Europeans did attribute to the 
concession. The CSCE process, while not so emotive for the Alliance as MBFR, 
reinforced this mutual distrust within the Alliance of US foreign policy priorities. US 
enthusiasm and European disaffection for MBFR was reversed over CSCE. The 
Alliance's position was to ensure CSCE used the Soviet desire for recognition of the 
post-1945 frontiers in Europe and for Western economic benefits in order to ensure 
progress on a detailed agenda focused mainly on Basket Three (human rights issues, 
flows of information and increased mobility of people between East and West, etcet­
era). The US administration, on the other hand, approached CSCE more as a neces­
sary evil, as one element in primarily a superpower activity to diminish the possibility 
of global war, which would only falter on over-ambitious Basket Three provisions. 
The US had little inherent interest in the CSCE and stayed out of most of the technical 
discussions. What interest there was focused on the conference as a bargaining chip in 
linkage with other superpower issues.
161
Chapter 5
For the Europeans, Basket Three was the real prize. Denying Moscow early 
completion of CSCE at summit level was one of its most important bargaining points, 
since this would prevent the full propaganda value of the CSCE's being exploited by 
them. This invited the Soviet attempt to bypass Europe and achieve a rapid completion 
of CSCE with as few concessions as possible, using US detachment from the talks. At 
the Washington summit in June 1973, therefore, using the lure of an October start to 
MBFR, the US agreed "to make efforts to bring the conference to a successful conclu­
sion at the earliest possible time... [and at] the highest possible level." Because CSCE 
did not particularly interest the US, the implication was that important European politi­
cal objectives would be conditioned by Nixon's domestic circumstances. Although 
concessions on offsets, exchange rates, etcetera, were ultimately acceptable to Bonn, 
for example, in order to smooth the course of the Atlantic dialogue and to deflect 
Congressional criticism, compromising CSCE for the sake of superpower accommoda­
tion suggested a deeper Alliance problem with the benefits for Europe of detente.
European suspicions confirmed: 
the Washington summit, June 1973
What remained unclear in mid-1973 was whether the US was still formulating 
policy as if there were a pentagonal world order (which implied reduced commitments 
to the Alliance) or whether the US was simply consolidating the bipolar configuration 
which had existed since 1945 and, with it, US leadership in Europe. Though the latter 
had served the Europeans well in the past when US and European interests had been 
more or less identical, they increasingly resented what Soviet nuclear equivalency 
meant for European interests. "Europe speculated nervously about the ramifications of 
the Soviet-American relationship, especially the degree to which it had become the 
central element in American foreign policy," wrote Schaetzel23. In an environment 
conducive to rumours of what the superpowers' accommodation would mean for 
Europe, the Europeans "found it hard to believe that Russia could resist the temptation
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to play on Europe's apprehensions that its vital interests were topics of discussion, 
perhaps subject to disposition in the course of private tete-a-tetes. Such suspicions 
would be difficult to handle in the best of circumstances, but in a sour Atlantic mood 
they introduced a dangerous complication in European-American relations."
The agreement reached at the US-Soviet summit on the prevention of nuclear 
war24 touched a raw nerve in West Europe by explicitly committing the US and Soviet 
Union to "proceed from the premise" that they forswore the use of force against each 
other, against each other's allies, and against any other country "in circumstances 
which may endanger international peace and security." Article IV committed the 
superpowers to urgent consultations so as to avert war either between themselves or 
between either party and other countries. Each party would be free to inform its allies 
of the process of the consultations carried out in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement, but there was a clear implication that these consultations would be second­
ary to those between the US and the Soviet Union.
The agreement posed problems of presentation for Washington in trying not to 
unsettle the Europeans by portraying it as more significant than it was, while not 
denying it as an important "step toward a new era of cooperation... lifting the fears of 
nuclear war from mankind," which would boost the president's prestige. Although the 
US could not accept the Soviet proposal for them to renounce the use of nuclear 
weapons against each other, Kissinger was unwilling to reject out of hand a project to 
which Brezhnev attached considerable importance, particularly in the latter half of 
1972 when it was essential to the US that Moscow should feel it had more to gain from 
the developing relationship with Washington than from backing Hanoi. In fact, the 
declaration represented an American success in watering down the Soviet draft. A 
case in point was references to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in war (so under­
mining NATO's military strategy). A draft in September 1972, having dropped the 
ban on the use of all nuclear weapons, confined their use to the territory of their re­
spective allies, so protecting the superpowers from nuclear devastation "while guaran­
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teeing the devastation of each country's allies. Nothing would have been better de­
signed to promote European neutralism or to depreciate the value of alliances." The 
proposal for joint action against third countries which were threatening world peace 
also seemed a contrivance to enlist the US in an attempt to deter any future Chinese 
aggression - a policy scarcely consistent with a pentagonal world.
While cooperating in the work of the declaration, therefore, the US was acting to 
blunt the edge of the Soviet initiative:
"In over a year of negotiation we had transformed the original Soviet proposal of 
an unconditional renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against each other 
into a somewhat banal statement that our objective was peace, applying as well to 
allies and third countries..."25
The final declaration therefore did not compromise either of the superpowers' 
rights to individual or collective self-defence under the UN charter, nor prohibit war 
with a third party. The obligation to enter into "urgent consultations" when the risk of 
war arose was a mutual politically-binding restraint, not a legal proscription, on nucle­
ar use: no machinery was to supervise it, and as Kissinger conceded: "If either of the 
two superpowers wants to find an excuse to go to war, it will find an excuse to go to 
war." Any sharp lawyer could find a way to violate the loose wording of the text. The 
agreement was in practice a code of conduct for superpower behaviour. This was not a 
criticism of the declaration. "Every agreement in history that has been observed has 
depended either on the willingness of the parties to observe it or on the willingness of 
one of the parties to enforce it, or on the rewards for compliance and the risks of non- 
compliance... It should, therefore, be seen as a restraint on the diplomacy of both 
sides... not a guide to action in case those restraints break down and war occurs." 
Rather, it reflected the success of Kissinger's efforts to loosen obligations by placing 
the declaration in the context of a bilateral agreement, not a treaty commitment.
European reactions
The problem for the European allies in NATO was the questionable compatibility
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of the declaration with the Alliance strategy of deterrence based on "first use" of 
nuclear weapons. If nuclear war was now a more remote possibility, what were the 
implications of that for the continued validity of the US nuclear guarantee to West 
Europe? The accusation that the US was collaborating in a Yalta-style condominium to 
settle the fate of Europe (and the world) over the heads of the rest of the international 
community was one loudly heard in West Europe.
The US asserted, rightly, that European fears were unfounded because if  the 
agreement failed to prevent war, then existing obligations to NATO would be main­
tained. Hence the importance of Article 4 of the agreement whereby:
"Nothing in this agreement shall affect or impair:
... (c) The obligations undertaken by either party toward its allies or other
countries in treaties, agreements or other appropriate documents."
Furthermore, Article 5 allowed each party to inform the governments of allied or 
other countries of the progress and outcome of the consultations initiated by the super­
powers under the accord.
This, however, was not enough to placate critical opinion in West Europe. For 
the Nine, already hard-pressed to define their own status in international affairs, the 
June 22 agreement expressed the reality of superpower cooperation: that regional 
conflicts, while being influenced by US-USSR relations, should not be allowed to draw 
the two unwittingly into a strategic conflict which was not initially of their making. 
Such a system of international conduct would eventually undermine NATO. What US 
signature on the agreement had not done, in the context of what appeared to be the 
related economic and political offensive against the Community, was convince the 
European allies that these had been safeguarding in any way against the weakening of 
NATO.
In criticising Kissinger in this way the Europeans missed the point, for the accord 
had not been an American objective, and was more a procedural than a substantive 
document. But this did not mean that Kissinger was not prepared to pursue policies
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that the Europeans would find hard to accept. The implications of nuclear parity and 
the constraints which this placed on American policy had been accepted by the US 
which, in turn, expected the allies to do likewise. The Europeans' reaction was, 
however, to see the US as defining the role of West Europe in the world not for the 
benefit of the Europeans and the US, but in order to reassure Moscow that, in security 
terms, the enlarged Community would remain inseparable from NATO and was not a 
separate defence entity of which the Soviet Union would need to take account in fu­
ture. That Europe was involved in these calculations without being informed was 
consonant with the administration's style of leaving it to America's allies (and to the 
force of events) to decide where they fitted into the evolving pattern. The allies' 
nervousness that a US-USSR design existed in which Europe was only peripherally 
involved was exacerbated by the absence of effective consultation. Kissinger later 
described it in terms similar to the presentation of the Year of Europe initiative. What 
limited negotiations there were in NATO proved insufficient to reconcile the allies to 
the American position. Although W C Cromwell's version was that Brandt, Pompidou 
and Heath had learned of what was proposed only two days in advance and NATO 
permanent representatives as a whole only six hours before the declaration was signed, 
Kissinger maintained that there had been sufficient consultation to the extent that Al­
liance interests were really affected.
"The Europeans were especially sensitive. They had known about the project for 
months. I had personally briefed Pompidou, Heath and Brandt several times.
But allied unity eluded us despite the intensive consultation. Though Heath,
Brandt and Bahr had given support, and the British had been partners to the 
drafting, Pompidou had always been wary, and for reasons of their own the 
leaders of Britain and Germany had not kept their bureaucracies informed."26
The allies never fully accepted that detente could not accommodate timely and
full confidential briefings to the NATO permanent representatives. Instead, formal
consultations through NATO channels tended to take place after the event, very often
outside the North Atlantic Council and, in the case of the 22 June accord, by way of a
briefing of ambassadors accredited to Washington (at a meeting in San Clemente on 29
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June). Innocuous though Kissinger may have protested the declaration to be, it in­
creased the risk that the seamless web of Alliance common defence was starting to 
unravel as the US began to see its security as not necessarily indivisible from that of 
Europe.
The reluctant acceptance by most of the US's partners that the declaration was
not a departure from established policy was not shared by France. Kissinger's meeting
with Jobert on 28 June in San Clemente, originally intended to discuss the declaration,
was dominated by French criticism of the US-USSR accord. Jobert was later to write:
"When power is concentrated in the hands of two superpowers, what is more 
natural than that they should seek to avoid confrontation. But just as natural is 
that every other country will worry about this entente and the powers of arbitra­
tion which it implies. Neither Nixon nor Brezhnev could have thought that such 
a text, which puts the whole world in the superpowers' sights and control, would 
leave other countries indifferent; both the US and the Soviets deny that they are 
organising a condominium: but the evidence had been there since Yalta, only the 
terms of the condominium had been lacking."27
French dislike of the June 1973 accord was aggravated by US policy in the 
Middle East war and in particular Kissinger's view that stopping the fighting and estab­
lishing a peace settlement depended entirely on US-Soviet cooperation. Jobert's state­
ment to the French National Assembly on 12 November 1973 provided the most lucid - 
if only because the most vitriolic - attack on the June agreement and its implications 
for world (and particularly European) interests. The Middle East war was instructive 
because:
"brutal crises such as this one are revealing: they highlight evolutions that were 
only suspected, bring out behaviours that were formerly hidden, and also inform 
us about ourselves, our possibilities of action and also, I cannot help but say, the 
limits of our action. "28
In the five months since June 1973, Jobert claimed to have seen "before our eyes 
the preparation, then the emergence on the international plain, of arrangements of such 
consequence" as to be too great to ignore. Jobert returned to it at the NATO Council 
meeting in Brussels in December 1973, claiming US-Soviet consultations over the 
Middle East to be the direct product of the June 1973 accord. The 1973 summit under­
lined the fact that the US were increasingly seeing security in Europe as just one area
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among many wherein lay the potential for superpower conflict or cooperation. If the 
West Europeans wanted additional security, "they would have to find it themselves, by 
increasing or rationalising their forces, by strengthening unity, or even by arrange­
ments with the Soviet Union within the framework of arms control or the global super­
power balance."29 That possibility could not be excluded as the Europeans began to 
draw conclusions from the June summit and from their weakness throughout the 
Middle East war. The latter was to trigger within the Alliance a "grave crisis and an 
unprecedented exchange of transatlantic recrimination."30 But the Middle East war 
also showed the limitations of detente, and arrested progress toward the superpower 
condominium which had aroused the Europeans' worst fears.
The Alliance and the Middle East
The events and implications of the October war and beyond have attracted con­
siderable attention in the last twenty years31. The following will focus on the major 
Alliance concerns that emerged from the war. As with other issues during 1973, the 
competing influences of US-Soviet detente and Alliance management defied solution at 
a time when confidence within NATO was already being eroded. The resulting ad hoc 
style of running the Alliance meant that no existing arrangements for Alliance coopera­
tion could be guaranteed to be invulnerable to external pressure, even on an issue of 
apparent US-USSR conflict.
When, in April 1973, Kissinger had described the Europeans' perspective as 
coloured almost entirely by regionalism, his purpose had been to emphasise how such 
regionalism deprived the Alliance of a flexible and coherent posture during times of 
crisis. This was particularly so for crises outside of the Alliance, for which no pre­
planned response could be adequate. Kissinger's comment in April 1973 that "we 
cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its 
benefit" was recalled by him when speaking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
after the crisis: "It is sad to relate the last three weeks bore out that description."32 But
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the reason behind the tension between the allies was that the superpower nature of the 
conflict made resolution possible only over the heads of the Europeans. The regional­
ism of the Europeans was not the issue at question in October 1973.
The US interpreted the Middle East war in the context of long-standing super­
power rivalries in the area. It looked to the Alliance for full support in order to pre­
vent a Soviet expansion of influence. A united NATO stand was required to help 
Israel (principally through airlifts from European bases) and to warn the USSR that the 
West was prepared to protect its interests. The Europeans did not see it this way. 
"Few in Europe agreed that the world was on the brink of confrontation or saw the 
security of the Alliance as being under threat."33 They regarded the war as being 
without direct implications for European security, and despite their previous criticisms 
of Kissinger's remarks to this effect, they now defended the regional role assigned to 
Europe and argued that NATO obligatons did not extend to the Middle East. Motivated 
primarily by a concern to preserve their oil supplies (the greatest danger to which 
would be to give in to US pressure and come out in favour of the Israelis), they reject­
ed Kissinger's view that supplies could be guaranteed only by a united NATO response 
which reduced Moscow's role in the Middle East. Hartman, the new US assistant 
secretary of state for European affairs, admitted subsequently34 that there should have 
been no presumption of Alliance solidarity on the Middle East, given a history of 
differences in the area (which had become more marked after the Six-Day War in 
1967). Rather than fall in with the US, Europe was anxious to impress on Washington 
the importance of avoiding a head-on confrontation. What, for Europe, was neutrality 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict was ostensibly interpreted in Washington as neutrality in the 
overall US-USSR relationship, with serious repercussions for the Alliance35.
The Europeans' unwillingness to see the conflict in terms of the superpower 
relationship was impervious to the course of the fighting. While they were ready to 
criticise detente for not having prevented the war, the European allies were prepared
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(just as was Washington) to invoke detente as the means to end the war. Indeed, they 
were determined to soft-pedal in dealings with Moscow, for instance in rejecting US 
suggestions that NATO respond to the Soviet Union's open support of the Arabs by 
reducing economic exchanges with the USSR and slowing down the conclusion of the 
CSCE process. These US proposals for collective retaliation against the Soviet Union 
and the East European countries which were involved in the airlift of arms to Egypt 
and Syria (made before the Soviet Union had shown any sign of sending troops to the 
Middle East) were rejected on the grounds that they would not be effective and that 
they would promote East-West tension at the very time that a superpower conflict had 
to be avoided36. Europe's reasoning was that sustaining the US position in the Middle 
East was not worth the price of stalling detente in Europe, for instance by slowing 
down the CSCE process (a relatively low priority for the US, but an important concern 
for the Europeans)37.
The American resupply operation to Israel was the starting-point for differing 
Alliance perspectives. Portugal alone allowed the US to refuel at the Lajes base in the 
Azores, and only then because of blatant diplomatic arm-twisting38 and refusal to 
supply military equipment for Portugal's colonial wars in Mozambique and Angola. 
Turkey and Greece declared, on 10 and 13 October respectively, that the US bases in 
their countries could not be used. Most striking was the public rebuke of the US by 
West Germany for the transportation by Israeli ships of US military material from 
Bremerhaven, in the face of the German request to be informed of all shipments to 
Israel. (This was despite the open secret that hundreds of planeloads of small-arms, 
munitions and tanks had left the US military logistics and supply centre at Ramstein 
during the first days of the war). The rebuke was described as "probably the strongest 
language ever publicly directed to Washington by a West German government." 
Public distancing of Bonn from US policy was regarded in Washington as "a particu­
larly gratuitous slap in the face."39
The Americans knew of the Europeans' strong misgivings about the Middle East
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war from the outset. At four NATO Council meetings on 6 October, there was no 
Alliance consensus on the way forward. American irritation was directed at the 
Europeans' formal refusal to allow landing rights to US aircraft, which called into 
question the role of US bases in West Europe and required the US navy and air force, 
denied the access to bases in Western and Southern Europe, to make detours of up to 
2,000 miles to reach the Middle East theatre. (The Soviet Union, on the other hand, as 
K issinger noted later, was not impeded from overflying NATO airspace over 
Turkey.40) The reaction of the Germans therefore raised "some question" about 
whether the Bonn government viewed "readiness" in the same way as the Americans 
did41. Furthermore, the success of the airlift had demonstrated the feasibility of rein­
forcing US bases in Europe from the US, grist to the mill of those seeking to reduce 
the US presence in Europe. The threat by US defence secretary James Schlesinger that 
the US would have to "investigate all aspects of the responsiveness of various countries 
in this crisis" and take them into consideration in the future, at a time of considerable 
misgivings in the Congress about the cost of the forces, was particularly ominous for 
the European NATO members42.
While German difficulties were representative of wider European scepticism of 
the American role, it was against Bonn that the US directed most of its criticism. 
These events were regarded at the time as having brought US-West German relations 
to a post-war low point43. Stung by US criticism, and determined to treat the US- 
German tension as part of a problem within NATO rather than as a bilateral dispute, 
Bonn sought quickly to mend its fences with Washington, as a result of which, in an 
exchange of letters, Nixon assured Brandt that he regarded differences as settled44 
because the Germans were not the main culprits in the lack of Alliance solidarity. This 
was certainly the case. US anger at Brandt had, for instance, been matched by their 
disappointment at British hostility to lending any backing to the US policy, both diplo­
matically and in terms of military assistance to the Israelis. It was further evidence of
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Britain's failure to bring about the much-hoped-for globalisation of European perspec­
tives (and confirmed the more sympathetic policy toward the Arabs which Lord Home 
had espoused at Harrogate in 1970; see chapter 6).
Anglo-American tension during the Middle East war
A number of particular events brought tension into Anglo-American relations in 
the early stages of the conflict. This was compounded later by considerable UK unhap­
piness at American handling of the nuclear alert. Yet despite US criticism, for in­
stance, of the British ban on arms shipments to the Middle East, that in their view 
discriminated solely against Israel by depriving it of spare parts and ammunition for 
British-supplied Centurion tanks, London's failure to help Israel until it was on the 
brink of defeat was due more to discord in, and prevarication among, the US govern­
ment over the implications for detente than to any particular lack of cooperation on the 
part of the Europeans. The same applied to the British refusal to propose (at Washing­
ton's request) a ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council in the early stages of 
the war. This was due to the view in London that Anwar Sadat had little interest in a 
ceasefire at a time of Egyptian successes, and that superpower calculations were over- 
optimistic45. Kissinger, however, interpreted this as a British attempt to distance itself 
from American policy in order to protect oil supplies. On top of that was the refusal to 
allow America to use reconnaissance and refuelling facilities at the RAF base at Akro- 
tiri in Cyprus46, which caused the US to impose a temporary ban on US intelligence 
reports to Britain (although British officials maintain that links were not severed and 
that, at official level, the supply of material continued47).
Central to the British criticism was the American intention to support Israel 
diplomatically and militarily by invoking Alliance solidarity without prior consultation 
and the agreement of the European allies. It can be argued that US high-handedness 
would have been damaging even at a time when relations were generally good, and, 
given differing interests and perceptions in the Middle East between the US and
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Europe, consultation - even had there been time - would have only sharpened Alliance 
divergency and confirmed that the Alliance was incapable of any unified action on this 
issue.
Details of these developments remain classified. Lord Home recalls, however, 
that no formal US request for use of British bases was made, and hence there was no 
need for any British refusal. There were, however, certain conditions applied before 
agreement to a US request early on in the conflict (about 10 October) for US recon­
naissance flights to use the US facility at RAF Mildenhall. Among these was the need 
for a cover story, rather than direct avowal that UK bases were being used, a condition 
Washington was not prepared to accept48.
Although Home and others insisted at the time that there was no question of the 
British refusing permission for the Americans to use British bases in the UK and 
Cyprus for reconnaissance purposes, a different interpretation emerged thirteen years 
later when - in the context of American use of British bases for the bombing of Libya - 
Edward Heath suggested that US access to British facilities in 1973 had indeed been 
denied. He told Parliament on 16 April 1986:
"We had to deal with an equally difficult question during the Yom Kippur war in 
the Middle East in 1973. We were asked for the use of bases, including those in 
Cyprus. The reply which my government sent to the United States was no."49
The American nuclear alert
The more immediately important question of consultation concerned the world­
wide nuclear alert, which affected US bases globally, including all those in Western 
Europe. Of the allies' complaints of lack of consultation, Kissinger wrote subsequent­
ly:
"The allies were really objecting not so much to timing as to the absence of 
opportunity to affect our decision. But imminent danger did not brook an ex­
change of views and, to be frank, we could not have accepted a judgment differ­
ent from our own... allies should be consulted whenever possible. But emergen­
cies are sure to arise again; and it would not be in anyone's interest if the chief 
protector of free world security is hamstrung by bureaucratic procedure."50
Kissinger's feelings at the time were not disguised. Following Nixon's comment
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that "our European friends hadn't been as cooperative as they might have been in 
attempting to help us to work out the Middle East settlem ent... and that Europe... 
would have frozen to death this winter unless there had been a settlement,"51 Kissing­
er was reported to have said (but later denied): "I don't care what happens to NATO, 
I'm so disgusted,"52 and he told a European Parliamentary delegation: "What concerns 
us is that for two weeks while the United States had to make significant decisions, the 
Europeans acted as though the North Atlantic Alliance did not exist... The Europeans 
seemed more interested in gaining marginal individual advantages than in cooperating 
on united action."53
American officials were unapologetic about any alleged lack of consultation54, 
characterising the swiftness of events as the inevitable part of any such crisis, though 
the Europeans' objections were due less to the need for the Americans to call a nuclear 
alert than to the way they went about informing the Alliance. It was profoundly dis­
turbing that information about the existence of the alert and its necessity was conveyed 
at ambassadorial level and not by direct communication from Nixon to the major 
European leaders. Further, it was unsatisfactory that the news was held back for three 
hours while the Americans prepared and delivered their reply to the note from Dobry­
nin, the Soviet representative in the US. There was a clear implication that Washington 
had expected an unhelpftil reaction were they to have told the Europeans of the precau­
tionary nature of the alert55. The issue was undoubtedly mishandled in the NATO 
Council meeting the day after the alert. Briefing of the NATO ambassadors took place 
one hour after the delivery by the US of their reply to the original Soviet proposal to 
move troops into the Middle East which had precipitated the alert56. The unsatisfacto­
ry conveyance of details of the alert through the US NATO representative, who was 
too inadequately briefed to satisfy all the Europeans' legitimate concerns, created the 
impression that the consultation was perfunctory and minimal. This was in contrast to 
the intensive negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union to draw up UN Securi­
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ty Council Resolution 338 as the basis for the eventual ceasefire.
Kissinger seemed to be operating on the premise that, so strenuous had the 
Europeans been in asserting their separateness from American policy, Washington had 
no obligation to consult. His actions furthermore suggested that to obtain allied support 
for the alert would have required US reassurances to its allies about the limits to which 
Washington would pursue the crisis, reassurances which - if leaked to Moscow by the 
more timorous of America's allies - would have diminished the credibility of the alert.
Assuming, as the Europeans had to do, that the US intelligence sources which 
had detected the possibility of a Soviet movement of troops in the Middle East were 
sound, and that the decision to call the alert was taken independently of the crisis 
caused by the dismissal of the Watergate special prosecutor57, the decision to proceed 
to a higher state of alert with whatever consultation of allies was possible was in 
accordance with NATO emergency procedures58. European acceptance of the necessi­
ty for a worldwide Defence Condition 3 alert (the highest state of readiness in peace­
time) was, however, necessarily made more difficult by the imprecise nature of the 
Soviet threat. Schlesinger defined the immediate cause to be "not of a military nature" 
but due to the "ambiguities" of Soviet behaviour. He admitted the probability of Soviet 
intervention to have been low, but stressed it could not be ruled out59. Kissinger also 
attributed it to "the ambiguity of some of the actions and communications and certain 
readiness measures that were observed."60 While the note delivered by the Soviet 
ambassador in Washington announcing their intention to intervene alone if necessary 
was described by Senator Jackson as a "brutal letter," indicating that "we are at the 
showdown stage,"61 the administration was more cautious, hence the "precautionary 
nature" of the alert.
Thus Kissinger's description: "We are not talking of threats that have been made 
against one another. We are not talking of a missile crisis situation... And therefore 
we are talking about a precautionary alert and not an actual one."62
In his testimony to Congress, Arthur Hartman attempted to explain whether US-
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European differences were endemic in the peculiar dangers that a Middle East conflict 
presented to the Alliance, or whether the differences were due simply to inadequate 
consultation. At the crucial time that the alert was called following the Soviet ultima­
tum for joint US-Soviet intervention, the general feeling in Europe was that either such 
intervention was acceptable, or that the Soviet Union was bluffing. The Europeans, 
said Hartman, seemed to have the wrong idea of what US-Soviet or Soviet intervention 
would have meant. Only once the circumstances were explained did most of the allies 
accept the US's position. Despite the oil factor and the increasing sympathy of Euro­
peans with the Arab cause, Hartman said Nixon and Kissinger had believed Europe 
would be fully supportive of the Americans given the information that the latter pos­
sessed63.
Europe's complaints over lack of consultation
If Washington did act in the belief that the Europeans would accept without 
argument the necessity for an alert, this was unrealistically optimistic, suggesting how 
little European concerns were understood. It discounted the very real misapprehen­
sions in Europe about US foreign policy resulting from the erosion of trust throughout 
1973, the suspicions of US-Soviet connivance, and the effect of a politically weakened 
president. It ignored the specific differences that Europe had with the US over the 
Middle East. These were sensitivities that Kissinger certainly chose to ignore64. The 
alert and the preparation of Resolutions 338-340, about which there had been scant 
consultation or information, made the Middle East a singularly inappropriate area for 
the US to put the Alliance's coherence to the test. Hence the view that, in Jobert’s 
words, Europe was "brutally pushed aside by the superpowers in the peace process... 
treated like a non-person."65
Failure of consultation was felt most particularly in London where, in the face of 
evident US disregard for standing consultative arrangements, recourse had still to be 
made to these agreements with the US, signed in 1951 and 1952. They provided the
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basis for consultation in the event of action affecting both US bases in the UK and any
consideration of nuclear use outside the UK. Despite the brave face put on by the
government, the fact was that consultation was negligible and amounted to being
informed only after the decision by the National Security Council, albeit before
implementation of the alert (confirmed in private conversation with both Lord Home
and Sir Donald Logan). Heath and Home explained the absence of full consultation on
the grounds that use of US bases in the UK had not been at issue.
"The operational use of facilities in this countries was not in question. If it had 
been in question,it would have been governed by the agreement between the 
British Government and the United States Government which has been in force 
for many years under several administrations and which remains valid. I hope 
that that makes clear the position about the alert and this country."66
The following day, in the same debate, Home said similarly:
"The procedures have flowed from a communique issued after talks between Mr 
Churchill and President Truman on 9 January 1952... (which reaffirms the 
understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for 
joint decision... in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time...). That has 
governed our approach to these matters since then and I do not see any reason 
why it should be varied."
[in answer to a point about US planes operating from US bases in the UK]
".. .there was no proposal that [US] forces should be used. If there had been 
such a proposal that they should be used from the UK, consultations would have 
had to have taken place. The Americans could not have done anything without 
our consent."67
London's very considerable unease at US actions and at the UK's marginalisa­
tion, and the French view that Europe had been humiliated, were not diminished by US 
accusations of betrayal levelled against the Europeans. Exclusion from the diplomacy 
behind Resolutions 338-340, and enforced involvement in a tactic to outface the Soviet 
Union over the survival of the Egyptian Third Army, said much about the workings of 
the superpower relationship and the role of the Europeans within it. At the very least, 
Washington's failure to consult, despite countless promises to do so, and its decision 
not to give its allies advance warning of a military alert which inevitably affected their 
interests, "fits a dismally familiar pattern..."68
The refusal of the Europeans to endorse the alert (for example, in H eath 's
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remarks to the Commons on 30 October, Home's opinion that there was no evidence
that the Soviet Union was seriously considering unilateral action in the Middle East69,
and the public protest by the Germans over arms shipments on 25 October) brought out
into the open what many had sensed for some time:
"that in addition to continuing common interests, there exist deep differences 
between American and European security outlooks which can no longer be 
accommodated by pledges of transatlantic harmony."70
The basic problem was the concentration of military weight in the US, and the 
fact that the existing provisions for consultation within NATO did not take account 
automatically of Europe's wish to be consulted on all matters affecting their interests. 
For a purely national American alert, involving their forces based in Europe for use 
out of area, the US president was under no formal obligation to consult, only to inform 
as soon as possible. Since this was so little in the European interest in cases involving 
military operations out of area, immediate thought was given to how to avoid the 
recurrence of such a damaging and public division of opinion. This reached no specif­
ic conclusions other than reiterating the existing agreements for consultation, though 
useful work in agreeing the need for closer consultation was done at the meeting of 
defence ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group on 6-7 November 1973. Nonethe­
less, doubts remained about the degree to which the Alliance could come to terms with 
future breakdowns of consultation. The remedies discussed in the latter part of 1973 
were procedural rather than substantive. Both the United States and Western Europe 
agreed that consultations would have to be improved in the future, but this only begged 
the question. "Even if the Nixon administration had consulted fully with its allies in 
1973, and even if European governments had fully met American requests... for politi­
cal support and consultation, the pall of mutual doubt would not have lifted."71
Diplomatic moves: 
European exclusion from the peace process
US diplomacy to prevent a Soviet presence in the Middle East had other conse-
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quences for the Europeans. Having rejected on 20 October, when Kissinger went to 
Moscow, a Soviet request for a joint US-Soviet force to be sent to the Middle East, 
and backed this up five days later by a nuclear alert, the US was able to dictate the 
peace process without reference to others. Given the plight of the Egyptians, the Soviet 
Union was in no position to delay agreement on UN resolution 338 (which called for 
an immediate ceasefire, implementation of resolution 242, and negotiations for a peace 
settlement under the "appropriate auspices"). To this had been added, under resolution 
339 (agreed on 23 October), the demand that a UN observer group be assigned to 
oversee the ceasefire of 22 October (whose collapse and the imminent defeat of the 
trapped Egyptian army had encouraged the Soviet Union to press its original aim of a 
joint superpower force in the area). Under the third ceasefire resolution 340 on 25 
October, the Soviet Union retreated from its position and accepted a UN force for the 
area which excluded troops from the five permanent member countries of the UN 
Security Council.
Without consultation, therefore, Kissinger had written France and Britain out of 
a peacekeeping role in the Middle East, an action which brought the two close to 
vetoing resolution 34072. American domination of the peace process was further re­
flected in the preparation of the "appropriate auspices" for the peace talks. In his tour 
of the Middle East in November 1973, as a prelude to the Geneva conference sched­
uled to open on 18 December 1973, Kissinger made clear that he saw no role for the 
Europeans, despite representations from France and Britain. It was explicit retaliation 
against Europe's strong pro-Arab bias, a bias that Kissinger did not want to take into 
account in the Geneva peace process. It demonstrated that an independent European 
diplomatic stance, when contrary to US policy, would not by right secure access for 
the Nine in the superpowers' diplomacy. On the contrary, it would mean their exclu-
73sion .
Europe was therefore frozen out of the Geneva talks, so weakening the ability of 
the French and, to a lesser degree, the British to convince the Arabs (as well as the
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more sceptical members of the Nine) that the Community's diplomatic weight in the 
peace process was an argument for preferential lifting of the oil embargo. By depriving 
the Europeans of the opportunity to be represented in such a high-level forum as the 
Geneva conference, Washington reduced the credibility of Europe's position among 
the less convinced governments among the Nine. By so doing, it was laying the foun­
dations for US domination of the Washington energy conference in February 1974.
First-hand evidence that Washington held all the cards did not, however, imme­
diately induce the sense that the Nine should rethink their ideas. In a speech to the 
European Parliament on 13 November, Brandt reflected the anxiety of the Nine in the 
light of the October war. Proceeding from the premise that "in a world whose destiny 
cannot and should not be determined by two superpowers alone, the influence of a 
united Europe has become indispensable," Brandt advanced the case for a genuine 
European union, both political and economic, as a necessity for world stability. There 
were lessons for both the US and the Europeans to be learnt from the crisis in the 
Alliance. For the US there was the realisation that "Europe has become self-confident 
and independent enough to regard itself as an equal partner in this relationship, and it 
is as such that it must be accepted. Partnership cannot mean subordination." For the 
Europeans came the warning that, despite being directly affected by the conflict be­
cause of its energy reliance (a reliance that meant that the "Middle East conflict con­
cerns us perhaps more than others"), the Community could not exercise influence in its 
present condition. "The dramatic world political events of the past weeks have demon­
strated how powerless the European states remain as a factor for peace and stabilisa­
tion in the world as long as they are unable to act in unison."74
Similarly in his speech to the French National Assembly on 12 November, Job- 
ert75 attacked the US for failing to consult over the alert. Superpower conduct was a 
logical development of the 22 June 1973 agreement by which "the United States and 
the USSR entered on a process of balance and arbitration that reaches out far beyond
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their own territories... everything inclines them to develop that agreement and to resort 
to permanent arbitration both on their own difficulties and on the conflicts of others 
that might interfere with their dialogue." By confirming French uncertainties about the 
"operation and effects of the system of consultation of the Brezhnev-Nixon agreement" 
and by the absence of the information and consultation which was so essential to Al­
liance solidarity, "the reverberations of the night of 24 to 25 October will be felt for 
some time to come. Regardless even of whether the alert was justified when it was 
proclaimed, one may still ask questions as to the consistency of the assistance of the 
Alliance with its very object."
De facto condominium was evinced moreover by the way that France, Great 
Britain and China were "deliberately barred from taking a hand [in the peace negotia­
tions] by the provisions of Resolution 340. "76 Europe was pushed aside, in a belittle- 
ment of its patient and persevering search for a peace settlement over the previous 
years, a "forgotten victim of the conflict but a victim nonetheless... more a pawn than 
an instrument or an asset in the arbitration of the great powers... Neither France nor 
Europe must accept being sacrificed to a policy of balance in the operation of which... 
they would have no say. The Middle East conflict has led us to ask questions about the 
very operation of the Alliance, how to reconcile the consultations for which it provides 
with those provided for by the agreement of 22 June 1973 between the two superpow­
ers, and on the concept some have of the Alliance. "77
The French response to possible superpower condominium
The apparent unravelling of existing security arrangements suggested by US- 
Soviet nuclear parity, the Washington agreement to prevent nuclear war in June 1973, 
and the Middle East war of October were evidence that Europe could not aspire to 
wider international influence without tangible reinforcement of its incipient political 
unity. Far from abandonment of the goal of political union by 1980, as many were 
arguing in the face of the Nine's disunity over the energy issue, the cost of delay
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would be continued European marginalisation.
Events in 1973 changed the perspective of even those Alliance members closest 
to the US point of view. When Brandt told the European Parliamentary Assembly in 
November 1973 that "partnership cannot mean subordination,"78 he was merely antic­
ipating what Jobert was to tell the WEU on 21 November 1973, that "many nations are 
waiting for Europe to show that an alternative to condominium exists and that there are 
other paths to assume equilibrium in the world."79
The reality was that the sort of cooperation which Jobert had in mind in 1973 - 
entirely mischievously, according to Home and de Rose - was the articulation of half­
thought-out French responses to changed security in Europe. It was nonetheless impor­
tant that the provenance of such thoughts should be Paris rather than other capitals, 
since it reflected the doubts about security by the most independently-minded of the 
European allies. The anti-American thrust in French thinking was with an eye more to 
German reactions than to whether the UK would contemplate an Anglo-French extend­
ed deterrent. Neither Bonn nor London was to display fulsome interest, with the result 
that, while European defence was on the table, "there was no consensus on the forum 
in which to pursue it or on the broader implications of its development, particularly 
with respect to relations with the United States."80
According to de Rose, France was obsessed with superpower domination in 
Europe in a way that it had not been since Khruschev's visit to Camp David in 1959. 
Paris was more serious about alternative ways to ensure European security than at any 
time since the first Fouchet plan of 1961. Jobert had come to the Quai d'Orsay in April 
1973 obsessed with Europe's military weakness and the implications for its ability to 
stand up to US diplomatic pressure and negotiate effectively with the Soviet Union. In 
his first speech as foreign minister to the National Assembly on 19 June 1973, Jobert 
had indicated his belief that the defence issue would be behind every discussion held in 
1973, "and perhaps it will even move into the foreground." Unless Europe concerned 
itself more with the problems of defence, it would give itself up to "fatalism and resig­
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nation." He underlined this concern that "with each passing day, European defence 
takes on more a character of its own."81 By the time he addressed the WEU Assembly 
on 21 November, he was talking about a Europe increasingly abandoned to its own 
devices and faced with the responsibility of ensuring its own defence.
As a result, it was the French, through Jobert, who reopened the debate in 1973 
on the need for Europe to provide its own security, and specifically an independent 
European nuclear option. These ideas were a remodelling of Gaullist principles of a 
European defence force built around the French nuclear force de frappe , but with the 
difference that the latter would now consist of a joint Franco-British nuclear force, 
something under active study between London and Paris by the end of the year82.
Although his speech in June was described as pointing to "an important evolution 
in French foreign policy thinking,"83 the vagueness of Jobert's remarks betrayed the 
basic weakness of France's thinking. European defence cooperation required an act of 
self-denial on the part of those who feared that augmented French power would have 
serious implications for the Atlantic connection, and those who doubted that the French 
were genuinely capable of filling the vacuum left in Europe by the absence of the 
ultimate US security guarantee. Certainly French diplomacy in 1973 did not suggest 
that the French were able or willing to provide such a lead on the basis of anything 
more than overt self-interest. Jobert's speech did not clarify the French position, there­
fore. While presenting the dangers for West Europe if it ignored defence as an area of 
cooperation, he reiterated the need for France to preserve its autonomous nuclear role 
and the continuing necessity for a US troop presence in Europe. In this circular argu­
ment, he justified the need for France to ensure its own defence by the prospect of 
superpower condominium at the expense of European interests, and by the frailty of 
the Nine's cohesion. Jobert's speech gave no indication of whether France was more 
favourably disposed toward the idea of a common European defence policy: the omis­
sion reflected the very considerable problems facing European attempts to build up
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more coherence in an area where they were unable to match the US84. The more the 
West Europeans felt impelled by events to try to look after their own interests, the 
greater the difficulties created for the relationship with the US when it came to defin­
ing future relations.
French concerns about the effect of US-USSR rapprochement, strengthened by 
the Middle East war, were the stimulus to Jobert's further statement in November on 
greater European cooperation, the realisation of which depended on its partners' shar­
ing similar uneasiness. The French problem was that its European allies' disaffection 
with the US was not sufficient for them to fall in with long-standing French objectives 
for greater European military independence from the US. A transitory crisis could not, 
for instance, provide the rationale for West Germany to reconsider its allegiance to 
NATO and the US, much as Bonn was concerned about US troop withdrawal from 
Europe and about growing stagnation in its Ostpolitik resulting from the priority being 
given to building a new superpower relationship. As the Alliance ties began to show 
signs of fraying, the German response was not to look to France for closer defence 
links. Indeed, the Atlantic trauma of late 1973 only encouraged Germany to demon­
strate to Washington that Bonn was not party to the French wrecking tactics. As with 
the energy issue, so with security: France could not on the one hand obstruct the 
progress toward political and monetary union, and on the other expect its European 
partners to follow its policies for achieving a European Europe. Lord Home, while 
recognising the new ground that Jobert was breaking, said85 London was never in the 
slightest bit interested in the ideas floated by Paris in 1973 because of their distrust of 
French anti-American motives. French accusations that the US were no longer loyal to 
the Alliance ill became a country which had based its defence policy on distancing 
itself from NATO's collective security.
This explained the response to Jobert's more explicit proposals made to the West 
European Union on 21 November 1973, in which he suggested that the WEU be the 
forum for discussions among the seven members of the Nine (excluding Eire and
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Denmark) on European defence cooperation. Although the Nine had spoken with one 
voice on the Middle East, he argued, no-one had listened. Rejecting the idea of a 
European Nuclear Committee (which might weaken French control over its own deter­
rent), Jobert suggested the WEU standing committee on armaments (rather than the 
Eurogroup) become the European defence procurement agency; that it permit consid­
erable exchanges of information between the new WEU committee and Eurogroup (but 
without France's taking part in the latter, to which Paris continued to object); and that 
it become the foundation on which the European pillar of the Alliance might be con­
structed86.
The apprehension in Paris that continued cooperation by the European members 
of NATO, constituted as the Eurogroup, might isolate France would thus be removed. 
If its partners could be persuaded that ultimately European security demanded an 
organisation which did not contain the US, then the WEU proposal could be seen as 
setting the course for European security. The strongest argument in favour of the 
French suggestion for the development of the WEU as the means of achieving a de­
fence identity  for Europe was in fact the very presence of F rance in that 
organisation87. Nerlich described the situation as follows:
"The basic weakness in France's West European policy... is trying to establish... 
a system... of defence that can only be achieved by the simultaneous develop­
ment of cooperation with her three main partners, the United States, Great Brit­
ain and West Germany - at great cost to them. France can achieve a position of 
leadership by only her partners' self-denial and concessions." It was a "logical, 
even though futile, step."88
Jobert's address underlined, therefore, differences in approach to European 
defence cooperation. West Germany, determined to minimise the repercussions of the 
Middle East crisis on the Allies, preferred to strengthen cooperation within the estab­
lished NATO-Eurogroup framework. France remained unprepared to join the Euro­
group, so limiting its potential as a coalescing European entity within NATO. Intensi­
fying WEU consultations met with little enthusiasm - indeed, the suggestion of using 
the WEU's standing armaments committee as the exclusive framework for European
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arms cooperation was a direct challenge to the Eurogroup's activities in this field and 
was regarded by all of France's partners as an unambiguously backward step for 
European cooperation. Seeking to establish a defence identity separate from that of the 
US on the foundation of real but inevitably transitory disaffection of France's Commu­
nity partners was, therefore, wholly unrealistic. Regardless of any institutional changes 
they might wish to make in order to create a defence identity for Western Europe, 
European security was still regarded as predicated on cooperation with the US. The 
logic of the situation in 1973 pointed to the French becoming part of a military body 
which included the US as the realistic way to improve European cooperation on de­
fence.
There was much talk89 of German wavering in November 1973 as France 
homed in on potentially bruised German feelings about detente. To give weight to 
French ideas, it appears Paris was prepared to allow Germany the formal leadership of 
a European defence corps which would be designated for specifically European pur­
poses, but with the intention, says de Rose, that France would do the back-seat driv­
ing. Nerlich believes there was a shift away from Bonn's stance on the inviolability of 
the Eurogroup at the end of 1973, despite the government's formal position (reaffirmed 
in a statement on 8 November 1973) which repeated the firm guidelines agreed in May 
1972 that the Eurogroup should take precedence over all potentially competing or 
complementary bodies90. In fact, events suggest German wavering was motivated 
simply by German intentions to let down Jobert lightly91. Brandt's visit to Paris on 28 
November 1973 was seen as a crucial test of German resolve. There were signs of 
German movement on the issue, notably the agreement with Pompidou that a basically 
political approach should be taken on defence issues. But, at the same time, Brandt 
emphasised that the fact that discussions were being carried out was more important 
than the framework in which they occurred (taken as a clear hint that they should occur 
in NATO or the Eurogroup rather than the WEU). The German defence minister,
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Leber, had already told Jobert in talks in Paris on 9 November that French participa­
tion in the Eurogroup was the precondition for any European defence cooperation. 
Jobert's position at the November WEU ministerial meeting argued the other way. 
France held to its opinion that the Eurogroup was "un sac dont la corde qui leferm e  
est americaine,"92 but the ideas it put forward had no takers. The meeting of the WEU 
Council of Ministers in The Hague on 11 March 1974 agreed to postpone consideration 
of the French proposal until an unspecified date, a decision taken (says de Rose) in the 
light of renewed tensions between the US and the Nine over the initiation of the Euro- 
Arab dialogue and the desire of the non-French members of WEU to prevent further 
difficulties.
The German conditions showed the irreconcilability of Franco-German positions 
for as long as France remained outside of an Atlantic-oriented body. Despite its 
commitment to the Community, it was the Atlantic Alliance that was the basis for 
German security. "Our decisions must be guided by the big issues affecting our politi­
cal existence and not be influenced by ephemeral events," Leber told the WEU in a 
clear rebuttal of Jobert's divisive policy93. And, while having no objection to the use 
of the WEU as a forum for discussing cooperation in conventional forces, Britain, as 
the moving spirit behind the Eurogroup, retained an attachment to its continued effec­
tiveness.
Despite renewed French interest in a greater European orientation for defence, 
its own ambivalence and the insurmountable misgivings of its West European allies 
made the substance of defence cooperation in 1973 minimal. Jobert had spoken of 
European defence in terms other than of national autonomy and French military offi­
cials had expressed enthusiasm for a range of functional agreements which went fur­
ther than mere consultation. But, wrote Buchan, "their Sphinx-like President had yet to 
make clear whether he was ready to put the authority of his office behind a major 




In an interview with the IPU in January 1975, Joseph Luns was able to conclude 
that "what you heard a couple of years ago about Europe going it alone with a Euro­
pean defence has completely disappeared in all countries of the A lliance."95 The 
French bid for leadership of a European defence community was thus regarded as a 
symptom of, but not a solution to, Alliance malaise.
188
Relative security and insecurity
Notes
(1) See for instance a highly critical article published for the use of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
which cited exaggerated American preoccupations with the USSR and its effect of "Deepening the European 
malaise and contributing to a weakening of the Alliance": Detente: An Evaluation, USGPO, Washington, 93rd 
Congress, 2nd Session, June 1974.?This also commented for instance (p. 21) that "diplomacy, however brilliant, 
is no substitute for policy, and policy, particularly one which stresses its 'realistic' character, has to be assessed 
by its results. Looked upon in this way the policy of detente has very little to show in terms of either promoting 
Western interest or Western cohesion."
(2) On which see, for example, the mini-nuke saga in Michael Legge's Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy 
o f Flexible Response, Rand, 1983, pp. 28-29.
(3) W C Cromwell in Orbis, Spring 1978, loc cit p. 15. See also the Financial Times, 27 April 
1973 (article by Paul Lewis) for whom already the view was that the administration "was rocked to 
its foundations" by Watergate.
(4) Alain C Enthoven's "US Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 53 No 
3, argues that the balance of payments element had been overstated. He argues that for example 
Germany, as a result of absorbing the losses as the dollar devalued, subsidised the US to the tune
of $10 billion, 1969-74.
(5) See Phil Williams: "Isolationism or discerning internationalism" in Review o f International 
Studies, 1982, Vol. 8, pp. 27-38. His US Troops in Europe, Chatham House Press No. 25, RIIA,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984, has much of the background to the domestic US and Alliance discus­
sions.
(6) Nixon's "US Forces - Policy for the 1970s", 25 February 1971, cited in US Military Commitments 
to Europe, House report, No 93-978, p. 13.
(7) See C Gordon Bare: "Burden-sharing in NATO", Orbis Vol. 22 No 1, Spring 1978 p. 431, and 
Burden-Sharing in NATO by Simon Lunn, Chatham Papers 18, RIIA, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1983, pp. 14-16, for a summary of the interlinked issues during the Nixon years.
(8) The day after the Jackson-Nunn amendment was carried, the Mansfield amendment was passed in 
the Senate by 49-46, only to be overturned by a second vote five hours later (required because the 
Mansfield amendment had been a modified version of a similar amendment by Senator Cranston).
Normally this second vote would be routine in the Senate and not put to a recorded vote. But it 
allowed the Administration to lobby Senators and so defeat Mansfield on the second vote by 51-44,
an important point of principle given Senate pressure generally on the Administration.
(9) See Nixon: US Foreign Policy fo r  the 1970s, 3 May 1973, loc cit, p. 84.
(10) See The American Commitment to Europe, 17 August 1972, Report of the special sub-committee on 
NATO Commitments of the HASC, No 92-64. For the background to American thinking see, for in­
stance, US Military Commitments to Europe, 9 April 1974, pp. 6-8, Hearings before the Foreign 
Affairs sub-committee, H.A.S.C No 93-41, 1974.
(11) See US Security issues in Europe: burden sharing and offsets, MBFR and nuclear weapons,
September 1973, by J G Lowenstein and R M Moose, a staff report prepared for the sub-committee on 
US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2 Decem­
ber 1973, USGPO, Washington, 1973.
189
Chapter 5
(12) See C G Bare: "Burden-sharing in NATO", Orbis, Spring 1978, loc cit p. 427, and Lowenstein and Moose, 
US Security Issues in Europe, loc cit pp. 3-7 for details of this study group.
(13) See US Military Commitments to Europe, 9 April 1974, loc cit, p. 24.
(14) New York Times, 26 January 1974: "Troop cost talks stall".
(15) The effect of the March exchanges in resolving troop costs is unclear: C G Bare, Burden-sharing in NATO, 
loc cit p. 433: "It would be incorrect to ascribe the timing of the agreement to sharp exchanges... negotiations had 
been underway... and a successful conclusion was probably inevitable." See also New York Times, 21 March 
1974: "Timely boost for NATO" and the Financial Times, 22 March 1974: "Paying for the US troops".
(16) Furthermore, foreign minister Scheel was able to announce to the Bundestag on 20 March that he had contin­
ued to express his opposition "to the idea of linking defence, economic and monetary policies... I cannot offer 
military protection in exchange for economic well-being or in exchange for monetary decisions. The United States 
does not want this and nor do w e." (Quoted from the report of the Assembly of the WEU: Obstacles to agreement 
between Europe and the United States on solving the present economic and political problems, Doc. 632, p. 6, 
May 1974. See House Armed Services Committee, full committee briefing on German offset agreement, 7 May 
1974, for details of the agreement (Document No. HR93-46), and also Nixon's message to Congress o f 16 May 
1974: "A Report on Progress Made in Securing an Equitable Sharing of the Costs of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation among its Members, pursuant to Section 812(d) of Public Law 93-155" (House of Representatives, 
93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. H93-298). The sixth Presidential report to Congress of 27 May 1975 
confirmed that the offset requirement had been met - in fact exceeded (House of Representatives, Document No.
H 200-4).
(17) Phil Williams: "Whatever happened to the Mansfield Amendment?" in Survival, July/August 1976.
Watergate worked against Mansfield in 1974 and not for him as it had done so in 1973. Mansfield's 
proposal was defeated 54-35 on 6 June 1974.
(18) See C Bertram: "The politics of MBFR" in The Vbrld Today, Vol. 29 No 1, January 1973, and G 
Flynn: "The Content o f European Defence" in Orbis, Vol. 20 No 2 Summer 1976.
(19) Lawrence Freedman describes these domestic motives as follows: "A powerful argument against 
those seeking unilateral cuts (in the hope they will be reciprocated) is to point to the possibil­
ity of the same result being obtained through the less risky route of negotiations... these objec­
tives, if negative, are often quite real to the governments involved... Consequendy the value of 
arms control to governments often lies in the reassuring spectacle of negotiations, rather than in
any concrete achievements." In Arms Control: Management or Reform?, Chatham House Papers 31, RIIA, 
Roudedge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 16.
(20) Prospects fo r  the Vienna Force Reduction Talks, August 1978, p. 6.
(21) These European positions are examined in Lowenstein and Moose's staff report loc cit, which 
concluded that Europe was fatalistic: "Since US cuts seem inevitable (one way or another), NATO 
should attempt... to get whatever it can in return." Nunn was under no illusion that US reductions 
would trigger off parallel reductions in Europe, triggering Finlandisation; see "Policy, troops
and the NATO Alliance", Report of Senator S Nunn to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 April 
1974, cited in Einhom, loc cit. See also Consultations and Decisions in the Atlantic Alliance,
Report to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of WEU Assembly, Document 635, 21 November 1974, pp. 14- 
15.
(22) Kissinger: Years o f  Upheaval, loc cit, p. 286.
(23) J R Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, loc cit p. 56.
(24) See ACDA's Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Washington 1990, p. 179.
190
Relative security and insecurity
(25) Kissinger: Years o f Upheaval, loc cit pp. 284-5, for this and the other references on this page.
(26) In "Europe and the Structure of Peace", Orbis, Spring 1978, loc cit, and Kissinger: Years o f Upheaval, loc 
cit p. 286. Lord Home said Whitehall was relaxed throughout about the substance, but lamented the inadequate 
US presentation of policy (private interview, May 1982).
(27) Jobert: Memoirs d ‘Avenir, loc cit.
(28) "French Criticise US-Soviet Role", The New York Times, 13 November 1973.
(29) Strategic Survey 1973, IISS, 1974, p. 63.
(30) Strategic Survey 1973, IISS, loc cit p. 61.
(31) Nonetheless, one of the best summaries of the issues is still to be found in International Affairs, Vol. 50 No 
4, October 1974, particularly Coral Bell: "A case study in crisis management during detente", pp. 531-43.
(32) Quoted in The New York Times, 31 October 1973.
(33) See Strategic Survey 1973, IISS, loc cit, p. 62.
(34) See statement of Arthur A Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 19 February, 1974 in
US-Europe Relations and the 1973 Middle East Wbr, joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 1st and
2nd sessions, 1 November 1973 and 19 February 1974, published in Department o f  State Bulletin, 18 March 
1974.
(35) The Economist: "The Day of the Ostriches" gives a highly critical account o f European ac­
tions; and Robert Leiber: Oil and the Middle East Wbr: Europe in the Energy Crisis, p. 12, Harvard
Studies in International Relations, Cambridge, Mass., 1976.
(36) See the Financial Times, 31 October 1973: "US keeps up attack on Europe over Middle East", and The 
Times, 19 October 1973: "US presses NATO."
(37) New York Times, 31 October, 1973 reported "the Europeans felt that they had not received 
information warranting a conviction that they... had entered a major East-West conflict."
(38) See Elizabeth D Sherwood: Allies in Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990, for a 
further description of this.
(39) See International Herald Tribune, 27/8 October 1973: "Bonn and US act to soften dispute over arms to Is­
rael"; The Daily Telegraph, 26 October 1973: "Americans rebuked for sending arms from Germany". For details 
of the US-German dispute see Roger Morgan: The United States and West Germany 1945-73, OUP, 1974, p. 244; 
and The Daily Telegraph, 30 October 1973. See Coral Bell in International Affairs, October 1974, p. 539, loc 
cit.
(40) Kissinger: Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, p. 709, and also Leslie H Gelb: "US jets for Israel 
took route round some allies": New York Times, 25 September 1973.
(41) See The Times, 27 October 1973: "American anger over supposed NATO lack of cooperation during 
Middle East War".
(42) Quoted in The Guardian, 27 October 1973: "Europe let us down - US".
(43) The Times, 31 October 1973: "Bonn moves to heal breach with US". Brandt, however, cites the US-German
191
Chapter 5
acrimony aroused over the American use of German bases in 1958 for operations in the Lebanon as the cause of 
similar concern about how much Washington could rely on Germany in pursuit of what the US chose to regard as 
Western interests out of theatre. See Brandt's People and Politics, loc cit p. 316. Other references include Inter­
national Herald Tribune, 29 October 1973: "Bonn silent on US criticism of Allies' role", and The Sunday Times'. 
"So much for the Year of Europe": quote by Senator Frank Church: "The assumption that we made in the past 
that we could always rely on NATO to support us was wrong. We are certainly not going to pick up our tanks 
and leave Europe but we must both look more realistically at this changing relationship."
(44) The Times, 3 November: "US-Bonn dispute over arms cleared up"; New York Times, 3 November:
"US and three allies try to heal rift".
(45) The New York Times, 31 October 1973: "Kissinger said to express disgust at allies' position". Kissinger's 
promise that a full exposition of events would justify the alert was regarded as adequate assurance. Hence Ameri­
can irritation at Britain's refusal to promote the ceasefire resolution. The Times, 10 December 1973: "Why 
America feels Britain has let her down".
(46) See The Times, 2 November, 1973: "Unhelpful British stand rankles in Washington", and The 
Guardian, 31 October 1973: "Britain let us down, charges angry America".
(47) See R L Pfaltzgraff: The Middle East Crisis: Implications for the European-American relation­
ship, in a paper to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago,
August 29-September 2, 1974.
(48) Private interview with Lord Home in May 1982. Lord Cromer agreed with this analysis, but added that he 
had firm instructions from the Cabinet Office in London to reject any US request to use British bases. While his 
remit was to remain closely involved with the State Department in monitoring US relations with Moscow and the 
negotiations concerning a cease-fire, he remarked that this was possible at middle to senior levels in State, but that 
Kissinger became increasingly remote from consultation of allies, either through ambassadors in Washington or 
through NATO channels in Brussels (private interview, May 1982).
(49) Quoted from Hansard, 16 April 1986. Ed Streeter's recollection (at the time he was US Deputy Head of 
Mission in London) was that UK conditions amounted to a refusal, and were treated in Washington as such at the 
time (private interview, March 1982); it is probably the most accurate interpretation.
(50) See Kissinger: Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, p. 713. See also The Guardian, 22 November 1973: "US world 
troop alert was recommended by Dr Kissinger".
(51) Nixon press conference USIS, October 1973.
(52) The New York Times, 31 October 1973.
(53) Quoted in, for instance, The Times, 30 October 1973: "Dr Kissinger accuses NATO allies".
(54) "The US is firing off salvos in all directions which are ill-timed and ill-conceived. Ameri­
cans don't even consult, and then complain we don't share their views," a NATO official is report­
ed to have said. See New York Times, 30 October 1973: "Europeans irked by US complaint".
(55) Kissinger: Years o f  Upheaval, loc cit, p. 713.
(56) Kissinger: Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, p. 713.
(57) Kissinger denies a connection with the sacking of Archibald Cox on 20 October and the associated resignation 
of Attorney General Eliot Richardson (Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, pp. 547ff.). Chalmers Roberts records an open 
verdict in "Foreign Policy Under a Paralysed Presidency", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52 No 4, July 1974.
(58) A fact not disputed at the time by Sir Edward Peck and Franfois de Rose, the UK and French Permanent
192
Relative security and insecurity
Representatives to NATO.
(59) See The Times, 26 October: "American anger over supposed lack of co-operation".
(60) Kissinger press conference, USIS, 26 October, p. 4.
(61) The Times, 26 October: "Dr Kissinger says alert was an urgent warning".
(62) Kissinger, speech given on 26 October 1973, in USIS.
(63) Hartman, US-Europe Relations and the Middle East Wbr, 19 February 1974, loc cit, pp. 38 and 49.
(64) "Z" says the US treatment was deliberate but confused; in "The Year of Europe?" in Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 52 No 2, January 1974.
(65) Speech to the National Assembly, quoted in Le Monde, 14 November 1973.
(66) Heath, 30 October 1973, speaking in the Queen's Speech Debate; Hansard, Vol. 863 No 1, Col.
36.
(67) Hansard, Vol. 863 No 2, Cols. 184 and 185.
(68) The New York Times, 31 October 1973: "What Year of Europe?". See also The Economist, 9 February,
1974: "The unfriendly friends".
(69) Lord Home later retracted these doubts in admitting that Europe "did not recognise as quickly as the US" the 
strategic significance of events; cited in Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, p. 725.
(70) See IISS, Strategic Survey 1973, p. 61.
(71) Strategic Survey, IISS, 1973, loc cit, p. 64. This was precisely Kissinger's view about consultation, which he 
described as "far from a panacea. It is least effective when it is most needed and when there exist basic differences 
of assessment or of interest. It works best in implementing a consensus rather than creating it." But he recognised 
also American shortcomings: "American policy has not always been sensitive to the psychological prerequisites 
for effective consultation. It generally holds that influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company: 
the partner with the largest number of shares in a common enterprise is supposed to have the greatest influence." 
(The Troubled Partnership, loc cit, pp. 227 and 229.)
(72) As it was, France and Britain did not help the US in frustrating Soviet efforts for the inclusion of US and 
Soviet troops in the UN force. The US amendment would have excluded from any UN Emergency Force forces 
from permanent members of the UN Security Council. France abstained, and the UK said it would not be applica­
ble to any permanent UN force.
(73) See The Guardian, 27 November 1973: "Fears that US may freeze Europe out of peace conference". See also 
Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, p. 721, for his recognition that the exclusion of France and Britain was 
humiliating, but unavoidable.
(74) See The New York Times, 14 November 1973: "Brandt Criticises US policy methods"; The Guardian, 14 
November, 1973: "Brandt calls on the EEC to move towards European Government".
(75) "M. Michel Jobert souligne les progres de la construction europeenne”, Le Monde, 14 November 1973. Both 
speeches are cited in Kissinger: Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, pp. 718-9.
(76) Le Monde, 14 November 1973. Jobert's view was that the US-Soviet negotiations to reach agreement on the 
UN Resolutions rendered the Council powerless to perform its functions: "This powerlessness was tacitly orga­
nised by the two powers who wanted to settle the affair amongst themselves."
193
Chapter 5
(77) See Le Monde, 14 November 1973, loc cit.
(78) Quoted in The New Yorjc Times, 14 November 1973, loc cit.
(79) Address before the Assembly of the West European Union, 21 November 1973, French Embassy Press 
Service, (73/245/H).
(80) See R McGeehan and S J Wamecke: "Europe's Foreign Policies: Economics, Politics, or Both" in 
Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 4, Winter 1973.
(81) See the Financial Times, 20 June 1973, loc cit.
(82) According to L'Express of 26 November 1973.
(83) See the Financial Times, 22 June 1973, loc cit, and The Guardian, 22 June 1973: "Hopeful French hint on 
defence."
(84) Uwe Nerlich: "West European defence identity: the French paradox" in The Yforld Today, Vol. 30, No. 5, 
May 1974, has what is still the definitive background to the French initiative and the problems that it raised for its 
European partners. The issue is also discussed in European Defence Cooperation, Hearing before the Subcommit­
tees on Research and Development and on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Ninetyfourth Congress, Second Session, 31 March 1976, USGPO, Washington, 1976.
(85) In private conversation, May 1982.
(86) Address before the Assembly of the Western European Union, 21 November 1973: French Embassy Press 
and Information Service, (73/245/H), loc cit. See The Times, 20 November 1973: "France seeks closer defence 
links"; Le Monde, 24 November 1973: "La France veut developper la cooperation militaire intemationale". In 
fact, these ideas had already been canvassed in February 1973 by M. Bettencourt, the French Deputy Foreign 
Minister, on which discussions within the WEU had continued through the summer.
(87) See Julian Critchley in The Times, 7 December 1973: "The difficult art of self-defence in Europe."
(88) See Uwe Nerlich: "West European Defence Identity: The French Paradox," The Vforld Today, loc cit, pp. 
195-97.
(89) See for instance Christopher Coker: The Future o f the Atlantic Alliance, RIIS, Macmillan Press, 1984.
(90) Nerlich: "West European defence identity: The French paradox" in The Wnld  Today, loc cit.
(91) This is Franfois de Rose's view.
(92) Pompidou, quoted in M. Jobert, Memoirs d'Avenir, loc cit, p. 268.
(93) See The Times, 23 November 1973: "Germans disagree with France over US role", and Le Figaro,
24 November: "L'assemblee de I'UEO a confirme les divergences franco-allemands".
(94) See A Buchan, "Europe and America: from Alliance to Coalition" in the Atlantic Papers, The Atlantic Insti­
tute for International Affairs, 1973, No. 4, p. 21. See also Le Figaro, 7 December 1973: Defense: le choix de la 
France for the opinion that the Middle East conflict and super-power rapprochement had caused a remarkable 
evolution in the French policy on European defence.
(95) Quoted from the Report of the Assembly of the WEU: Cooperation with the United States, Twenty-First 
Ordinary Session (First Part), Doc. 669, 28 April 1975, p. 83.
194
Chapter 6 
Energy, the Arabs, and the Alliance
Through all the negotiations and difficulties cited in preceding chapters the 
Europeans had largely been on the receiving end of US (and US-Soviet) diplomatic and 
economic pressure to conform to a role in the overall security arrangements affecting 
Europe. The Europeans' opportunity to break the mould and establish an international 
identity did arise in 1973, however, in the shape of the war in the Middle East. The 
attempts at a diplomatic stance separate from the Americans as a way to offset their 
greater economic vulnerability foundered on over-ambition and the resources which the 
Americans could ultimately bring to bear in addressing all sides of the problem. The 
mechanics of Atlantic interdependence and the Europeans' greater dependence on 
imported energy brought to a halt the Nine's new-found self-confidence in 1973.
The danger of dependence on Middle East oil was a problem facing the West 
well before 1973. Kissinger's 23 April speech, stressing the growing importance of the 
issue and the need for high-level cooperation, was simply the most recent of many 
public statements recognising that a potentially serious problem existed1. The events of 
1973 demonstrated how the increasingly entrenched political positions and inflexibility 
both in the Alliance's geographical competence and in the subject matter which could 
be discussed in an Alliance framework made impossible the cooperation needed to 
overcome a major economic crisis in the western world. The failure of Alliance soli­
darity - and the determination of the Nine to pursue a policy perceivably distinct from 
that of the US - called into question NATO's ability to respond to future economic, 
political and security challenges where long-term interests were obscured by opportuni­
ties for shorter-term gain. The aftermath of the October 1973 war and the twofold 
decision, first by the Arab countries and then by all oil-producing countries, to limit 
production and impose a considerable price increase was a challenge to which the
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Alliance could face up only after the reflex of pursuing immediate national self-interest 
had been overcome, which ended only with the creation of the International Energy 
Agency in November 1974. The outcome was that the US's advantages in managing 
the energy problem and the related monetary implications reinforced the Alliance's 
one-sidedness.
In the circumstances of late 1973, progress in resolving the energy crisis and 
agreeing common interests as part of the Year of Europe initiative were incompatible. 
Divergent economic interests reinforced the diplomatic impasse. The attempt to reas­
sert US authority within the Alliance became just one more facet of the US's diplomat­
ic and peace-keeping role in the Middle East. The Europeans, rather than organise 
within the Alliance, regarded the Nine as the best means to nail their colours to the 
mast precisely because it was the one serious forum which excluded the US and so 
could be seen as representing policies framed independently of Washington. It was to 
be a damaging context in which to come to terms with the Arab threat to the Alliance's 
economic security.
Although energy shortages at the time added another difficulty to an already full 
agenda of unresolved issues, the gravity of the problem - and the eventually perceived 
need for cooperation - proved to be the factor encouraging Atlantic reconciliation. The 
common threat provided the Alliance with an opportunity for statesmanship which US 
exhortation about consultative machinery alone could not achieve. Out of disarray in 
1973 came the International Energy Agency in 1974. The new institution2 confirmed 
the interdependence which the Nine had been unwilling to reaffirm in any new docu­
ment describing Alliance relations. It almost amounted to the fresh act of creation 
which Kissinger had sought in April 1973 (which had envisaged rather more prosaic 
plans for stockpiling and distribution of scarce resources in the event of a shortage and 
sharing of new technology).
Because of the scale of the US success in pre-empting Community activity, the
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Kissinger analysis focuses mainly on the disintegration diplomatically of the Nine in 
the run-up to, and at, the Washington conference. The following examines those diffi­
culties to show how, in allowing the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
OPEC, to play off one country against another, the Nine (and also the Alliance) paid a 
high price for its failure to coordinate energy policy. Certainly for the Nine the events 
of the autumn of 1973 generated a new conviction that - while European union was to 
remain the objective - the wider Atlantic interest could not be disregarded. The fol­
lowing also explains the origins of the Europeans' apparent myopia and their concern 
not to jeopardise energy supplies for the sake of a conflict of which they wanted no 
part and where their evolving diplomatic position was contrary to that of Washington. 
It shows how the vacuum in the Alliance's readiness to address the energy crisis in 
concert led to a collapse of both Alliance and European solidarity; how the Nine failed 
to agree on the first substantive test of their political cooperation under the weight of 
American pressure; and how the Kissinger diagnosis and proposed solutions played 
such a determining role in the way that US authority was reasserted and the Year of 
Europe was eventually concluded.
Europe, the US, and the origins of disorganisation
OPEC's deployment of the oil weapon against the West as part of the October 
1973 military offensive against Israel caught the EC unprepared, (and the same could 
be said for every other country in the world). The Alliance's inadequacy to the task in 
the autumn of 1973 was as much a historical problem as one of competence. The 
seeds of the difficulties lay in the failure to develop any effective contingency plans, 
and hence the absence of any economic underpinning for what the Nine aspired to 
diplomatically.
The first serious attempt in Europe to formulate guidelines for energy had been 
made by the Commission following the Arab boycott of certain pro-Israeli European 
countries in 1967. But of the recommendations produced in December 1968, only that
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for the creation of stockpiles equal to 65 days' oil consumption was implemented. As 
Western dependence on imports increased (matched by grievances of the oil producing 
countries against the West), the Commission3 foresaw a future in which oil supplies 
were threatened "by more or less widespread interruptions". Apart from increasing the 
stocks to be held from 65 to 90 days' reserve, however, the 1972 Paris summit simply 
agreed that "an energy policy should be worked out as soon as possible by the 
Community institutions... to guarantee a sure and lasting supply under satisfactory 
economic terms."4 This was done on 20 April 1973: the Guidelines and Priorities fo r  
a Common Energy Policy5 proposed:
a) strengthening cooperation between the US, Japan and Europe, for example, 
through coordinated stockpiling of oil supplies;
b) closer relations with oil-producing countries, to ensure stability: cooperation 
with the US should not work against the "legitimate interests of the oil-exporting 
countries";
c) creation of a common energy policy including a uniform system for oil im­
ports and exports, cooperation on development of nuclear energy, and a more 
positive position toward the role of the major oil companies.
These guidelines, if adopted, would have served the Community well six months 
later; in fact, the Commission had set out the criteria by which the Community's 
choices and shortcomings could be gauged in the crisis half a year later. No action 
was taken on the guidelines, however; at the meeting of energy ministers in May 1973 
to consider these proposals, the French view prevailed that the Community should have 
no interest in a joint approach with the US on energy when their respective policies 
toward the Middle East were different, and relations with third countries should be 
conducted by individual governments, not by the Community institutions. This was still 
the French view six months later.
Within the US government there was a similar range of views6. There were 
those who saw the energy problem as one of Saudi-US relations, to be solved by in­
creasing political and military ties and by altering US policy toward Israel, for example 
responding to the proposal by Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, for a long-term
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bilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia and the US, so ensuring oil supplies without 
political conditions. On the other hand, there was the imperative of a solution through 
cooperation among oil-consuming countries, necessitated by the attenuation of the oil 
companies' ability to resist increasing Arab demands.
As has been seen in chapter 2, the differing relative dependence of the US and 
Europe on oil was decisive in terms of Western reactions to any solution predicated on 
interdependence. The US gained relatively when OPEC multiplied oil prices fivefold in 
1973-1977 because oil importation accounted for only 20% of the US's total needs, 
compared with Western Europe's 54%. Nonetheless, the US thought in terms of com­
parable approaches, a further example of what Waltz described as the tendency to 
respect "managerial habits of three decades [which] are so deeply ingrained that the 
danger continues to be that we will do too much rather than too little."7 In his April 
address setting out the tasks for the Alliance during the Year of Europe, Kissinger had 
made clear:
"We are prepared to work cooperatively on new common problems we face. 
Energy, for example, raises the challenging issues of supply, impact of oil 
revenues on international currency stability, the nature of common political and 
strategic interests, and long-range relations of oil-consuming to oil-producing 
countries. This could be an area of competition; it should be an area of collabo­
ration. "
In fact, talks between US and European officials did begin in April 1973 on the 
possibility of a conference of the major oil-consuming countries to form a concerted 
response to OPEC. Similar talks took place within the OECD, where the US had pro­
posed a multilateral approach as long before as 1969 but had received no favourable 
European response because of suspicions of a US ploy to shore up the position of its 
oil companies under the guise of serving Western interests8. In 1973 the focus in the 
OECD was on ways to extend the existing oil-sharing scheme among the European 
members so as to include the US, Canada and Japan. Problems arose here concerning 
the time when the pooling should come into effect (some wanted pooling confined to 
shortages arising from technical not political reasons) and the US insistence that it be
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obliged to share only a proportion of its oil imports, not its domestically-produced oil9. 
Weakness exposed:
the Alliance and the crisis after October 1973
The background to the OPEC decision related to the price rises in 1973 and the 
Arab output and destination restrictions can be found elsewhere. Relevant to the state 
of Alliance relationships was the need for a new approach to energy. In particular, the 
failure of the OECD10 to activate the European emergency allocation scheme strongly 
influenced Kissinger's thinking on the creation of a new energy institution. At the 
meeting of the OECD oil committee on 25-26 October it was concluded that the situa­
tion was not comparable to that when the European sharing system was last resorted to 
in 1956, when the European shortfall was 30%. OECD members therefore resisted 
US proposals for any emergency steps which could be interpreted as conspiring against 
the Arabs11. OECD squeamishness was reinforced by the US refusal to share more 
than its oil imports. Sharing US oil production as well as imports became a precondi­
tion for Europe's joining any allocation system which risked alienating the Arabs.
The existence of a formal allocation system inside the OECD partly explained 
why the EEC had no such system. Instead of creating one, stress was placed (particu­
larly by Britain and France) on the political implications of the crisis. Economic 
cooperation could not ameliorate the problem facing the Nine, and might very well 
exacerbate it. Linkage of oil with the Arab-Israeli confrontation made energy a politi­
cal problem. A common position on oil (and on energy in general) therefore depended 
on the Nine's establishing an agreed diplomatic position on the Middle East crisis. In 
terms of relations with Arabs, however, the Nine were not of one mind; by its very 
nature the Israel-Arab war was an inauspicious beginning for Europe to speak with one 
voice. Each member state left unity to chance. ''Where solidarity among EC members 
states should have been the order of the day in the fall of 1973, each member state 
sought to safeguard its own interests first, presenting a rather contemptible demonstra­
tion of naked national egoism. "12 The separation of economic from political self­
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interest was understandable:
"The temptation to opt for the path of least resistance is always very strong 
among the Community countries; thus they will more readily accept a common 
stance on a political issue where it does not carry with it any possibility of giving 
more substance to a Community decision-making body. Political decisions can 
seem painless; they can also be a distraction from the main business of the 
Community, the arduous ongoing process of forging economic links to meet felt 
needs."13
Opposition to intra-EEC allocation of oil supplies was made in the knowledge 
that this would conflict with Community obligations to the Netherlands. The initial 
response of some EEC member states was to impose oil export licences in order to 
preserve domestic supplies despite treaty obligations concerning free movement within 
the Community14. The controls imposed by Belgium, Italy, and Britain (all of which 
were major exporters of refined oil products) proved ineffective because oil companies 
rerouted supplies to countries that did not have controls15. Nonetheless the embargo 
against the Dutch presented an acutely embarrassing dilemma for the EEC: whether to 
demonstrate solidarity with the Dutch and so risk a general embargo, or whether to 
delay sharing (and so in effect enforce the embargo) in order that those member states 
most advantageously placed could try to improve their own position by diplomatic 
means, and attempt to build greater European political cooperation on this dubious 
foundation.
The latter course necessarily entailed pursuing a policy which would be opposed 
by the US, not least on the grounds that it threatened the Geneva peace process. In 
the short term there were benefits in agreeing policies in opposition to those of the US, 
but beyond that, those who felt the Nine's foreign policy dilemma most keenly were 
quick to regard the Alliance solution as more attractive once the Nine's separate policy 
meant paying too high a price in terms of Atlantic harmony.
Foreign ministers' meeting, 5-6 November: 
the Nine's statement on the Middle East
The contrived separation of economic and foreign policy was confirmed by the
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meeting of the Nine's foreign ministers in Brussels on 5-6 November. Originally 
intended by the Commission to consider both aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem, the 
meeting's conclusions were almost entirely devoid of economic content. By addressing 
the Middle East situation in general terms, the Nine sought to divert attention from the 
specific problem of solidarity with the Dutch, consigning it to a separate statement in 
which the Council of Ministers, "conscious of the interdependence of the economies of 
the member-states of the European Community" called on the Commission to "follow 
attentively the situation resulting from the shortage of crude oil and to report to the 
Council."16
The political declaration on the Middle East has subsequently carried the status 
of marking the start of the Nine's independent foreign policy in the Middle East, and 
was criticised by Kissinger on that basis at the time. The 6 November declaration, 
designed to show that the Nine were ready to do all in their power "to contribute to the 
restoration of a just and lasting peace", suggested that differences within the Alliance 
during the war itself were to be translated into an independent diplomatic stance by the 
Nine. The Nine urged both sides in the war to return to their October positions and 
agreed that peace negotiations should take place inside the UN (and so by implication 
not be organised solely by the US and Soviet Union).
The resolution was ambiguous within the context both of the Nine's foreign 
policy cooperation and of a Middle East settlement. Seeking a position which went 
beyond the Nine's earlier even-handedness (as set out in the 13 October 1973 declara­
tion), but which continued to carry consensus among the member states, the Nine 
assented to the view that they must try to bring about a comprehensive political settle­
ment in the Middle East. It could be argued that only this would eliminate the reasons 
for the embargo against the Dutch; but the more important purpose was to allow the 
Nine to aspire to a higher profile in Middle Eastern affairs. The immediate impetus 
for the declaration was Pompidou's call on 31 October for a common European policy 
on the Middle East by which Europe would have a larger role in world affairs and so
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demonstrate a "capacity to contribute to the settlement of world problems", on the 
grounds that it was dangerous for the US and the Soviet Union to settle world crises17. 
But in US eyes the Statement on the Situation in the Middle East gave priority to an 
Israeli withdrawal to the 22 October line to consolidate their gains up to the time of the 
ceasefire, instead of to disengagement as brokered by the US after negotiations. Kiss­
inger saw it as a programme that was "a direct challenge to our policy".
"The European statement would either undercut our diplomacy or demonstrate 
Europe's irrelevance... The only rational explanation for the Europeans' haste (ie 
for not waiting for the completion of the Kissinger mission to Cairo) was that 
they wanted to stake out a position in advance of ours even if we succeeded - 
before, as it were, the ground was cut from underneath them - and to have a 
platform from which to oppose us if we failed."18
Comment at the time and afterwards interpreted the Nine's position as appease­
ment of the Arabs by leaning strongly toward the Arab interpretation of resolution 
24219. What Home called the third success for EEC political consultation (along with 
the Nine's cooperation at CSCE and the response to the US-EEC declaration) was a 
policy which Britain had long advocated, based on UN Security Council resolution 242 
and Home's Harrogate speech in October 197020.
The timing of the statement resulted in the Arab decision of 19 November that 
the EEC (except the Netherlands) would not be affected by the 5% production cut 
scheduled for December. Because of the absence of any Arab reaction to the Dutch 
show of diplomatic support, however, the Hague's partners were equally reserved in 
offering assistance. At the same meeting which issued the Middle East declaration, the 
Dutch request for oil pooling was rejected. The Dutch claimed that the embargo was 
directed against Rotterdam, as the major oil entrepot of Europe, not the Netherlands 
itself; hence the embargo was directed against all European countries and required a 
concerted response. Yet the Arabs continued to cite Dutch support of Israel, particu­
larly a government statement of 8 October 1973 which had accused Egypt and Syria of 
starting the war. It was a situation which the Dutch were unable to retrieve by their 
subsequent support for the 6 November resolution.
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At best, the accord among the Nine was intended only to postpone difficult deci­
sions. For the French and British it reflected their view that European diplomatic 
support for the Arabs was the best means to help the Dutch and the other EEC coun­
tries not on the Arabs' list of friendly countries. For the rest of the Community, it was 
acceptance of a trial period for attempts to resolve the crisis through diplomacy, de­
spite their doubts that the EEC could really exercise real power in the Middle East. 
Ultimately what was needed was EEC pooling and cooperation with the US and Japan. 
Immediately after signing the statement, Brandt criticised the Arabs' tactics, saying 
that "pressure does not win friends, not even if the means of pressure is oil policy." 
On 9 November, Scheel insisted that the Federal Republic was neutral despite the EEC 
declaration. He also sought progress on a common energy policy. "It is absolutely 
senseless to make verbal declarations at this stage. There has to be action instead."21
Efforts toward Community cooperation
The Commission's objective remained that of a common energy policy by the 
end of 1973, as agreed by Community ministers in May 1973. The Commission was 
counting on the meeting of the energy ministers scheduled for 25-26 November 1973 
to take concrete decisions, gaining impetus from the failure of the foreign ministers' 
meeting of 5-6 November to address these points. Both France and Britain were 
opposed to discussion of oil in an EEC framework: Pompidou's proposal in late 
October for a Community summit, and the scheduling of this meeting in Copenhagen 
for mid-December, had deferred discussion of energy cooperation on the grounds that 
decisions could be taken only at the highest level. Until mid-December the intention 
was simply to keep options open. As a result the meeting of energy ministers scheduled 
for late November was cancelled and at the foreign ministers' meeting of 3-4 Decem­
ber the Commission's proposals were not even formally tabled; ministers simply 
agreed that consultations should continue between Community officials.
French opposition to talks on an energy policy was due less to the substance of
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such a policy than to its timing. Indeed France had advocated it for years, principally 
in order to reduce the oil companies' role in such a crucial area of the Community's 
economy. This had been strenuously resisted by the Dutch (now supported by the 
British) who jealously guarded the autonomy of the oil companies. Furthermore, 
French conditions for agreement to any such policy included the coordination of nucle­
ar energy policy, over which Paris had a particular axe to grind22.
In the short term, Britain and France had more to lose from pooling Community 
oil resources since it would compromise their friendly status. This necessitated pre­
venting EEC interference in their diplomacy with the Arabs, but was - only on a 
generous interpretation - consistent with those Commission's proposals calling for 
establishment of "appropriate relations" with the oil-producing countries. Prime minis­
ter Pierre Messmer stated that instead of oil pooling, bilateral deals with producer 
countries were "one of the realities of today."23 Furthermore, establishment of an 
exclusive Euro-Arab dialogue to secure oil supplies would erode the commercial posi­
tion of the US in the Middle East, and as such became a French aspiration at the 
Copenhagen summit.
The Dutch and the oil companies
Although signatories of the 6 November resolution, the Dutch and some of its 
partners (most notably the Federal Republic, Belgium and Denmark) openly questioned 
the wisdom of disregarding the internal requirements of the Community. The Dutch 
were not completely without the means to influence policy; on 16 November the prime 
minister, Joop den Uyl, publicly threatened to restrict exports of Dutch natural gas to 
EEC partners unless they allowed the free movement of oil within the Community24. 
Although a decision to block gas exports would affect the Federal Republic and Bel­
gium most severely, the Dutch threat was directed principally against the French. 
Since the Netherlands supplied 40% of the natural gas consumed in France, the threat 
was very real. Dutch suspicions of French policy had increased with suggestions in the
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French press that the Arab boycott of Rotterdam would benefit Le Havre. Support for 
the Dutch grew as opposition to Anglo-French designs for regular summits and their 
policy on oil created polarisation within the Community. Germany sounded a clear 
warning in advance of the summit: during a visit to Paris, Brandt spoke in favour of 
Community solidarity and again warned against the consequences of the direction in 
which Paris was seeking to steer the Community. "By accepting the weakening of one 
country, we would really be weakening the Community by itself and subsequently each 
of its members. "25
Although Dutch leverage was important, equitable access to oil was in fact being 
resolved by the oil companies, which between them controlled 65% of Europe's oil 
supply. The ineffectiveness of the Arab countries in enforcing the production cuts, and 
of the West in organising how to deal with them26, "ensured that the actual handling 
of the emergency would be assumed by those companies." The scramble for oil there­
fore produced no tangible benefit. Allocation of reduced supplies by the companies on 
a pro rata basis resulted in cuts averaging 7 % for everyone27. Since, therefore, oil 
deprivation was less than critical, some commentators saw no evidence that the oil 
weapon encouraged Europe to put pressure on US policy, concluding that the oil factor 
"played something less than a determinant role in shaping American policy, or even 
the policies of its major allies."28 The same did not apply to the rise in oil prices, the 
long-term issue where the US was able to exert its influence over its allies. The impli­
cations of what was the real issue facing the Alliance were not fully realised until after 
the second price increase in late December (by which time the West was better placed 
to cope with production cuts as a result of the relaxation of Arab measures following 
the Copenhagen summit).29
The Copenhagen summit
In his letter of 31 October 1973 to other heads of government, Pompidou had 
suggested that regular summits be restricted to just themselves, with the first to take
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place before the end of the year. It would aim to establish an emergency procedure for 
calling meetings of the Nine at moments of crisis. His explanation was couched 
primarily in political terms, expressing French views about a possible superpower 
condominium and its effect on Europe. The superpowers' role, he said, did not corre­
spond to the role that should be played by Europe which is involved directly in the 
Middle East through history, geography, and its Mediterranean links. The intimate 
fireside meeting would provide the framework and the coordinating focus for the Nine 
governments on major foreign policy questions.
While Pompidou's initiative to create a European identity which focused on polit­
ical cooperation, periodic summits and the establishment of a crisis management body 
had a certain validity, French high-handedness over the handling of the energy issue 
had considerably damaged the unity of the Nine. Community initiatives launched in the 
teeth of American opposition required prior French undertakings on energy and the 
regional fund issues, which Paris was unwilling to concede. French ambitions for a 
European identity did not match the concerns of most of its Community partners. For 
most of the Nine, following US policy on the Middle East was not ideal. Equally there 
was no compelling reason for the advocates of greater European unity to support a 
compromise between France's own national interests and those of its partners. France, 
by not providing strong and credible European leadership, allowed the US to present 
itself as a more reliable protector of long-term Community interests, a more influential 
broker in international affairs, and a more successful advocate of wider European 
interests. This process began at Copenhagen.
The first signs were the determination of the Federal Republic and the smaller 
member states to influence the summit agenda. Pompidou's original proposal for a 
summit devoted exclusively to political issues (plus concern about the course of mone­
tary union) was amended under Dutch and Federal Republic pressure so as to include 
energy issues proper on the agenda, not just in the general political context envisaged
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by France and Britain. In order to break down the artificial policy distinctions which 
some had tried to draw in dealing with the Middle East war, Germany proposed that 
the summit should review the current state of the Community generally, and particular­
ly progress toward the deadlines imposed in October 1972. That meant placing current 
disagreements directly in the context of the longer-term objectives which the Commu­
nity had set itself twelve months earlier. As a result, only the fireside-chat element of 
Pompidou's summit prescription was retained. It was accepted (at UK instigation and 
despite Heath's earlier support for Pompidou's proposals) that urgent business such as 
regional policy would have to be discussed and that the events in the Middle East could 
not be regarded simply as a foreign-policy issue in isolation of the rest of Community 
policy.
While admitting that the October war had demonstrated the Community's institu­
tional as well as international weakness, French diplomatic preoccupations with the 
former seemed, for most of the Nine, to miss the point. The Arabs' action was threat­
ening the EEC with a major economic recession for which Pompidou's institutional 
proposals would offer no solution. There was also little optimism in the smaller 
member states of the Nine about French proposals for a new style of decision-making, 
and considerable suspicion that France was using the Middle East crisis to ensure that 
crucial decisions affecting the Community were taken outside of Community institu­
tions. Institutionalising summits which had no fixed agenda and resulted in no commu­
nique would retard rather than accelerate progress toward European union. Their 
agreement to such a formula required assurances that their interests would not be 
overlooked and that Community institutions would remain inviolate. Brandt in particu­
lar was sceptical about the efficacy of the French ideas, warning that the price of 
German support was always that European solidarity be considered indivisible. By 
asserting German influence more strongly inside the Community than ever before, 
Brandt was largely instrumental at the Copenhagen summit in "obliging France and 
Britain to go further than they had previously intended in subscribing to a written
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commitment to joint Community action on energy policy."30 The Nine agreed that the 
Council of Ministers should adopt proposals allowing the Commission to produce a 
balance sheet covering all aspects of the energy situation in the Community. This was 
really only a very general set of guidelines to ensure "the orderly functioning of the 
Common Market for energy," but the prospect of greater short-term cooperation over 
energy seems to have been enough to ensure the success of the summit, the theme of 
which had been the very existence of the Community, said Brandt, "not more, not 
less."31
The French and British also failed to persuade partners to put more pressure on
Israel by going beyond the 6 November declaration, despite the presence of Arab
delegations at the summit32. There was, however, little substantive gain for the Dutch
from the meeting33. The British and French maintained their opposition to formal oil-
sharing on the grounds that this would be an empty gesture toward the principle of
European unity, leading only to a worsening of the position for every member, a line
which Turner suggested:
"In retrospect, the low-key diplomacy of the French and British seems to have 
paid off, even if it was somewhat galling. Undoubtedly, there was a distinct 
element of self-interest in this policy. The Anglo-French expediency was not 
glorious, but it seems to have been effective."34
US pressure: 
Kissinger rebuffed
Two conflicting influences had been at work at the Copenhagen summit: intense 
American pressure following Kissinger's Pilgrims speech on 12 December which had 
proposed an Alliance approach to energy; and the presence of the Arab delegations at 
the summit, symbolising the way the EEC might meet the energy crisis independently 
of cooperation with the US.
In his speech, Kissinger addressed both the diplomatic and energy-related lessons 
to be drawn from October 1973. On energy, he proposed that the US, Europe and 
Japan make a united effort to meet the world energy problem for the long term and
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transform the current energy crisis into "the economic equivalent of the Sputnik chal­
lenge of 1957." Specifically he called for the creation of an "energy action group" 
(EAG) of senior individuals to develop within three months an initial action pro­
gramme "for collaboration in all areas of the energy problem." From the outset, the 
oil-producers would be invited to join talks in matters of common interest as part of a 
formal dialogue between the Arab world and the West to prevent a recurrence of the 
embargo35.
While the inclusion of the US in concerted action would give Europe access to 
American technology in developing alternative energy sources (Kissinger had said that 
the US was prepared to make "a very major financial and intellectual contribution to 
the objective of solving the energy problem"), the idea of the EAG could be construed 
as simply another way to bring about US efforts to organise action within the OECD. 
Furthermore, an Atlantic version of an EEC energy policy would be seen in Arab eyes 
as provocative. In addition, Kissinger's longer-term proposal for an Atlantic-Arab 
dialogue would eliminate the uniqueness of a European-Arab dialogue, with the loss of 
the economic and political benefits which Europe alone wished to share with the 
Arabs.
Although Kissinger was correct to say that the energy crisis was a challenge 
"which the US could alone solve with great difficulty and that Europe [could not] solve 
in isolation at all," his proposals were also open to interpretation as a means of exert­
ing influence on an incipient Community energy policy and the Middle East dimension 
of a more concerted foreign policy by the Nine. "The linkage was so overt, and the 
overall tone so much in keeping with the Secretary of State's previous utterances that it 
(was) perhaps not surprising that reactions were rather muted." Placing the energy 
proposals so firmly in the context of the Year of Europe may have been counterproduc­
tive. "In many ways, the Pilgrims' Dinner speech was a repeat performance of the 
Atlantic Charter speech; Dr Kissinger could not help leaving the impression that the
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g countries on comprehensive arrangements comprising cooperation on a wide scale 
»r the economic and industrial development of those countries, industrial investments 
id stable energy supplies to the member countries at reasonable prices."39
rab pressure: 
issinger rebuffed
The Arab delegations at Copenhagen gave precisely the sort o f access to the 
EC's decision-making that Kissinger had been seeking for the US. Their presence 
as also the "apex in fawning at the feet of the Arab leaders."40 In fact, despite the 
rab presence, there was some hardening o f the N ine's position tow ard the Arab 
>untries. The Nine took a tentative step in the direction of an energy policy and 
arned that the restriction on oil supplies was becoming counterproductive. General- 
, however, the French and British policy held, with only perfunctory agreement to 
eir partners' thesis that the Middle East crisis did indeed raise questions not just of 
ilitics but of economics.
The starting positions at the summit were that Britain and France were prepared 
engage in a genuine dialogue, responding to what the Arab delegations had suggest- 
on their arrival. The other member states preferred that the Nine simply listen to 
lat the delegation had to say. The Arab m inisters, ostensibly in Copenhagen to 
port on their summit in Algiers at the end of November, claimed their purpose was 
t to "extort concessions" or blackmail the summit. They did, however, also insist 
it Community declarations were no longer sufficient and that the Europeans must put 
sater economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Israel. This demand caused 
nsiderable difficulty for the Nine, coming on the eve of the US-sponsored Middle 
st peace conference in Geneva. Most members of the Nine were opposed to anything 
it might prejudice Kissinger's peace-making efforts and invite American retaliation, 
e degree to which the Arab delegation wished to engage the Europeans was indicat - 
by their strong support for Pom pidou's proposal for long-term participation in a
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proposals had been as hastily prepared, and would be just as hard to put into effect, as 
those for a new Atlantic Charter."36
The signs were encouraging given favourable responses from individual member 
states apart from France in advance of the Community summit, and despite the diplo­
matic chasm (which the proposal was intended to bridge). Even Heath was able to tell 
Parliament that the proposal was "in the great tradition of the Marshall Plan."37 At the 
Copenhagen summit, however, the US plan went largely unaddressed and was referred 
to only obliquely in the communique, in which the Nine "considered it useful to study 
with other oil-consuming countries within the framework of the OECD ways of dealing 
with the common short- and long-term energy problem s o f consum er countries." 
Without responding directly to the EAG proposal, the Nine advocated greater coopera­
tion inside the OECD despite the irrelevancy of the latter during the previous months. 
What Kissinger considered to be "another conciliatory overture" was greeted without 
comment at the summit38.
France was prominent in orchestrating the Nine's muted response. To the gener­
al apprehension of its partners about antagonising the Arabs was added French opposi- 
tion to any attempt at diluting the Euro-Arab dialogue which Jobert had proposed to the 
French Senate on 30 November 1973. Rather than cooperation with the US, Copenha­
gen agreed: "with a view to securing the energy supplies o f the Community, the 
Council will adopt a comprehensive Community programme on alternative sources o f 
energy. This programme will be designed to promote a diversification of supplies by 
developing existing resources, accelerating research in new sources o f energy and 
creating new capacities of production, notably a European capacity for enrichment of 
uranium, seeking the concerted harmonious development of existing projects." The 
spurning of Alliance cooperation resulted from the rival attraction for the Community 
of a special European relationship with the Arab world. The idea of establishing such 
links had been m ooted by the Com m ission befo re , and the C openhagen sum m it 
communique confirmed the importance of "entering into negotiations with oil-produc-
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dialogue designed to intensify Euro-Arab relations41. "Given Europe's stated objec­
tives," wrote Kissinger later, "this [dialogue] was bound to be at cross-purposes with 
our own efforts. "42
What was in effect a diplomatic competition between the US and the Arabs for 
the support of Europe was an exercise which grossly flattered Europe's importance. 
Whatever European aspirations were, the central strategic relationship with regard to a 
Middle East settlement continued to be the US-Arab one. Kissinger had made clear that 
US diplomacy would not be influenced by any Euro-Arab arrangements agreed in the 
run-up to the peace conference, at which the US had already assigned the Community 
a peripheral role by excluding France and Britain. Nonetheless, Arab cultivation of 
European support was designed to rival the economic leverage which the US might 
seek to exercise in the Middle East. Europe would have this role by providing an 
alternative (though lesser) source of industrial and technological cooperation while 
increasing the pressure on the US to establish close economic ties quickly so as not to 
be excluded from an area of such potential. The American response to this Arab tactic 
was, says Kissinger, to demonstrate that European pressure could not affect US policy. 
"Painful as we found it, we thought we served our allies best by stressing their inabili­
ty to affect our decisions, therefore removing an incentive for producer pressures 
against them... it could not be achieved without cost, especially to allied relations."43
National responses to the situation
Without the discipline of an Atlantic or Community framework, the intentions of 
the Europeans (and in particular those of France and Britain) soon became clear in a 
series of bilateral deals, initially to secure a continuing supply of oil and then to 
manage the balance of payments effects of the oil price rises. Oil for arms was the 
counterpart of blocking Community attempts at creating a common energy policy. The 
prospective deals were also to be a way of pointing Arabs toward European markets as 
well as to cement political relationships44. Their realism was dubious from the start,
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notably ambitious French plans for a 20-year arrangement with Saudi Arabia. The 
bilateral deals, and those of Germany and Japan in bartering oil for intensified techno­
logical cooperation, created strains within the Community which precluded formulation 
of a collective response to the oil issue. By weakening the unity of the Community, it 
strengthened the American case for genuinely collective action45.
Despite these overtures, the fact remained that the Community were not in a 
position to see out the crisis by diplomatic means alone. The weakness of French think­
ing on energy lay in their concentration on supply as the (short-term) issue on which 
the Community could exert some influence independently of the US. Following the 
summit's support for the Arab interpretation of resolution 242, the Arabs rescinded the 
planned 5% cut for January 1974 and increased the flow of oil to Europe and Japan by 
10%, the benefits to be enjoyed in principle by countries on the "friendly" list. This 
could clearly be taken by France and Britain as justifying concentration on diplomatic 
support rather than cooperation with other oil consumers. Yet OPEC ministers meet­
ing in Tehran at the same time had agreed a rise in oil price, bringing the increase 
since the outbreak of the war to nearly 400%. That meeting in Tehran showed that the 
European initiatives were irrelevant to the real problem.
Because the energy crisis proper was price- not supply-related and the cause of 
the West's balance of payments problems, inflation, currency difficulties, etcetera, 
there was a clear need for international cooperation within the existing trade and 
monetary institutions. Aspirations of European autonomy which had been aroused by 
the US-Soviet collusion, the American nuclear alert, and opportunities to put European 
foreign policy cooperation into practice were not sustainable under the new economic 
conditions. Cooperation with the US gradually became seen as an increasing impera­
tive for the Community, even though, by the end of December, with Arab relaxation 
of the cuts the corner had been turned on the short-term problem:
"The physical availability of oil was less a problem than the price at which it was 
sold and the precautions which should be taken to ensure that the industrialised 
world would never find itself in so desperate a situation again. "46
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It was a task for the Alliance, not for the Community alone.
For Britain the energy crisis was the test of the rapprochement with France and 
of how this impinged on the "natural relationship" with the United States. But Heath's 
handling of the problem reduced his options inside the European Community without 
helping the prospects for Atlantic cooperation. Despite his approval of Kissinger's 
initiative in the Pilgrims speech, Heath was not convinced that the Americans could 
help Europe quickly enough. He saw the American proposals as an essential to any 
medium- and long-term solution. In the short term, therefore, Britain felt justified in 
making its own arrangements in the Middle East, and indeed claimed that they were 
compatible with Kissinger's plans for consumer unity. Rejecting Kissinger's warnings 
that the pending deals were "totally selfish," ruinous and "impossible both to attain or 
sustain,"47 Britain defended its policy as a necessary short-term measure, while under­
taking to inform the US prior to signing any deal48. The British position was influ­
enced by prospects of North Sea oilflows, encouraging it to resist proposals for oil 
pooling and for Community authority over UK oil assets. In this its position differed 
from that of the French who opposed oil sharing largely on short-term tactical grounds. 
Thus Britain was prepared to bargain very hard on energy despite its concern to secure 
a commitment on the regional fund (which was eventually activated at the Paris summit 
in December 1974).
The German position was strengthened after the French withdrawal from the 
EEC currency "snake" in January 1974, a unilateral action which aroused considerable 
hostility within the Community because it indicated that not only was France unwilling 
to cooperate in energy on a Community basis, but it would also apply its policy to the 
franc (despite a German offer of a loan in order to obviate the need to float the franc). 
From this the EEC drew its own conclusions on the strength of France's current 
commitment to Community unity. The increasing impatience in Bonn at the lack of 
financial discipline in the Community budget induced a new influence in the German
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voice in Community affairs which was to be decisive not only in the resolution of polit­
ical differences inside the Alliance but also in reaching the successful conclusion of the 
Washington conference in the face of French obstructionism. The stand that the 
Federal Republic took on the regional fund was, said The Economist, the moment that 
history may record as being when Germany started to assert itself in foreign policy49. 
While there was continuing work on proposals for a Community energy market, it was 
clear that the initiative on energy questions lay with the US rather than the Communi­
ty. The Commission, like the Federal Republic, was worried about the effect on 
European solidarity of Jobert's tour of the Middle East in January 1974, but could do 
nothing because the Council of Ministers was deadlocked on the energy issue. Its view 
on the possibility of a proliferation of oil deals and their effect on Community solidari­
ty was expressed by Soames in a speech in which he warned that they could:
"trigger off an ugly auction of oil against money or against political independ­
ence, oil against conventional arms... I fear that if we cannot unite on this issue 
and face it together in loyal solidarity, the loss will not simply be economic, it 
could very quickly become political as well."50
Preparations for the Washington conference
The outcome of the Copenhagen summit and nervousness about any action that
implied confrontation with the Arabs meant that US ideas for an energy conference
were formulated only gradually, following Kissinger's presentation of the American
case to the Pilgrims. But active French opposition to all things American showed it
was necessary for Kissinger to move decisively. The invitations to the conference in
Washington were preceded by Kissinger's press conference of 3 January in which he
warned of the consequences of dealing bilaterally with the Arab countries.
"We are profoundly convinced that as far as the consuming countries are con­
cerned, unrestrained competition between them would be a disaster for every­
body, and I say that even though in the short term we are better placed than 
anyone else to withstand such competition."51
Caution was required in the light of the apparent success of French diplomacy in 
the Middle East in signing of the Franco-Saudi preliminary deal. The connotation -
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particularly in French minds - of an oil-consumers' front with the oil companies' 
monopoly of supply was also to be a problem for the American initiative. The poten­
tial divisiveness of French actions was readily apparent, but the issue for the US 
administration was whether to table proposals likely to find favour with the rest of the 
Community and isolate France from the outset, or to attempt to meet French needs in 
order to secure its support for US plans.
The Commission's response favoured joint Community representation rather than 
separate national participation, since the latter might weaken prospects for subsequent 
Community cooperation (France and Britain might not support full Community partici­
pation because of the delicate state of their Middle East diplomacy). These two would 
obviously be reluctant to have their hands tied by the Community, particularly as the 
US objective of an energy-sharing scheme would require abandonment of bilateral 
deals. Kissinger had said as much on 11 January 1974, in a thinly-veiled warning to 
any country which sought a solution outside of the Atlantic framework.
"We are aware of the fact that there are temptations toward bilateral arrange­
ments. And we, of course, are in the best position of any consuming country to 
engage in bilateral efforts on our own... Nevertheless we believe that unrestrict­
ed bilateral competition will be ruinous for all of the countries concerned, and 
that the seeming victories that can be achieved will be at the cost of world stabili­
ty and of the world economy. And therefore, we believe that it is essential for 
all of the developed countries to understand that we are truly 
interdependent... "52
France's strong reservations about the American proposals were expressed to its 
partners at the Council of Ministers' meeting on 15 January. The ministers agreed that 
the Community should accept the invitation and that each member should send a dele­
gation in its own right, thus solving the problem of the representation of the other EEC 
members. This was decided in the face of French views which preferred Commission 
and presidency representation on the basis of a tightly-drawn mandate, to be decided at 
a meeting on 5 February. Among French proposals for this mandate was that each 
participant in the conference should remain free to make its own contracts with oil- 
producers and arrange its internal market, and also that the talks be widened to include
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producer and developing countries and be organised under the auspices of the UN. 
France would have preferred that the Community reject the US invitation, maintaining 
that American and European interests in the energy crisis were fundamentally differ­
ent. This was because of the latter's far greater dependence on Arab oil; so Europe 
must retain a free hand to negotiate individually and directly with the oil producers, 
and should pursue its interests through a Euro-Arab dialogue and by convening a UN 
conference on energy, raw materials and economic cooperation53. For France, Kiss­
inger's proposed conference of consumer countries was not about energy at all; rather 
it was Kissinger attempting to institutionalise linkage of every strand of Atlantic coop­
eration54. The French prime minister described the US proposal as "illogical and 
dangerous. "55
Concerting a European position
Although the European Commission, in a declaration on the state of the Commu­
nity (31 January 1974), regarded the conference as a crucial test of the Community's 
ability to cooperate with the US as well as with one another, superficially the foreign 
ministers' agreement on 5 February appeared to give priority to French insistence on 
European solidarity over that of the Alliance. They rejected the US idea of an action 
programme and an international task force for the management of the crisis and sought 
instead to limit the scope of the conference; for example, by ensuring it was a one-off 
meeting and did not perpetuate itself. According to the Community's mandate, "the 
Washington conference cannot, above all in its present composition, be transformed 
into a permanent organisation... [and] should not serve to institutionalise a new 
framework of international cooperation. "56 It also stressed that the Nine should retain 
total freedom to determine their energy policy and their relationship with producer 
countries. To prevent discussion of monetary matters (in view of the EEC's monetary 
chaos following the withdrawal of the franc from the European snake) it was agreed 
that finance ministers would not attend (although Bonn made clear that Schmidt would
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be part of the German delegation). On this basis, the conference would be restricted to 
energy issues and would simply pass on any conclusions to existing international 
bodies. It was agreed that OPEC would be kept informed of all developments. The 
French also won their partners' agreement for a foreign ministers' meeting to prepare 
for a joint conference with the Arabs two days after the Washington meeting.
These concessions to the hard-line French position were not the bottom line for 
the Community, however. In this respect, British and German insistence at the meet­
ing of 15 January that national delegations should accompany EEC representatives was 
to prove decisive, as was the mandate's emphasis that articulation of individual nation­
al positions was not excluded and that fiirther coordination of the Nine's position could 
take place in Washington in response to developments. In a communique issued after 
the meeting of 5 February, Hans Eberhard Apel (parliamentary secretary of state in the 
foreign ministry, deputising for Scheel) said that the agreed mandate would guide but 
not bind the German delegation and that "naturally the EEC cannot have its hands tied 
in Washington."57 The potential for unravelling what had been agreed on 5 February 
by weakening the Community mandate meant that the way was clear for considerable 
US-German pressure to be put on France to align itself with the majority. In assenting 
to a broadly French mandate in order to ensure that France attended the conference, 
the other eight members were prepared to retain the appearance of European unity. 
They would still need to reckon with the French presence in Washington to prevent 
any straying from the Nine's mandate as interpreted in Paris. As the drafting process 
had demonstrated, however, France could not confidently expect unswerving fidelity to 
a mandate which itself acknowledged the requirement for flexibility.
Already France was acting out of weakness in attempting to counter American 
proposals by an appeal to the Community solidarity which Paris itself had undermined. 
Not to attend would create a crisis in its relations with the US and with France's 
European partners, with implications for the future of the European identity and the 
political cooperation process established in 1973. But to go would be to risk compro­
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mising the European autonomy which Pompidou and Jobert claimed to be seeking 
amidst the Atlantic disarray of 1973, presenting Kissinger with an opportunity to inten­
sify Atlantic cooperation on US terms58 in a policy area hitherto lacking a concerted 
Alliance approach.
As a result, events began to move in Kissinger's direction, and as he records, he 
was determined to exploit them to maximum advantage. French dilemmas did, howev­
er, reflect other member states' concern about the firm stand which the US were 
preparing for Washington, particularly on the oil price issue which the US regarded as 
central if the Western economies were to re-establish order in their trade and monetary 
relations. These difficulties could not be overcome by bilateral deals between the 
Arabs and European countries. Kissinger explained on 6 February that he did not 
object to the deals as such, but he wanted "some general rules of conduct" established 
as a guide to negotiation59. His concern (greeted with considerable disbelief in 
Europe) was not that these deals might affect US sources of supply, but rather that they 
would maintain the high price of oil. This concern was justified by the fact that the oil 
price agreed in the French deals with the Arabs was causing consternation even in 
Paris. The prospective deal between the British and Saudi Arabia was abandoned partly 
because of uncertainty over future oil prices and partly because of American pressure 
on both parties60.
Aware of European nervousness about anything that could be interpreted as 
American arm-twisting, the US readjusted its objectives. Although the Nine minus 
France broadly accepted the American thesis about the necessity of Alliance-wide 
cooperation, like France they were not willing to allow the conference to consolidate 
US influence either in Europe or in the Middle East. The US now placed less stress 
on reversing the oil price rises; instead the focus was transferred to reaching agreement 
on the ground rules for future bilateral deals plus cooperative action to reduce reliance 
on oil imports. As with the Alliance declaration, what was possible dictated to the US
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what was desirable. Washington reconciled itself to a continuation of bilateral deals 
subject only to some general rules of fair play; prices were to be reduced by coopera­
tion to reduce consumption rather than by confrontation with the oil producers. Proce- 
durally Kissinger was prepared to abandon his proposal for a new action group and 
agreed to use existing bodies61.
The Washington energy conference
The Nine's fragile unity was exposed soon after the conference opened. In 
response to Kissinger's appeal for consumer unity, the Americans received the support 
of most of the Nine except France. Scheel praised the US initiative in calling the 
conference and supported the idea of consumer collaboration. He welcomed Kissing­
er's procedural concessions in using the IMF and the OECD and the replacement of 
the EAG proposal for one that envisaged the creation of a special committee to coordi­
nate the work inside the IMF and the OECD and prepare for further consumer meet­
ings. Britain also agreed with the idea of a follow-up procedure and the need for a 
code of conduct to restrain the excesses of bilateralism. In contrast, Jobert denounced 
the conference as an attempt by the principal consuming countries to restore their 
influence, and said that France would have no part in the conference's perpetuation.
As the Nine foreign ministers had allowed for in their meeting of 5 February, 
there was continual re-assessment of their position in the light of events at Washington, 
but these meetings of the Nine failed to resolve their differences. The French accused 
Scheel and Schmidt of ignoring the Community mandate for the talks, while the 
Germans, using the flexibility of the mandate, persuaded partners of the importance of 
accepting Kissinger's invitation to cooperate with the US. Schmidt told reporters, 
"Europeans do not have the means to do this. They cannot even maintain a balance on 
their own continent."62 By such a damning criticism of French aspirations toward the 
Arab world, Germany was taking precisely the line that Kissinger took with regard to 
the autonomy of European foreign policy (and echoed strongly Kissinger's earlier
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remark that Europe could not achieve a settlement in the Middle East, not in a thou­
sand years).
All this was consistent with Lord Home's view 10 years later that at the Wash­
ington conference, Jobert behaved like a "nasty little man."63 The consequence of the 
division was that eight of the Nine endorsed the American proposals for the establish­
ment of a steering committee to prepare for a conference of consumers and producers 
before 1 May 197464. But it was not solely a procedural dispute, said Schmidt - there 
were underlying political considerations. French opposition to the working groups 
designed to continue the work of the conference reflected their rejection of permanent 
links in the Community's relationship with the US because of the fear of US domina­
tion. According to the German line, the argument about follow-up was really about 
the kind of links that the Community was prepared to accept with the US, an issue at 
the heart of the Year of Europe and decisive in Kissinger's assessment of the future of 
the Alliance.
Lord Home's view was that Germany and most of the Nine, including the UK, 
were guided by the fear that for the Community to have rejected the US's ideas would 
have indicated a very considerable shift in the relative alignment of the European 
member states, from which Kissinger would draw the inevitable conclusions. Kissinger 
did not openly introduce into the conference the question of American forces in Eu­
rope; nevertheless in bilateral contacts at the start of the conference he apparently 
referred several times to this element in the future relationship between Europe and the 
United States and the effect on Congress if the conference failed. Nixon, more bluntly, 
told the conference that "security and economic issues are inevitably linked and energy 
cannot be separated from either."65
These threats were taken seriously by the Germans and by other delegations, 
despite their ring of familiarity. "But there is no doubt that America's introduction of 
non-energy issues into the negotiation was not the only factor responsible for securing 
the Eight's agreement to establish the Energy Coordinating Group. Considerations
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relevant to the subject of the conference, energy cooperation, were equally impor­
tant...”66
Implications of Community divisions
The disunity of the Nine in Washington was the product of months of discord 
inside the Community over issues such as farm subsidies, the regional fund, and 
monetary union, as well as foreign policy. The Federal Republic regarded the energy 
conference as a crossroads for the Community's development. No longer would Bonn 
stand aside and allow Atlantic relations to deteriorate as part of a Community solidarity 
that did not accord with its own concept of foreign policy cooperation and European 
identity. German concerns were met with inducements to cooperate, rather than 
threats. For instance, in talks with Schmidt, US treasury secretary Shultz indicated that 
the US would consider discussing a lower figure for the German payments in the offset 
negotiations. All this emphasised the crucial role that Schmidt was to play in Alliance 
and Community politics, and the US determination to use him as a moderating influ­
ence. It reflected a renewed German impulse to examine prospects for a closer transat­
lantic partnership at a time of disenchantment with the Community. The divisions 
among France and its partners were "grave" and could not be papered over, said 
Schmidt, and the possibility of the Community's breaking up could not be excluded. "I 
would not like to overdramatise the situation, but the possible developments that could 
start from these difficulties we have here will have to be evaluated by our governments 
at home..." Schmidt made it clear that the dispute had confronted Germany, against its 
wishes, with the choice between preserving its relations with France or with the US. 
"We are absolutely clear that we don't want to be put to a choice between good rela­
tions with the US and unity on Common Market energy policy. "67
✓
It was a point stressed by Etienne Davignon, political director at the Belgian 
foreign ministry. "It was unacceptable that this conference not develop in some way 
that would concretely further cooperation between Europe and the United States."
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That was certainly the German interpretation of its role in 1974. It had begun the year 
determined under its own chairmanship to advance the cause of European unity which 
the French (and British) were harming in the energy and currency fields68.
The question remained whether France in its isolated position would continue to 
follow an independent policy, or reassess it in order to remove differences over its 
relationship with the US. Most of the European delegations were impatient with the 
contradictions in France's Atlantic policy and the French role in seeking greater 
European unity while consistently blocking progress toward it. This was the most 
striking aspect of the public schism in European ranks in Washington - that, after so 
many years of keeping the Franco-German relationship high on its foreign-policy prior­
ities the Federal Republic was prepared to make France pay for frustrating unity. For 
instance, Jobert's attempt to prevent the eight from following Kissinger's ideas by 
insisting on unanimity in decision-making prompted Scheel to question the requirement 
for unanimity under the July 1973 political cooperation formula69. The result would 
be the Community's following more of a German orientation, with France in isolation 
whenever it suspected an undue pro-American bias in European policy.
For Jobert, the crisis was in French policy toward the Community rather than in 
the Alliance70. It was toward his EEC colleagues that his anger was directed, not only 
for their "betrayal" at Washington but for the subsequent postponement of the foreign 
ministers' meeting intended to advance the French-inspired dialogue with the Arabs, to 
which the other eight had committed themselves on 5 February. Jobert's belief that on 
balance his presence in Washington would keep his partners in line with the mandate 
agreed at that meeting proved to be a miscalculation. From the outset, France had 
suspected an American intention to corral the Europeans into the Atlantic fold by 
placing energy into the broader context of Atlantic relations. In an interview71, Jobert 
explicitly accused Nixon of using the energy crisis as a pretext to try to assert US 
leadership. For this reason, said Jobert, it had been his sole intention to sabotage the
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conference. That the French failed was because their display of intransigence back­
fired. Despite some Gaullist satisfaction at French isolation, and insistence that its 
partners were out of step, and not France, had France been willing to give the impres­
sion of favouring some progress in developing European energy and cooperation on 
foreign policy toward the Middle East, the other Eight would not have been forced into 
adopting such a clearly pro-American position72.
In the political context of the Year of Europe, the Washington conference was a 
watershed; in the context of substantive progress on the energy problem it was less 
significant. For Kissinger, the aim of establishing sufficient political will for Western 
cooperation had been achieved, although contrary to his original intention, there would 
be no new permanent Atlantic institution to deal with energy and its economic and 
monetary effects. The communique (of which France signed parts only) called for 
energy conservation and development of alternative sources; it warned of the monetary 
dangers of aggressive exchange-rate policies; and it set up a group of senior officials to 
coordinate these actions and to prepare for a conference of producers and consumers. 
This modest list demonstrated the concessions judged necessary to win European 
compliance73. Moreover, there was no direct reference to a code of conduct to guide 
bilateral deals because of objections from both France and Japan.
European preference for an IEA operating inside the OECD (where unanimity 
was required before action could be taken) frustrated Kissinger's aim of establishing 
the IEA independently of the OECD. He did, however, secure agreement to a carefully 
devised form of majority voting (under which the combined votes of all 16 members 
was 148, of which the US accounted for 49) to remove the prospect of complete paral­
ysis. Overall, he ensured that his proposals were put into practice, with just enough 
conceded to satisfy the Europeans and Japan that the IEA would be working in the 
interests of all, and not just those of the USA74.
Although Kissinger was perhaps lucky to pull off an agreement, his grasp was 
sure enough in the diplomatic manoeuvring that went on behind the scenes. "The
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significance of the conference... lay... in the evolution of the Atlantic Community and 
the EEC. The energy crisis forced the European Community to face up to the ambi­
guities of its position on the Atlantic Charter. Hitherto, Atlantic disagreements had 
never been too dangerous for as long as the battles were over mere words: in 1973- 
1974, the energy crisis was concrete enough to flush out France's inordinate suspicion 
of American intentions. The Community has now clarified the majority's dislike of 
appeals to European identity based on anti-Americanism."75
The Euro-Arab dialogue and the IEA: 
coexistence and cooperation
The foreign ministers' meeting of the Nine on 4 March 1974 is an important 
footnote to the collapse of European unity at the Washington conference. As Kissinger 
was to write: "The immediate aftermath of the (Washington) conference... was 
dominated by the legacies of the controversies just surmounted, not a sense of direc­
tion."76 The proposal for a Euro-Arab dialogue showed the limitations of the Kissing­
er initiative in securing Alliance agreement on such a long-term issue, suggesting a 
determination among the Nine for independent action that had not been evident at the 
Washington conference. Aside from the implications for effective consultation which 
are examined later, there was much in the substance to unsettle Kissinger. The deci­
sion to begin a Euro-Arab dialogue covering a variety of subjects culminating in a 
conference of foreign ministers was seen by him as a political dialogue pursued in a 
manner most calculated to conflict with the American peace efforts in the Middle East.
In fact the dialogue was not solely French-inspired: it was central also to the 
Commission's thoughts on the energy issue. In January 1974, the Commission had 
proposed closer relations with the Arab world: in return for secure oil supplies at 
reasonable prices, the EEC would provide industrial assistance. Despite the logic of 
the Pilgrims speech and the Washington energy conference, both of which had focused 
heavily on the need for consumer cooperation, by mid-February 1974 the Community
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were attaching increased importance to producer-consumer cooperation as necessary to 
adjust to the new economic realities.
The meeting of the Nine foreign ministers on 5 February had in fact carefully 
avoided any implication that the decision to attend the Washington conference repre­
sented complete acceptance of a hard-line American position toward the Arabs. Like 
France, although in a lower key, most Community members sought the best of both 
worlds: solidarity with the US as the most reliable source of technical assistance and 
as essential to long-term reduction of oil dependence, and close ties with the Arab 
world as a means to secure uninterrupted supply. Economically, there was no inherent 
conflict between the two; but politically it raised crucial issues within the Alliance and 
demonstrated the unfinished business of the Washington conference.
The Europeans' partial retreat from their position at the Washington conference 
was also the product of their concern at the consequences of French isolation. Not all 
the member states were prepared to portray the Community's option as starkly as 
Schmidt had done. The "good European" was one that pursued the goals of the 
Community as a complement to those of the Alliance, indeed as both sides of the same 
coin. A successful Atlantic energy policy required US-EEC energy partnership, and 
this required a common EEC position. To support unreservedly the American position 
(which the Nine did not do anyway) would be to cut the French adrift from the main­
stream of Alliance thinking on energy and exclude the possibility of formulating a 
common European energy policy. According to both Dahrendorf and Soames (inter­
viewed in 1982), within the Commission there was strong support for a way to 
"compensate" France for its isolation at Washington. The Eight had been prepared to 
make a stand against the excesses of resurgent Gaullism in French policy toward 
America, but were not yet ready to sacrifice the Nine's greater political coherence for 
the sake of Kissinger's "divide and rule" aspirations.
The emergent Euro-Arab dialogue was to proceed falteringly throughout 1974. 
Short-term optimism in Europe that it would be the beginning of a productive process
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was belied by the three preparatory meetings in June, July and October 1974. It was 
always subject to US displeasure as the latter sought its own closer ties with the Arabs 
(such as the US's bilateral deal with Saudi Arabia in June 1974); to other developments 
over the heads of the Nine (such as the suspension of the Euro-Arab process as a result 
of Egypt's signing the Camp David accord in 1979); and to the differing priorities 
amongst the Nine regarding establishment of a common energy policy77. The re­
sponses of the Nine to US proposals for an energy policy and dialogue and to the 
follow-up work of the Energy Coordination Group established a fairly consistent pat­
tern, writes Lieber.
"The Community's own energy policy would make only... insubstantial 
progress; the Eight would differ from France by deferring to an American lead 
on crucial facets of international energy negotiations; and some attention would 
be paid to the desires of France and the Commission to establish rapport with oil- 
producing countries but mainly to the extent that this did not run afoul of Atlantic 
priorities."78
The origins of the Euro-Arab dialogue - which, while never developing any real 
substance, proved to be a not entirely short-term Community concern - in the Commu­
nity's response to the energy crisis in 1973/4, both in terms of its internal cooperation 
and as part of the history of Atlantic relationships, were inglorious. Such were the 
Community's internal divisions over energy out of which the dialogue was developed 
that only at the Community's summit in Rome in December 1975 did member states 
agree in principle on an EC emergency oil-sharing scheme. This followed eighteen 
months during which Commission proposals for energy conservation, an internal 
energy market, participation in the IEA, and its implications for relations with the oil 
producing countries were frustrated.
Fragmented and self-interested policies in response to apparent economic and 
diplomatic helplessness raised fundamental questions about the coherence and identity 
of the Nine. "The weakness evinced by Europe during the crisis, together with the 
longer-range potential implications of the increase in oil prices for the West European 
economies, cast doubt upon one of the fundamental premises of American foreign
228
Energy, the Arabs, and the Alliance
policy in the early 1970's, namely, the development of partnerships with emerging 
centres of power. Europe constituted neither a partner nor an emerging centre of 
power, but a weak collection of states attempting to make deals with oil producing 
state to secure adequate supplies of oil."79 These salutary lessons had a decisive effect 
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It was against this background of deteriorating relations in defence and security 
issues, impasse in trade and monetary affairs, and hesitant cooperation on energy, that 
the final six months of the Year of Europe were played out. Although by the end of 
1973 there was little hope that trade and monetary reform could be achieved in parallel 
with progress in redefining the Alliance's political objectives, the Nine's response to 
energy and the greater need - in the light of the Middle East war - for an Alliance in 
which members could work together effectively on defence and security issues did 
affect the Year of Europe end-game. By slowly - and painfully - disentangling the 
separate threads of respective US-European relations in NATO and between the US 
and the Community, a solution was achieved which restored credibility to Alliance 
obligations at no real cost to the Community's development.
The following examines how this was achieved as an act of mutual accommoda­
tion rather than, as Kissinger portrays, a US triumph in bringing feckless allies into 
line. As suggested in the Introduction, and it is particularly relevant in analysing the 
denouement of the Year of Europe, the triumphalism of Kissinger's account, while 
understandable, obscures the realities of the problems he faced and the best means to 
resolve them. As a record of self-justification, Kissinger's only long-term recommen­
dation is that cited at the end of chapter 5: that when the Atlantic partners disagree, 
one or other should step aside. That was implausible in 1973. Uunderpinning US 
predominance in the way implied could not be achieved without severely eroding 
working relationships. It is not a recipe for the 1990s as increasingly Europe finds 
itself tom between US and European prescriptions.
The formulae reached in 1974 should be judged against the problems they were 
seeking to resolve rather than their long-term durability. Although Kissinger did not
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achieve all his objectives, there was a new disposition in the Community to accept US 
authority - whether as part of the formal Alliance framework or in foreign-policy 
issues not covered by the 1949 treaty - and less enthusiasm to define a European identi­
ty in opposition to US policy. While neither Alliance nor Community solutions in 
1974 were in any way permanent, and Kissinger's problem of the Nine and the Fifteen 
was to remain, they were a reasonable basis for agreement. It was a solution accept­
able to both sides, furthermore. By mid-1974, neither had an interest in disturbing the 
security and defence relationship for the sake of differences over Community policy.
The dialogue under threat: 
Kissinger's speech to the Pilgrims, 12 December
The lesson drawn by Kissinger was that a crucial period of Alliance tension had 
been exacerbated if not caused by the establishment of an adversarial approach by the 
Nine toward America, epitomised by the Nine's efforts to define an identity. The 
policy decisions of the foreign ministers' meeting in Copenhagen in July had been 
applied not only to declaration drafting, where it had undermined the US initiative, but 
also to an explosive external crisis in the Middle East.1
Practical consultation, not abstract declarations, was now uppermost in Kissing­
er's mind in considering Alliance priorities. The absence of an institutional consulta­
tive procedure between the US and the Community had been shown to be a fundamen­
tal weakness in the overall Atlantic framework. It was an omission and a complaint 
against the Community that Kissinger raised publicly in his Pilgrims speech in London 
on 12 December and privately in remarks at about that time (but not disclosed until 
February 1974) to a meeting of American Jewish intellectuals when he was quoted as 
describing the Europeans as "craven," "contemptible," and as "acting like jackals."2
In his diagnosis of Alliance troubles to the Society of Pilgrims, Kissinger's cen­
tral contention was the adversarial style of Community political cooperation. He 
warned:
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"Europe's unity must not be at the expense of Atlantic Community... I would be 
less than frank were I to conceal our uneasiness about some of the recent prac­
tices of the European Community in the political field. To present the decisions 
of a unifying Europe to us as faits accomplis not subject to effective discussion is 
alien to the tradition of US-European relations. "3
Explaining the US's occasional failure to consult adequately as "a deviation from 
official policy and established practice - especially under pressure of necessity," Kiss­
inger observed:
"The attitude of... Europe, by contrast, seems to attempt to elevate refusal to 
consult into a principle defining European identity to judge from recent experi­
ence, consultation with US before a decision is precluded, and consultation after 
the fact has been drained of content."
Kissinger argued that "as an old ally the US should be given the opportunity to 
express its concern before final decisions affecting its interests are taken..."; the US 
"cannot be indifferent to the tendency to justify European identity as facilitating sepa­
rateness from the United States," a retreat from all previous assumptions that European 
political unity would, of necessity, reinforce the Atlantic partnership, but which did not 
deter Community heads of government agreeing the next day the need for Europe to be 
"an original and distinct entity."
Combined with this open attack on the six-month-old attempt by the Nine at polit­
ical cooperation, Kissinger bemoaned the fact that bilateral channels had been allowed 
to atrophy. "To replace the natural dialogue with formalistic procedures would shatter 
the close and intangible ties of trust and communication."
Kissinger's warning to the European Nine that their actions could endanger the 
Alliance of 15 was unambiguous. For the Nine - including France - Atlantic Alliance 
and a more coherent European Community were not necessarily incompatible provided 
the latter's identity was acknowledged and respected within the Alliance. But if Kiss­
inger judged the present identity of the Nine to be inimical to Alliance cooperation, it 
was questionable for how long the Community could resist selective American pressure 
to exert greater influence in European policy-making in order to ensure compatibility 
of objectives and policy. If consultation was to be the touchstone of an effective
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working relationship, the issue could be resolved only by adjusting the Copenhagen 
formula of July and placing qualifications on the Nine's aspiration for a separate identi­
ty
Kissinger's Pilgrims speech was an appeal to individual member states to exer­
cise their freedom of political will instead of sheltering behind Community solidarity. 
Compromise on their institutional rigidity would not itself be adequate. His meeting 
with the foreign ministers of the Nine in December, at the margins of the NATO for­
eign ministers' meeting, was just the sort of special, ad hoc new forum which he had 
envisaged and which France opposed. Significantly, and arguing against himself, the 
meeting, "merely underlined the malaise rather than easing it. "4 Consultation by itself 
was no solution because there was no automatic relationship between consultation and 
agreement; Kissinger had said so himself (at a press conference 21 November) with 
regard to the Middle East.
"It is a poor fact that the countries that were most consulted proved among the 
most difficult in their cooperation and those that were most cooperative were 
least consulted."
Although not a "substitute for common vision and goals," resolution of substan­
tive issues was now to depend on agreeing an acceptable consultative procedure be­
tween the US and the Nine. Augmenting Alliance consultation and introducing greater 
flexibility with the foreign-policy cooperation procedures of the Nine would not solve 
issues, but they were a necessary step toward their solution.
The insistence by Kissinger on the need for an early involvement of the US in the 
Nine's deliberations focused on an issue referred to the previous year by Miriam 
Camps. "What is really needed is a more intensive process of discussion and consulta­
tion at all stages of the policy-formulating process... unless we can find new tech­
niques for involving one another at earlier stages, and more continuously, in the proc­
ess of policy formulation, it is difficult to see how these two unwieldy coalitions can 
live in harmony... Consultation after policies have been decided upon tends to become 
not consultation but negotiation, and negotiation from dangerously rigid positions."5
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The European identity
Whatever their immediate purpose, Kissinger's Pilgrims remarks did not deter 
consideration of the European identity by EEC heads of government at the Copenhagen 
summit, just as his offer on energy cooperation had elicited no effective response. The 
Middle East crisis had encouraged completion of the identity text based on a French 
draft submitted in early November. For that reason, identity was not a direct response 
to Kissinger's Pilgrims call for a special relationship between the Nine and the US and 
for consultations by the Nine prior to reaching a decision. Rather than commit itself to 
a position on these painful issues, the text was intended to be non-specific.
Defining the aims of a common foreign policy, it read:
"The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic of the construc­
tion of a united Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressive­
ly to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or 
groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own 
cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. 
They are convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with 
confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a united Europe, thus 
making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their rela­
tions into a European union."
Reflecting concerns arising from the Middle East war, it asserted that:
"International developments and the growing concentration of power and respon­
sibility in the hands of a very small number of powers mean that Europe must 
unite and speak with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper 
role in the world... [they] should progressively define common positions in the 
sphere of foreign policy." (Article 6)
In the context of disruptions in the Alliance and the apparent failure of the Year 
of Europe, the text could have been much worse. On relations with the US, it read 
(Article 14):
"The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine - who share 
values and aspirations based on a common heritage - are mutually beneficial and 
must be preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of the Nine 
to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend to 
maintain their constructive dialogue and to develop their cooperation with the 
United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship."6
As was noted at the time7, the Nine did acknowledge that those of them who
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were members of the Atlantic Alliance considered that "under the present circum­
stances, there is no alternative to the security provided by the nuclear weapons of the 
United States and by the presence of North American forces in Europe" (Article 8). 
Not only did this give explicit acceptance of the Alliance basis of European defence 
(although the caveat of "under the present circumstances1' had some force), it also sug­
gested the Nine were willing to see defence issues as relevant to their particular rela­
tionship with the US, and not confined to NATO alone. While not itself a solution to 
the Alliance's problems, it was at least a basis for Washington to pursue further dis­
cussion. Since the inception of the idea in July it had been an unpromising prospect for 
the US, however. The thrust of it, as completed in November, confirmed American 
reservations. A State Department official was quoted as observing:
"..it doesn't place Europe in an adversarial position toward us. But it isn't exact­
ly what Henry had in mind. "8
Despite some positive language in the text, the identity demonstrated to Kissinger
the difficulty of securing the Nine's acknowledgement of partnership with US in the
prevailing political climate. In a press conference of 27 December, Kissinger again
paid attention to the potential of the Nine's political cooperation to derail the Year of
Europe initiative. The year had been "disappointing" for one which had been called
"perhaps too rashly" the Year of Europe. But he said the problem had not been one of
presentation or of tactics.
"There is one prime problem in our relationship that only the Europeans can 
answer. All other criticisms can be taken care of. The single question is, 'What 
is to be the shape of the emerging Europe?' Will it be organised on the basis of 
exclusivity, or is it prepared to recognise, while preserving its identity, the 
importance of Atlantic cooperation?"9
The US, Kissinger went on, was not interested in a legal document that respond­
ed to a single initiative; the US had made proposals to create a US-European dialogue - 
"That offer is still open."
French motives under scrutiny
This was Kissinger's challenge: were the Nine prepared to accept an identity
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with only a thinly-veiled anti-US bias organised according to French prescriptions, or 
would they continue to see themselves as part of a wider relationship in which Euro­
pean autonomy was not an end in itself? As matters stood, the special relationship 
between the US and Europe which Kissinger had proposed in April, based on partner­
ship and interdependence, had been countered by an identity which said only that 
Atlantic ties were "mutually beneficial" and must be preserved without detriment to 
Europe's status as a distinct and original entity.
"There appeared to be emerging two quite different conceptions of a united 
Europe. One is pressed by France and holds that Atlantic relations actually 
impede the European one. The French conception, illustrated by the Nine's 
September draft declaration (though it was primarily a British draft) stressed 
Europe's independence and equality within the Atlantic Alliance, and emphasised 
that in those areas where Europe still was weak, notably defence, new efforts 
would be demanded. The other version, Kissinger's, seemed to be a new version 
of the two-pillar idea... some of the phrases in the American document, words 
like partnership and interdependence, were too strong for the neo-Gaullists who 
preferred notions such as dialogue and independence."10
The US administration's policy toward France was under particular scrutiny at 
this time. The conclusions of the Washington energy conference convinced US officials 
that French opposition to American ideas was on grounds of their provenance rather 
than substance. The contradiction in French policy between counting on continuing US 
involvement in European affairs while encouraging resistance to that role within the 
Nine, was becoming increasingly untenable. The Nixon administration had done more 
than any other since the war to bring about rapprochement with France11. According 
to de Rose, the Year of Europe was intended to be a way to bring back France into the 
mainstream of the Alliance and so heal the rift (still comparatively recent) created by 
de Gaulle, before it became unbridgeable. Much was made, when Nixon took office, 
of his admiration for a Gaullist blueprint for Europe and his determination to improve 
relations with Paris. 1973 was therefore a year of French opportunity. The US admin­
istration, in proposing the initiative, made clear that they were open to European 
views, and told the French privately that they were prepared to accommodate French 
arguments about the future of the Alliance, within reason.
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Reconciling Franco-US interests was, therefore, the key to stability in the rela­
tionship between an Alliance likely to be beset by further crises of personality and a 
Community seeking its own identity in international affairs. France would be the 
decisive player in determining whether the future of US-European relations would 
continue as a trial of strength and so whether the EC and NATO would cooperate or 
compete. As Community integration took on a logic of its own after 1973, it became 
accordingly more important to bring Paris back on board and agree a modus vivendi 
within the Alliance. Moreover, the interpretation that the US administration was intent 
on mending fences with Paris is supported by the subsequent disclosure of selective 
cooperation on nuclear programmes, notably developing techniques for testing under­
ground and development of MIRV technology12. This signalled an end to the long­
standing US hostility to the independent French nuclear programme (and was reflected 
in the terms of the Ottawa declaration, which accorded a specific role to the French 
deterrent in Western security).
Euro-Arab dialogue: 
the end of the US-Nine declaration
Progress toward a cooperative approach to Alliance ties was made in the early 
months of 1974 when the US presented the Nine and the West as a whole with propos­
als for cooperation to overcome the crisis in energy. The Washington conference 
showed that the position had become worse rather than better, starkly revealing disuni­
ty. But the talks also demonstrated the limits of French diplomatic leverage. Where 
offers of cooperation alone had failed to encourage the Nine to compromise diplomatic 
aspirations, US pressure was to succeed. The Nine's decision to pursue the Euro-Arab 
dialogue (taken by the Nine on 5-6 March, and involving exploratory contacts, estab­
lishment of joint working groups, and an eventual EC-Arab conference at ministerial 
level), and the risks it posed for US diplomacy in the Middle East and Western coop­
eration on energy, forced Kissinger to raise the stakes. He was encouraged by the
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belief that the decision was diplomatic posturing by the Nine and by its clear French 
provenance. As such it was an opportunity to repeat the US diplomatic pressure exer­
cised at the Washington conference.
While the official American position was that there was nothing necessarily 
incompatible between the US initiative for a joint approach by the oil-consuming 
countries to oil producers and the development of a special Community relationship in 
the Middle East, Kissinger's argument was that the two would require careful coordi­
nation. On 7 March, he spelt out further his critique of how the Euro-Arab dialogue 
had illustrated the consultation problem.13
"There is an incongruity in allied relationships. On the one hand, defence is 
considered indivisible and is integrated, and the US is asked to consult fully 
within NATO on all aspects of its foreign policy that could affect the common 
defence. On the other hand, there is a tendency to withdraw from consultation 
into the European Community issues that are considered part of the political 
constitution of the Nine... [We] cannot take a position on a document that is 
handed to us surreptitiously when there is no mechanism for consultation... in a 
very vague and general way we were being told some of the ideas [about the 
Euro-Arab dialogue], but between being told an item in a vague and general way 
and being given a concrete programme and an opportunity to comment on it, 
there is a wide gap. We were never shown the communique or told the major 
substance of it in a systematic way in a time period when our reaction could 
possibly affect the decisions."
At the same time Kissinger was at pains not to link the dispute to American 
troops in Europe. "The defence of Europe is also the defence of the US. We do not 
have troops in Europe to do a favour to the Europeans."
Bonn had received no indication that this would be the American reaction14. 
After the consultations in Bonn on 4 March, Kissinger had told the press: "I return to 
America with the conviction that our German-American relations are on a very firm 
basis and that West European-American relations are also taking a very positive evolu­
tion." Brandt, while adverting to some US reservations about Euro-Arab discussions, 
made clear publicly that such talks would require months of preparation and that there 
would be careful consultations. In other words, he was at pains to stress that the Nine 
were not seeking to disturb US diplomacy in the Middle East. The unexpected strength 
of Kissinger's reaction to the Euro-Arab dialogue suggests it was marked considerably
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by personal pique as well as distaste for the Nine's diplomatic efforts, but he also had 
a valid point about the wisdom of such a meeting with the Arabs at such a critical time, 
reservations which were not respected by the Nine. "Problems with the Nine's meth­
ods of consultation no longer applied to the largely abstract issue of declarations. We 
now had divergent policies in areas we considered vital."15
On Kissinger's return from Europe on 6 March, Nixon wrote to Brandt regret­
ting the absence of effective consultation and deferring further US participation in the 
draft declaration with the Nine. By implication Nixon's trip to Europe - a prospect 
only just revived following the Scheel-Kissinger talks on 4 March, and pencilled in for 
late April - was also on hold. In explaining why Hartman and Sonnenfeldt would not 
go to Bonn for further talks, Nixon accused the Community of engaging in "rival activ­
ity" in an area where the US was active. The postponement of work on the declaration 
was unwelcome for Bonn, given their strenuous diplomatic efforts over the previous 
six weeks. Brandt's reply of 8 March repeated that he did not regard the Euro-Arab 
dialogue as an alternative to cooperation with the US. He urged continuation of the 
work on the declarations, which would "serve to temper discussion on the European- 
American relationship."16 Brandt's reply described the Euro-Arab dialogue in terms of 
"flanking support," not rival activity. He reaffirmed the Community's commitment to 
strengthening consultation and to the joint energy policy agreed in Washington; but he 
also pointed out that consultation ought to be a two-way process.
German officials at the time and subsequently17 made clear their belief the US 
was fully aware of what Community foreign ministers were about to announce, and 
that it was not incompatible with the conclusions of the Washington energy conference 
or with American diplomacy in the Middle East (which at the time was concentrated on 
the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces). Furthermore they maintained that 
Kissinger was fully aware of the specifically German role in removing those elements 
of the French initiative which were likely to cause most offence in Washington. The
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Germans regarded it as an unavoidable gesture of Community solidarity which did not 
detract from Kissinger's diplomatic success at the Washington conference.
Although US officials subsequently explained that the problem lay with not 
having seen the precise text of the foreign ministers' agreement, the suspicion re­
mained that Kissinger was taking advantage of the Community's disarray over energy 
cooperation and the change of government in London to force the Community to stand 
up to the French on the question of effective consultation between the US and the 
Nine18. At a time when Alliance relations were improving, the US was exploiting the 
initiation of a low-key dialogue (the idea of which had long been mooted) in order to 
press the Europeans to choose between Washington or Paris, in the knowledge that 
Paris's claim to European leadership was already discredited.
Making the US-Nine declaration the victim of this US decision to make an issue 
of consultation suggested the declaration was expendable. In fact, some progress had 
been made under German chairmanship, and the Nine had agreed a revised version of 
the draft at the same time as it took the decision to begin a dialogue with the Arabs. 
The text had been passed to the Americans on 5 March for discussion on 15 March 
when Sonnenfeldt and Hartman were due to meet the nine political directors in Bonn. 
The postponement on 8 March of that meeting19 did not affect the attendance of the 
two Americans at NATO as part of the process of intensified consultation agreed at the 
December NATO ministerial council. Nor did it affect US participation at the energy 
coordinating group meeting set up by the Washington conference. It was a clear snub 
to the Nine, but did not suggest Kissinger was looking to generate a crisis in relations 
across the board. A self-contained, controllable and ultimately successful crisis in US- 
Nine relations, which broke French influence at the minimal cost of the US-Nine 
declaration, appears to have been what Kissinger had in mind20.
The postponement of work on the US-Nine declaration, despite US disclaimers 
that it was simply designed to give the US more time to study the new German text, 
came just when the Nine had believed an acceptable text to be nearing completion.
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The Nine's amendments to their original draft text of September 1973 were designed to 
accommodate objections that the earlier draft was too long and insufficiently lofty. The 
new draft21, agreed by foreign ministers on 5 March, was shorter (13 paragraphs 
rather than 22) and omitted the earlier, more detailed sections on the reform of the 
international monetary system, the environment, and scientific and technical coopera­
tion. Of greater significance was the inclusion in the text of a genuflection toward the 
US position that Atlantic relations should have a special priority for the Nine. The 
relevant passage was:
"The nine members of the European Community, having decided to define their 
new relations with the rest of the world, consider it natural to do so first with the 
US given the links that history, the sharing of so many common endeavours and 
a long-standing friendship have woven between them."
There was also a more forthcoming concluding paragraph:
"They [the US and Nine] therefore undertook to intensify their existing coopera­
tion and consultation by using to the full all the means which are at their disposal 
and in a fashion appropriate to the state of their evolving relations. They express 
the conviction that progress toward a European union will enable this construc­
tive dialogue to assume its true dimensions."
These references to "evolving relations" and "intensification of consultations" intro­
duced the element of dynamism into the declaration which Kissinger had sought from 
the start of the exercise. Although much closer to the US desiderata, however, the 
new text was still some way from the sort of draft which Washington was seeking. It 
contained no reference either to "partnership" or to "interdependence" and stopped 
short of including development of "consultative and cooperative arrangements" which 
the US draft had contained, and the lack of which had been highlighted by the 
Community's handling of the Euro-Arab dialogue. To the French - and many others - 
such a reference would be the thin end of a wedge designed to institutionalise relations 
so as to give the US a formal role in the Nine's decision-making process.
Nonetheless, the two sides were closer on the question of the substance of a US-Nine 
declaration than had hitherto been possible. As proof of its irrelevance, however, 
postponement of work on the text on 6 March led to abandonment of the whole exer­
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cise three weeks later as the first step toward US-Nine reconciliation.
Rhetorical acerbity increases
The recriminations became most marked in mid-March 1974. On 11 March, in 
ostensibly private remarks, Kissinger criticised European policy-making, going so far 
as to question the legitimacy of European governments since 1918 because of their 
failure to regain full public confidence after failing to prevent war in 1914. He de­
scribed the biggest problem in US foreign policy as "not how to regulate competition 
with its enemies" but how to bring America's friends "to a realisation that there are 
greater common interests than simply self-assertiveness and that the seeming victory 
they are striving for is going to prove hollow." On the energy crisis he said, "The 
question is whether the nations of the West and Japan are capable of working coopera­
tively or whether they are like Greek city states in the face of Macedonia and Rome... 
dealing competitively with a situation for which there is no competitive solution." 
Underlining US superior strength, he said, "We are going to win the competition with 
Europe if it takes place... but it is not a victory worth achieving... The United States 
has no objection whatever to an independent European policy. It does have an objec­
tion when independence takes the form of basic hostility to us... in a crisis which can 
only be dealt with cooperatively, the Europeans deliberately adopt a competitive re­
sponse."22
The State Department later stressed that the US's overriding concern was to 
preserve the unity of the West, but it repeated the point that the Alliance's difficulties 
were "real and serious" and would take time to resolve23.
On the European side, Jobert contributed to raising the temperature of the de­
bate, firstly in a radio interview to the Europe 1 network on 8 March24 in which he 
declared:
"I believe all French people want France to pursue an independent policy. I
consider it less a matter of independence than dignity... I want American troops
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to remain in Europe. But this said... the maintenance of their troops is in no way 
a fundamental matter for us, while it is for the United States."
He went on to say, turning the tables on the US:
"... the US was not in Europe to protect European security but to protect Ameri­
can security, and... it was a mistake to think it was acting out of concern for 
European interests and... it was maintaining the present level of American forces 
in Europe not as an act of political charity but because of calculations of national 
interest. It is not I who say this, it is Mr Hartman. He said this publicly."
This was followed by an interview on 12 March to Sud Ouest:
"The attitude of Mr Kissinger toward Europe seems to me to spring first from an 
artificial analysis and finally from an extreme attitude... whatever is exaggerated 
is negligible... he has not understood how to deal with Europe... there is no 
victory in obtaining something against the person's will."25
Jobert's views were not without support from elsewhere. On 13 March, The New 
York Times blamed the administration for allowing Atlantic differences to become 
"exacerbated in a verbal braw l,"26 while Schaetzel described Kissinger as "totally 
insensitive... a man given to improvisation and manoeuvre" and believing in the 
"bombshell theory of diplomacy."27 Kissinger's self-deprecating remarks at the press 
briefing on 14 March recognised the situation: "I seem to have done more for Euro­
pean unity than any man since Jean Monnet."28
Nixon's contribution was styled as a campaign of "well-planned contempt... 
well-orchestrated irritation,"29 underlining Kissinger's robust stance with the intention 
of contributing to the undiplomatic slanging match. De Rose interpreted it as a direct 
response to Jobert's reference to dignity and self-respect, and thought it revealed that 
the Alliance's difficulties and disputes were to be aired as publicly as possible so as to 
ensure maximum impact in Alliance capitals. On 15 March in a question-and-answer 
session before the Executives Club of Chicago, Nixon made clear his impatience.
"... the Europeans cannot have it both ways: they cannot have the US participa­
tion and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation 
and even hostility on the economic and political front. And until the Europeans 
are willing to sit down and cooperate on the economic and political front..., no 
meeting of heads of governments should be scheduled."
Because of poor progress on the US-Nine declaration - a rejection at the highest 
level of the Nine's 5 March text - any summit "would simply be papering over difficul­
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ties and not resolving them." In thinly-veiled warning of the consequences if the Nine
failed to cooperate on economic and political questions, Nixon said:
"In the event that the Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with 
economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find it almost 
impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence at 
present levels on the security front... [it means] that we are not going to be faced 
with a situation where the Nine countries of Europe gang up against the United 
States - the United States which is the guarantee for their security."30
In that these comments were a reiteration of what Kissinger had been saying for 
months, their substance was not surprising. But (after Kissinger appeared to have 
reduced tensions by the partial withdrawal of his earlier remarks) their timing and the 
fact that they were expressed at presidential level underlined the strength of feeling, 
which had been accumulating since April 1973 on the Nine's regionalism in foreign 
policy compared with the indivisibility of their security relationship in the Alliance. 
Furthermore, they appeared to mark a new stage in the deteriorating relationship, 
without any of the courtesies of Kissinger's Pilgrims speech. Significantly Nixon had 
picked on the issue of least real importance - a joint declaration of principles - in ques­
tioning the maintenance of US troops in Europe rather than the Alliance's real prob­
lems, finding a way to reconcile greater Community cohesion with American require­
ments for transparency of decision-making.
The administration's clear intention was to overstate the problem and make public that 
they chose to interpret the Nine's refusal to incorporate flexibility in their pursuit of 
greater political and economic cohesion (which had been the defining characteristic of 
their identity) as threatening continued US troop deployment in Europe. Unless there 
was agreement "on both the security and the economic and political fronts," Europe 
and America would go their own ways31. Nixon's determination that the Nine produce 
a declaration expressing parallel sentiments to that of the NATO draft before he could 
consider a European visit was conveyed on the same day in a letter to Brandt (the 
contents of which were again made public).
"I have concluded that it would be preferable to let the situation mature further in
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the hope that at a later time events will demonstrate the mutual benefit all of us 
will derive from the achievement of more consultative arrangements. In these 
circumstances, the possibility of my participation in the signature of the declara­
tion... should... also be deferred.."32^
A period of conciliation
Despite the strong impression at official level and in the press that Nixon's 
comments were largely for domestic consumption, the response from Europe was 
immediate and conciliatory, taking the heat out of what was becoming an escalating 
rhetorical trial of strength. The day after, ambassador Berndt von Staden discussed 
with Kissinger possible ways to improve consultative arrangements between the Nine 
and the US and in particular the idea that the Nine's political directors should invite 
US officials to exchange views on issues concerning America before proposals were 
put to Community ministers. Scheel's priority was the importance of responding posi­
tively and in clear terms to Nixon's remarks33. Scheel stressed the importance of 
improving channels of communication between the US and the Nine and the impor­
tance of the allies' acting together rather than "in the full glare of publicity." He made 
the point also that "Washington must realise that the European Community is in the 
process of developing concrete common policy34. Although there was to be no perma­
nent consultative machinery along the lines of NATO's permanent council, the German 
proposals did provide a way between US demands for full consultation and French 
refusal to permit more than a bare minimum of US-Nine contacts.35
The problem was set out well in a WEU assembly report as follows:
"The Americans wish to cooperate from the outset in the process of formulating 
ideas, whereas the Europeans wish to work out a concept before holding consul­
tations. Now it is a matter of mutual understanding to know at what level the 
consultations should be held. The American partner can certainly not be included 
in the preliminary consultations between members of the Ministries for Foreign 
Affairs of the nine member countries of the European Community. Nor are there 
any European observers in the State Department, for instance, to see how the 
Americans work out their points of view. It must be seen that the aim of the 
present process in Europe must be a united Europe with a single point of view 
formulated in the same conventional way as the policy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany now is.
"I [the rapporteur, M Sieglerschmidt] personally think - 1 am not speaking on
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behalf of Europe - that a distinction must be drawn between the process of pre­
paring a point of view in the framework of the Nine and a formal decision to be 
taken by the Nine. Once the first stage of forming a point of view has been 
completed, I am convinced the time would be ripe for consultations. In fact, 
there would be no point in my taking part in consultations if I merely provided 
information and then said that I was quite willing to listen to slightly different 
opinions but did not wish to alter my decision. If this is to be the procedure, it is 
quite pointless. On the contrary, it must be possible to change the point of view 
by a decision which is then of another kind.
"But the first problem arises when the Americans say: this is quite true but it is 
very difficult. When you finally manage to find a common, nine-power point of 
view and when we come into the consultative procedure - apart from the question 
whether it is still possible to reach a different decision, that of the Nine being 
already so categorical - you have, if you wish to change it, to discuss the matter 
again with each of the Nine, then you meet again and afterwards put the question 
to each of the Nine. But I must state quite clearly that this is necessarily so and 
cannot possibly be changed. This is the difficult process leading to political 
unity. If we cannot follow this procedure through to the end and if our American 
allies cannot accompany us to the end in order to aid us, then there is no political 
unity in Europe."36
These remarks were in sharp contrast to those made by Jobert on 17 March, 
which showed he was unmoved by calls for increased consultation ("We have had no 
lack of consultations, political or otherwise, with the Americans both on the bilateral 
level and between the Community and Washington"). Furthermore, his most concilia­
tory words ("I hope that no-one in the United States or Europe will let himself be 
tangled up in excessive reasoning that cannot but be harmful for everyone") presented 
the statements by Nixon and others as disproportionately inflammatory compared with 
the measured response from the Nine37. Jobert's comments, while less antagonistic 
than before, suggested he was not to be cajoled by US rhetoric. His position, and that 
of the French ambassador in Washington, M. Koscuisko-Morizet, showed that a great­
er disposition toward conciliation would not extend to conceding important policy 
objectives. Linkage was unacceptable and consultation via existing channels was 
regarded as adequate.
For its part, US rhetoric took on a more measured tone (partly as a response to 
the recently concluded US-German agreement on defence offsets). In Houston on 19 
March, Nixon38 distanced himself from Congressional pressure for troop withdrawals 
which he had invoked on 15 March, emphasising he was not trying to blackmail the
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Nine into concessions in return for military protection. He made clear that he opposed 
unilateral troop reductions and that US forces could be withdrawn only as part of 
negotiated reduction. "Regardless of what happens in terms of the economic and politi­
cal arrangements... we will continue to work with our European friends even though 
we, at times, disagree." He re-stated the need for closer consultation, without which 
the Nine would be contributing to a "new sense of isolation in America." And linkage 
remained. "If their policies in political and economic fields appear hostile to us, it is 
going to be hard for any President to get through Congress the necessary appropriation 
to maintain their security and ours."
Kissinger echoed such restraint on 21 March, dropping demands for a formalised 
US-Nine consultation procedure (his testimony to Senate Finance Committee on 7 
March) in favour of a less ambitious position.39
"The technical difficulties that the Europeans face in reaching a decision do not 
necessarily mean that the decisions have always to be taken in opposition to the 
US. We would be very respectful of the European attempt to define their pur­
poses in forums in which we are not organically included. We believe it is quite 
possible to work out a procedure whereby the Europeans meet in forums appro­
priate to the European evolution and, nevertheless, give the US an opportunity to 
express our view..."
On the threat of linkage, he said, "We were not proposing the linkage of these 
various issues as a form of blackmail. We were not trying to trade in one negotiation 
against another negotiation. We were trying to describe a situation in which, if 
common purposes are not achieved by the nations of the West, their divisions may run 
counter to their common interests. It was an appeal to common statesmanship, not an 
invitation to barter."
The way forward on consultation
The possibility of progress on the separate issue of improved NATO consulta­
tion led to increasing US administration awareness that an agreement here could 
subsume work on the US-Nine declaration. On 15 March, Nixon had strongly linked a 
visit to Europe with the completion of both the NATO and US-Nine declarations,
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rather than what he described at Houston as simply "diplomatic double-talk". With 
increasing concentration on the consultation issue, however, and US insistence that the 
response lay with the Europeans, not themselves, administration attention began to 
focus less on the US-Nine declaration process. On 19 March, the State Department 
announced that a declaration was purely incidental. "You can have all kinds of declara­
tions, but if you do not have a consultative relationship they are nothing more than 
paper tigers."40 This move, coming after such inflamed rhetoric, needed careful han­
dling. Although an abandonment of the declaration approach had long seemed prudent, 
there still needed to be evidence of a solution of the problems which had underlain the 
declaration's original purpose.
The consultation procedure proposed by Scheel was a plausible way out of the 
impasse, though less than the formal consultation Kissinger had been seeking. Al­
though it would give the US a say in European policy-making where this affected US 
interests, the proposal would leave to the Nine the decision on what was to be regarded 
as policy affecting the US. This still begged the question, therefore, of the automatici- 
ty of consultations: the French would presumably take a restrictive view on when US- 
Nine consultations would be in order, and indeed had made this clear to Scheel when 
the idea was put to them. The efficacy of the German proposal was therefore ques­
tionable as a durable means to improve consultation.
While in Bonn on 24 March, Kissinger responded to French concerns that the US 
were actively seeking a veto in Community decision-making, emphasising that the US 
remained committed to greater European unity even if Washington were not always 
much impressed with its practical consequences41. In giving his tentative endorsement 
to German ideas, he said: "As far as the US is concerned, it has always favoured, and 
continues to favour, European unity in all respects, political as well as economic. We 
therefore believe that any thoughtful, systematic consideration of our policy will lead 
to the conclusion that our policies can pursue a parallel course without prejudice to the
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rights of the European countries either individually or as a unit, to take a different 
view if they disagree." He reiterated that there would have to be concrete progress 
before Nixon's visit to Europe was reinstated42.
Ideally, Kissinger would have preferred to eliminate the need for a consultation 
arrangement by returning to a situation in which the Community did not attempt to 
form common positions on foreign policy, so unacceptable had the Nine's preliminary 
efforts proved with regard to their policy initiatives of 6 November 1973 and 5 March 
1974 toward the Middle East. In practice, the intermediate German proposals would 
be sufficient to ensure effective Alliance cooperation in which the US voice would be 
the most difficult to ignore. Kissinger knew that - even under the existing unsatisfacto­
ry arrangements - the Nine could ultimately be cajoled through sufficient well-placed 
pressure. Nevertheless, such cajolery would offer only short-term solutions, and itself 
ran the risk of becoming counterproductive. The periodic requirement for US asser­
tiveness as a way to diminish French influence might eventually become the anvil upon 
which European unity was forged, as had nearly been the case in 1973-7443.
With consultation in the air, the administration's decision to end work on both 
draft declarations was conveyed to Brandt and Scheel when Kissinger was in Bonn. 
The declarations were now to be a matter of apparent indifference to the US. It was up 
to the Europeans whether they "come up with two declarations, one declaration or 
none." European resolve to examine the consultation issue, plus US weariness with 
the matter of declarations ("We just want to get it over with and get onto something 
else," said one official44) produced the decision to concentrate on more concrete issues 
and let Europe worry about whether to produce a declaration.
Kissinger's opinion on the fate of the declarations was expressed in a press 
conference in London on 28 March 1974. Kissinger was now prepared to characterise 
Atlantic tensions as a "family quarrel" and not one of different interests or philoso­
phies. He denied that the American intention behind the declarations had been to 
produce a legal document by which they could take issue with the Europeans if the
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latter failed to observe certain of its clauses, and repeated that what happened next
"... is not up to us, we have made our proposals. Since we were not attempting 
to achieve a legal contract it is really now up to West Europe to decide how they 
want to give expression to the Atlantic relationships."45
He made it clear, however, that he had not retreated from his belief in the neces­
sity of a declaration, only that Europe would no longer feed off American prescrip- 
tives.
"We think that some expression of what the relationship might be like over the 
next decade could still be useful..." but "we have no interest in forcing it on our 
allies and we are now waiting for some European initiative."
The apparent scuttling of what had been the flagship of the Year of Europe was a 
change made out of political convenience. Kissinger remained of the view that lack of 
basic agreement on the political objectives of the Alliance and the Nine, and the ab­
sence of reliable means of consultation between the US and the Community, made the 
Alliance susceptible to fragility when confronted with problems where the Nine had 
distinct views. This was particularly true for out-of-area problems such as the Middle 
East, where there were competing regional, economic and political objectives at stake. 
The failure of the declaration process to force the Nine to address its role within the 
Alliance had disclosed there to be a greater basic divergence of interests within the 
Alliance than had been hitherto acknowledged or experienced since Suez. Reliance on 
NATO channels meant both that these channels would be overworked and more inade­
quate to the task of disentangling economic and political disputes, and that the institu­
tional lacuna between the US and Europe would persist, with no compulsion by either 
side to take the other's interests into account. There was little point in signing empty 
declarations.46
The end of work on the US-Nine text was a diplomatic victory for neither the US 
nor France since initially neither had wanted that relationship defined in isolation of the 
wider Atlantic context. It had shown that the Community could not produce a policy 
statement about its future compatibility with Alliance obligations in terms as binding as
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the US would have liked. By mutual agreement, how the Nine fitted into the Atlantic 
Alliance was best left undefined, a problem to be glossed over if a more effective 
consultative mechanism could be found. On the other hand, the demise of its propos­
als for a more institutionalised US-Nine relationship would allow the US to focus on 
NATO as the principal transatlantic forum, so not lending substance or dignity to the 
Community as a coherent institution in a binary Alliance relationship.47
Whatever doubts the Nine had about the idea because of the problem of issue- 
linkage or the need for a European "personality", they were not shared by members of 
the Alliance such as Norway or Canada, who agreed with the US on the inadequacy of 
the Nine's consultation and the threat posed by it to the Alliance framework48. These 
countries, as well as most of the Nine, were prepared to support a declaration so as to 
convey to the US (particularly Congress) that the Alliance retained its relevance in the 
changed security environment of the early 1970s. Reaffirmation of the Atlantic 
commitment of the Nine was still a diplomatic prize worth winning, but without the 
deadline of a Nixon visit or a declaration, the temptation might exist to ignore Atlantic 
problems and the implications of how future US-Nine consultation would coexist with 
Alliance commitments. French attitudes would be crucial, however. If Paris continued 
to regard the Atlantic declaration exercise as a trial of strength, the problems of the 
previous twelve months would go unresolved.
French influence weakened: 
a UK-German axis emerges
Events had played into French hands during the course of 1973, reflecting 
Europe's problems with US foreign policy and the emerging imperative for a stronger 
European identity. By the spring of 1974 this vicious circle was broken, not least by 
the sobering effect of the statements by Nixon and his secretary of state in March 
1974. These had, said Kissinger:
"served a very useful purpose in recalling each side of the Atlantic to the funda­
mentals and creating the basis for a much more constructive relationship."49
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If France still continued to renounce all things American (as had been the case at 
the Washington conference in February) the rest of the Nine were increasingly pre­
pared to regard renunciation of a European identity as the lesser of two evils. The 
other eight had isolated France in February, and by late March were prepared to do so 
again in the face of any continuing intransigence. Aggravating relations with the US 
was becoming increasingly unacceptable politically: the US would be able to express 
its views more effectively to the Nine either collectively (as proposed by Scheel) or 
else through normal bilateral channels, meaning dilution of the July 1973 formula 
which was the basis of the Community's foreign-policy identity.
With the end of the Heath government in March 1974, Kissinger found more 
receptive interlocutors in London on questions of Alliance solidarity. Wilson and 
Callaghan had less personal commitment to the Community than the Conservative 
government, and did not feel the imperative to defend the Community against Kissing­
er's criticisms. Pledged to renegotiate basic elements of the terms of the UK's acces­
sion the Community, the incoming government also attached importance to undoing the 
more damaging aspects of Community foreign policy, particularly where this had led 
the UK into discord with the US.
Callaghan's unwillingness to be bound by the requirement of consultation within 
the Nine would, by itself, have put in question the Nine's cohesion. His preference - 
as was Kissinger's - was that US views be conveyed bilaterally to some or all of the 
Nine, and so be taken account of before decisions were taken. A consultation proce­
dure was needed which explicitly involved the US in European decision-making. In 
his first Parliamentary statement on foreign policy on 19 March 1974, Callaghan made 
his views clear50.
"I must emphasise that we repudiate the view that Europe will emerge only out 
of a process of struggle against America. We do not agree that a Europe which 
excludes the fullest and most intimate cooperation with the United States is a 
desirable or attainable objective... Some may have found President Nixon's 
rough words the other day [15 March in Chicago] unduly harsh. But at least 
they had the effect of introducing a greater sense of realism, and that has been a 
scarce commodity in much of the discussion over the past two years...
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"For us the value of political consultation and cooperation [with the Nine] will be 
ruined if it appears to take an anti-American tinge or if consultation with the 
United States is inadequate... We certainly welcome such a dialogue [between 
Europe and Arabs]. But I assume that neither the Community nor the Arab states 
would want that dialogue to hamper Dr Kissinger's efforts to secure a measure of 
peace in the Middle East. It is clear that he believes that at present the beginning 
of that dialogue would do so.
"... Our belief is that the Community should accept more modest and attainable 
goals... A Labour Government will... adapt and reshape the policies of the 
Community... [to] meet our conception of the Community's relations with other 
states."
Although the Wilson and Brandt governments became the focus of Kissinger's 
efforts after March, they approached the Atlantic problem from different directions 
(just as they did the broader question of the Community. The Labour government's 
commitment to renegotiate the terms of UK membership of the Community would 
directly affect the Federal Republic as the largest contributor to the Community budg­
et). Callaghan envisaged a new informal consultative system as a way to restore close 
UK links with Washington and prevent their dilution in the political framework of the 
Nine. Bonn on the other hand envisaged a consultation procedure which preserved as 
much autonomy from the US as was consistent with Atlantic obligations. The German 
priority in 1973 was to avoid the choice which the US increasingly began to pose for 
them between the US and France.
Differences in the British and German positions became apparent when Calla­
ghan visited Bonn on 22 March 1974. The Federal Republic's concern was that, de­
spite Kissinger's protestations to the contrary, the US attitude to European policy 
would be based not on the encouragement of greater political coherence among the 
Nine but on the UK's reflex Atlanticism and their own vulnerability to American 
pressure. British determination to renegotiate its accession terms threatened to stall the 
process of European unity by 1980. For the UK's part, German proposals for regular 
consultations with the US at political director level did not go far enough. Callaghan's 
preference was for unconstrained consultation at every level, both bilateral and multi­
lateral. His scepticism toward European political cooperation led him to see US-Nine
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consultation as largely theoretical, imposing only minimal obligations on the UK. 
London would consult freely with Washington when it wished.
Although Anglo-German differences on consultation with the US were more than 
just ones of degree, their positions were closer to each other than to that of the French. 
On 27 March Pompidou gave a clear signal to Washington of France's hostility to any 
process which involved the Community's seeking the prior approval of the US in its 
policy-making. While favouring regular contact and exchange of information, the 
president stressed he would always oppose any suggestion that Europe submit its inter­
nal future to US approval51. A formal consultative procedure as proposed by the 
Federal Republic was anathema, but more so was a return to the days of US divide and 
rule implicit in the UK's plans for more informal links, since these held out little 
prospect of Europe's speaking with one voice either before or after consultation with 
the Americans.
Consequently in Luxembourg on 2 April, France blocked a decision on whether 
there should be advance consultation with the US, against the wishes of the other eight. 
At the meeting, Callaghan expanded on his Atlanticist line and refused to endorse 
further preparations for the proposed Euro-Arab dialogue unless there were agreement 
to continual consultation with the US. Callaghan's view that, without prior consulta­
tion with the US, dialogue with the Arabs could cut across US diplomatic efforts and 
compromise decisions taken on energy in February was opposed directly to that of 
Jobert. The French view was that only after each step in the dialogue with the Arabs 
would the Nine need to decide whether the US should be consulted.
The immediate effect of the procedural argument over consultation prevented 
further progress on the Nine's dialogue with the Arab countries. Unless resolved, in 
the longer term it had the potential to disrupt all further foreign policy cooperation 
among the Nine. The initial approach to the Arabs on 5 March (with Britain abstain­
ing in the absence of a government) had included no reference to consultations with the
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US. Despite this, British officials insisted that the Community was eight-to-one in 
favour of bringing US into its deliberations in order to allow, said Callaghan, "full, 
frank and reciprocal discussions with the United States at every stage."52
Schloss Gymnich, April and June 1974: 
US-Nine consultation resolved
Despite the consensus in NATO supporting a conclusion of the declaration 
(which eventually led to renewal of the drafting process in May 1974), preliminary to 
that was the establishment of a modus vivendi between the US and the Nine. A declara­
tion of the fifteen allies was not enough, as Kissinger had said in late March; a con­
structive European response on economic and political relations was required to per­
suade the US of the usefulness of restarting work on any NATO declaration. That 
meant establishment of an effective system of consultation.
With revival of the Atlantic declaration linked to US-Community reconciliation, 
Bonn was determined to make progress on a consultative procedure. This would both 
restore good relations between Bonn and Washington and prevent the work's falling to 
the French when assuming the presidency of the Community after July 1974. By 
arousing concern - particularly in Bonn and London - about the adequacy of existing 
arrangements for consultation with the Nine, the US administration quite explicitly 
wished to pursue the issue so as to weaken foreign-policy cooperation among the Nine 
and revert to the pre-July 1973 arrangements which had allowed Washington to rely 
principally on bilateral contacts. As part of the logic of the Community's develop­
ment, the July 1973 arrangements had seemed justifiable, but a more emollient US 
approach than in 1973 might have produced a different result. This is what Kissinger 
had earlier miscalculated in the state of Community development in 1973: the harder 
the US had pressed its ideas of partnership and for their incorporation into a statement 
of Atlantic principles, the greater impetus there was for the Community to respond 
with its own identity and with independently-developed positions.
Three positions could be identified on the consultation issue:
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- that of Britain and the US which sought consultation at the earliest possible 
moment, what Callaghan styled on 21 May in a speech to the National Press 
Club in Washington as the three "C"s (consultation, cooperation and coordina­
tion), with consultation across a wide range of issues occurring "as soon as a 
problem of common concern starts to emerge;"53
- the minimalist French position at the other end of the consultation spectrum;
- the German position (and broadly that of the rest of the Nine) combining full 
consultation with America and the policy integrity of the Nine. In a speech in 
the US in mid-April, Scheel made it clear that he regarded the French position as 
unacceptable, and that the eight were determined "to devise a mutually satisfacto­
ry" European-American consultation procedure. Ultimately, Scheel predicted, 
Washington would have a single partner, a united Europe, "closely and perma­
nently connected with the United States." Until this occurred, the Nine would 
speak to the US both individually and as a group.
What Scheel's comments indicated was that Bonn, having avoided taking sides 
between Washington and Paris, was increasingly placing the onus on France to agree 
greater flexibility on how the Nine projected their independent foreign policy. If Paris 
would not agree to its partners in the Nine consulting with the US individually, the rest 
of the eight would do so regardless, so isolating France and bringing American views 
into discussion among the Nine anyway54.
In the end, such a clear-cut presentation of the problem was not required. The 
immediate effect of Pompidou's death on 2 April 1974 on the revitalisation of Atlantic 
relations was the departure of Jobert, the bete noire of the Year of Europe, upon whom 
Kissinger placed the prime responsibility for its problems55. Giscard d 'E staing 
compared favourably. His references to foreign policy indicated that while France 
would insist on US-European relations' being based on an "equality of rights", greater 
attention would be paid to good Franco-German relations (signified by the appointment 
of Jean Victor Sauvagnargues, a former ambassador to Bonn, as foreign minister).
German efforts to find acceptance for its consultation proposals continued with 
the meeting of foreign ministers at Schloss Gymnich on 20/21 April. The meeting 
produced what became the basis of agreement to replace the June 1973 procedures: 
consultations between Europe and the US would be on pragmatic, case-by-case, crite­
ria. No formal decisions were taken at Gymnich because of the interregnum in Paris.
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It still remained to be seen whether the convergence of views within the Nine could be
translated into practical and effective consultation acceptable to the US.
For Callaghan the emerging procedure was acceptable, stressing the primacy of
bilateral channels over the requirements of political union.
"Initially each of the Nine would be free to consult bilaterally with America on 
key issues, bearing in mind the possibility of later reaching a concert of Euro­
pean views."56
The conclusion of work on formulating a US-Nine consultative procedure came 
on 10 June, again at Schloss Gymnich, when all Nine foreign ministers assented to the 
case-by-case approach to consultation. The accord was a considerable dilution of the 
initial German proposition for formal consultations at political director level. It was a 
reasonable compromise, however. Each issue was to be considered on its merits. 
Whenever there was a consensus among the Nine that the policy initiative was of suffi­
cient concern to Washington, consultation would occur through the chairmanship of the 
Nine. Any one of the Nine could ask its partners to consider a particular issue as 
being of concern to America and hence worthy of consultation. The understanding 
was that such a request would be treated favourably by the other eight. If one of the 
eight were to veto that request to consult, or if consensus on any one issue failed to 
emerge, individual governments would be free to consult bilaterally with the US.
The formula could not by itself prevent antagonism between the Nine and Ameri­
ca, but by permitting bilateral consultation with the US the Community had legitimised 
a way out of future impasses, which, although an option open to individual countries of 
the Nine throughout 1973, could not have been resorted to then without accusations of 
bad faith. This suited both the French and the UK. While Callaghan could reasonably 
argue this procedure to be entirely consistent with his theory of "consultation, coopera­
tion and coordination", France could also insist that there was no question of the 
Nine's being forced to consult Washington against their will, and hence that Washing­
ton could not expect consultation as of right.
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Kissinger was formally informed of the Schloss Gymnich conclusions by
Genscher on June 12. His response was favourable, if muted. Rightly, he perceived
nothing new in the procedure.57
"... the consultation procedure that is now being envisaged can either go via the 
Presidency by unanimous consent - which is not new - or bilaterally via any of 
the countries composing the Nine... between these two forms it should be possi­
ble to work out adequate procedures. The major goal in any event is the sub­
stance and not the legal form... the element that is new... is the greater use of 
bilateral consultation."
Thus the consultation problem between the US and Nine was concluded, albeit in 
a decidedly lukewarm spirit. Schloss Gymnich did not amount to much that was new 
other than a recognition by the Nine of the need for flexibility in application of the 
formula agreed in Copenhagen in July 1973. This option of flexibility had existed all 
along, but it was a success for Kissinger to force the Nine to acknowledge its necessi­
ty, as part of his attempts to dissuade the Nine from following French policy for the 
sake of European unity. In praising US-Nine consultation as "more useful and sponta­
neous" on 6 June and in noting the change "in the spirit of attitude of consultation" on 
12 June 1974, Kissinger made clear that consultation followed, not preceded, good 
relations. No arrangement was watertight: the proof of the Nine's good intentions 
would come when the Euro-Arab dialogue began to discuss issues of substance under 
French presidency guidance58. Most important was that Schloss Gymnich allowed the 
issue of consultation within the Alliance to move to its final stage, and with it to the 
conclusion of the Year of Europe.
Brandt's departure: 
prospects improve further
The resignation of Brandt was the least consequential of the three changes of 
government in the spring of 1974, since by then the Alliance was on the road to recon­
ciliation. Although Kissinger writes disobligingly throughout of Brandt's role, it was 
the departures of Heath and Pompidou, more than that of Brandt, which provided an 
opportunity for conciliation unobtainable before. Nonetheless, Brandt's commitment to
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European unity was exploited by Jobert to counter the commitment to good Atlantic 
relations. Brandt maintained Atlantic harmony and European unity to be compatible, 
hence his refusal to choose between France and America, to the disenchantment of 
both Jobert and Kissinger. What James Goldsborough59 wrote of Jobert applied equal­
ly to Kissinger when he described the French foreign minister as:
"a man who learned everything from the Gaullists except the one thing they 
never understood: you cannot make the Germans choose between France and the 
United States."
On coming to office, Schmidt was publicly more committed to the Alliance and 
less to the Community in its present form, which he regarded as inefficient and expen­
sive. He shared Brandt's views on the need for an organised Atlantic dialogue, as his 
first speech as chancellor made clear. German foreign and security policy would 
remain unaltered.
- "We declare ourselves for the political unification of Europe in partnership with 
the United States... The European Community is the irreplaceable basis for this.
- "The achievement of a European political union is more urgent than ever.
- "The Atlantic Alliance remains the essential basis of our security... we shall 
work for the strengthening of the Alliance... The balance of power in the world 
and the security of Western Europe remain for the foreseeable future dependent 
upon the military and political presence of the United States in Europe."60
In underlining the importance he attached to the relationship with the US,
Schmidt was hinting heavily that he had a less finely-balanced opinion of the need for
European solidarity in the face of all adversity. He had publicly expressed his view in
Washington in February 1974 that French policy on energy cooperation called into
question the Federal Republic's commitment to the future of the European Community.
Thus his May 1974 speech echoed the train of thought which took him beyond the
more cautious terms which had been deployed by Brandt in order to keep the Federal
Republic on the fence. He expressed "deep concern" at disintegrating measures taken
by some members (for example, Italy and Denmark, which had in recent days raised
trade barriers to offset trade deficits), and told member states that they had to make
resolute efforts of their own before they could expect assistance from the Community
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(meaning Bonn). Callaghan described himself and Schmidt as "firm believers in the 
Atlantic Alliance". Callaghan's comment was that Schmidt "brought unreal talk of 
early European political union to an end. The Community departed from theoretical 
discussion and was more flexible and adaptable to the needs of its individual mem­
bers."61
Drafting re-commences: 
conclusion of the NATO declaration
By mid-May 1974 Atlantic feuding was nearly over. Proof was in the revival of 
the NATO declaration by Britain in a far more Atlanticist mould. From its referral to 
NATO officials on 24 May it would be only a month until its approval by NATO 
foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa (reflecting how close agreement had been at the 
time of its postponement in late March).
The British draft, with some US input (the UK's permanent representative, Sir 
Edward Peck, described it as a "combined effort"62), reflected Callaghan's forthright 
policy on the Alliance compared with that assigned to the Community. The eight's 
dissatisfaction with Britain's role since March as a self-styled conciliator increased 
when they discovered the degree of Anglo-US cooperation, however63. US representa­
tives in NATO had called it positive, and one diplomat was quoted as saying, "It is not 
surprising that the State Department called the British draft positive because we under­
stand that Callaghan completed it after duly consulting with Mr Kissinger. "M
Although drafted by the conciliatory de Rose, the earlier French draft, which the 
UK had now revised, had caused problems for the US and the UK in a number of 
ways. It had stressed the special position of the Nine within the Alliance, the special 
character of European security in the light of superpower detente, and the correspond­
ing need for Europe to consider its own defence organisation.
The British draft, on the other hand, made no reference to the European Nine or 
to European political union's having any sort of "favourable effect" on the Alliance
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(which in UK eyes it clearly did not). It mentioned the need for obligatory consulta­
tions even on issues which were outside the NATO area but which impinged on 
common security interests; it referred to economic and military issues as interdepend­
ent (implying, as Callaghan had told journalists in Washington in May, that economic 
questions had to be solved at Alliance level, not dealt with by the Nine alone); and it 
made no mention of a separate dimension for European defence.
British proposals for a sanitised French text did not, therefore, simply pick up 
where the Alliance had left off at the time of the draft's abandonment in March. It 
could not do so, since work on this earlier NATO draft had assumed the conclusion of 
a declaration between the US and Nine covering economic and political ties. The new 
draft's inclusion of references to economic and trade problems in an Atlantic frame­
work - something on which the US were insisting - was unacceptable even to Bonn and 
The Hague, who believed it compromised an area of specific Community competence. 
This was despite UK counter-arguments that without reference to economic links, the 
NATO draft would present an unbalanced perspective of Alliance relations and not the 
general approach for which Kissinger had expressly wished. Hence British revisions to 
the most ambitious elements of the French text, with the intention of heading off what 
they assumed would be strong US criticism, ran into problems with European allies. It 
was unclear how wedded the US were to the UK draft. With the departure of Jobert 
from the Quai d'Orsay, the US administration looked to be arranging a different sort of 
deal with the Alliance, and particularly in Paris where there were improved prospects 
for closer cooperation. Indeed, in contrast to the Atlanticism of Callaghan, which was 
intended to reinforce the American position and underline the UK resolve on renegotia­
tion, the new message from Washington was about the need for a unified Europe and 
the role which the UK should be looking to play in it alongside the French and Ger­
mans.
It was about this time also, according to Helmut Sonnenfeldt, that feelers were 
being put out from Washington about reinstating a Nixon visit to Europe on his way
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back from Moscow in June. There was some discussion of this between Giscard and 
Schmidt in Paris in early June and agreement, says de Rose, that the Nine should not 
put obstacles in the way, although neither was prepared to take any initiative on what 
form an invitation to Nixon should take. What remained unclear was whether a tour of 
capitals or one meeting at NATO headquarters was envisaged, and whether the inten­
tion was for the Alliance text to be issued as a separate declaration, as a (less impor­
tant) special communique, or simply as part of the summit communique itself. This 
was clarified only when, in advance of the Ottawa council, invitations were issued on 
14 June for the NATO summit at the end of the month. Luns made clear in doing so 
that he was acting on a suggestion from Nixon himself.
The summit was therefore intended to bring an end to the charter exercise at the 
same time as allowing Nixon to brief the Alliance on his talks in Moscow, particularly 
progress on the CSCE and MBFR talks amid rumours that the Americans might accept 
Soviet ideas for a East-West summit in July in Helsinki, leaving unresolved the human- 
rights issues covered by the so-called Basket Three.
The Ottawa declaration
Although much of the heat had been taken out of Alliance exchanges by May 
1974, discussion of the draft Ottawa text highlighted many of the same problems with 
consultation which had existed between the US and the Nine. Much of the language in 
the British text that was unacceptable to the French was either deleted or diluted. This 
was possible given eventual American willingness to accept that the informal procedure 
agreed to by the Nine at Schloss Gymnich was satisfactory as far as it went, provided 
it could be augmented by a strong commitment within the NATO forum to oblige the 
Community eight plus the other European members to consult formally (through 
permanent representatives in the North Atlantic Council) with the US on all issues of 
concern to the Alliance.
The British draft had referred to the need for "frank and timely" consultations on
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all questions of common concern, a position that was far too broad for the French 
interpretation of an informal consultation procedure only on questions that "appear to 
make it necessary." Although Sauvagnargues described the problem in the new low- 
key style of the French as a "semantic dispute," its resolution was nonetheless a pre­
condition for French acquiescence to the declaration. The United States wanted lan­
guage that gave consultation as wide a scope as possible, including consultations on 
matters not strictly part of NATO business, while the French wanted interpretation of 
what NATO consultations should consist of to be as strict as possible. Sauvagnargues 
made plain the French opposition to any obligation by Europe for automatic consulta­
tions. While consultation was a normal thing between friends and allies, France "could 
not subscribe to any obligation"65 which would limit Europe's ability to act without 
US agreement, particularly outside of area where the Community was seeking to 
develop a more concerted role.
Once the problem of the wording on "European Union" had been overcome to 
London's satisfaction (by substituting a vague and qualified reference to the Communi­
ty's possible long-term contribution to NATO), only the Franco-American problem of 
consultation remained. Success at Ottawa was possible only because of a last minute 
shift in position by the French, reached between Kissinger and Sauvagnargues just 
prior to the NATO council meeting on 18-19 June. In response to the French willing­
ness to affirm an intention to consult but not a legal obligation to do so, Kissinger 
accepted that consultations had to be "organic and emerge through normal practice, 
preferring that consultation be initiated at will among the a llies." Kissinger, after a 
brief meeting with the French foreign minister, agreed that an obligatory consultation 
procedure was undesirable; a requirement to consult would almost be a contradiction in 
terms. "I feel that consultation within the Alliance will become organic because of the 
common necessities the allies have."66
The compromise on consultation was introduced by the Belgian representative,
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Andre de Staque. It was in effect a vindication of the French position in that they were
not forced to admit (or forced to reject) a legal obligation to consult. Furthermore, it
was recognised that no formal NATO response to out-of-area threats could or should
be worked out in advance. Kissinger himself confirmed the secondary nature of a
commitment to consult compared with the political will to do so, still reserving the
right of the US to take military action on its own and consult later in an emergency.
"We have to distinguish between consultations and emergency situations. It is 
conceivable that emergencies would arise in which the United States has to act.
It would be irresponsible to believe that this could not happen but those occasions 
will, I hope, be very rare."67
Important for the US was Alliance, particularly French, acceptance of consulta­
tions outside of the Washington Treaty area as defined by Article 6 (to which Kissinger 
added the comment at the meeting itself that the US continued to regard the Middle 
East as an out-of-area theatre which directly affected Alliance interests). Thus the 
Ottawa Council asserted Alliance resolve to:
"keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and 
timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating 
to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these 
interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world" (Article 11).
The agreement adopted at Ottawa and signed by heads of government in Brussels
on 26 June was a fourteen-point declaration which inter alia, and in addition to the
above:
- reaffirmed that, after 25 years, the Alliance provided the indispensable basis 
for security and for detente (Article 2)68;
- stressed that common defence was one and indivisible (Article 3);
- recognised that the circumstances of their common defence had "profoundly" 
changed in the previous years: the US-Soviet strategic relationship was at a point 
of near equilibrium, so that the nature of the danger to the Alliance had changed. 
"The Alliance's problems in the defence of Europe have thus assumed a different 
and more distinct character" (Article 4);
- allowed the US to make clear (Article 7) that it would not accept anything 
which exposed Europe to external political or military pressure (NB: no refer­
ence to economic pressure). Furthermore, given concern about the 1973 US- 
Soviet agreement on preventing nuclear war, the Americans reaffirmed that 
agreements which reduced the risk of war should not be regarded as constraining 




- resolved the wording which had been disputed by the French about how to 
acknowledge that eight Alliance members were also part of the Community (and 
therefore of an organisation committed to European Union). The compromise 
agreed was a rather speculative vision of the eight's role inside the wider transat­
lantic forum: "It is recognised that the further progress toward unity, which the 
member states of the European Community are determined to make, should in 
due course have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defence of 
the Alliance and of those countries who belong to it" (Article 9). Furthermore, 
to counter the American references the previous year to European regionalism,
"the contributions made by members of the Alliance to the preservation of inter­
national security... are recognised to be of great importance";
- stated that the Alliance wish to "ensure that their essential security relationship 
is supported by harmonious political and economic relations. In particular, they 
will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic policies and to 
encourage economic cooperation with one another" (Article 11). This was all 
that remained of the US-Nine declaration, and while recognising that differences 
did exist, fell far short of the American attempts to tackle these problems head- 
on and to obtain an undertaking that there should be greater Alliance activity in 
these areas as part of the overall security relationship.
For the Europeans, one of the most significant points of the declaration con­
cerned security arrangements, which made clear that in addition to essential elements 
such as the indispensability of US strategic nuclear forces and of North American 
forces in Europe there was a new factor to be recognised. "The European members, 
who provide three quarters of the conventional strength of the Alliance in Europe, two 
of whom possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent role of their own, con­
tributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance, undertake to 
make the necessary contribution to maintain the common defence." (Article 6).
De Rose (in private conversation69) described the reference for the first time in a 
NATO document on the contribution to collective security of the French deterrent 
force as a highly significant step. French commentators have made much of this subse­
quently as signifying recognition of the legitimacy of that force, in contrast to 1960s 
US policy, and particularly that under Kennedy which had sought to prevent the 
French from acquiring such a capability and which had openly criticised the French for 
doing so70.
Aside from the declaration itself, the Ottawa meeting also secured European
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agreement to the leading role of the US in the Middle East peace initiative. Europe 
accepted that they should confine their dialogue with the Arab states to economic and 
technical aid, in return for which the US undertook to consult closely on the peace 
process.
The Brussels summit: 
the final act
For all that it marked the conclusion of months of in-house wrangling, comment 
on the Ottawa declaration was generally negative71. Likewise the summit was seen in 
sceptical terms (for example, as the "showbiz summit"), not least because Nixon's 
demise was by then so widely expected. As with the Ottawa declaration, the merit of 
the Brussels summit72 was largely that it "enhanced the role of words"; it was not self- 
evident that by itself this would contribute to more effective cooperation within the 
Alliance. The summit itself, from which Giscard was conveniently absent (because of 
the coincidence of the Shah of Iran's visit to Paris), lasted barely two hours. Most of 
those involved concur in the view that the process of agreeing the declaration - and the 
declaration itself - have had little subsequent influence on effective Alliance manage­
ment. Once the issue had been raised by Kissinger, the Alliance had been condemned 
to succeed in reaffirming (for both international and domestic audiences) its continuing 
relevance. On the other hand, although it laid no new foundations, endorsement of the 
Ottowa declaration did meet the requirements of the time (particularly the robust 
message to Moscow about the US interpretation of the agreement preventing nuclear 
war) and made no apology for the continuing requirement for nuclear weaponry. In 
this way it reasserted the primacy of the Alliance over other commitments arising from 
detente. It also made a significant attempt at defining consultation in recognising that 
Alliance interests could not be confined to Europe.
The Ottawa text also met the broad interests of all the signatories. On the Euro­
pean side, the interest in the declaration lay partly in the further US reaffirmation that 
American troops and nuclear forces remained indispensable. There was a specific
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reference to the contribution of European unity to joint security. For the US it helped 
the administration to stifle isolationist pressure in Congress, and persuaded America's 
European allies that they could not ignore the fact that common interests extended 
beyond Europe and that it made no sense for Europe and America to be working at 
cross purposes. The declaration accepted - albeit not very enthusiastically - that Al­
liance solidarity required cooperation in economic as well as security issues. It assured 
Europe that their interests would not be neglected and that their views and their more 
independent role would not be ignored. Most strikingly, it implied that the Community 
itself might have a defence role to play, with conspicuous reference to the contribution 
of the British and French deterrents.
Finally, it achieved what Kissinger had set out to do fourteen months earlier in 
criticising the Community for its institutional rigidity and its increasing disposition to 
disregard the objectives of US foreign policy. In accepting a flexible form of consulta­
tion, the US abandoned its demand that the Nine submit important decisions on foreign 
policy to prior consultation with Washington. The French were no longer in a position 
to discourage close bilateral links between Washington and European capitals. The 
Luxembourg formula of July 1973 had therefore been overturned. From then on, the 
content of those bilateral ties would be determined increasingly by the progress made 
toward European cooperation and the degree to which the Community member states 
regarded it as essential to consult closely with the US.
The long-term significance of the declaration was victim to its negotiating history 
and to the political need - given the recent turmoils in the Alliance - to find common, 
but not necessarily new, ground. In addition to agreeing a means to insulate the Al­
liance from the consequences of conflicting economic interests, three crucial issues 
remained unresolved: the long-standing pressure in Washington for a reduction in 
overseas defence expenditure; the fluidity of European security resulting from multilat­
eral and bilateral negotiations between East and West; and the question mark over
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defence cooperation between the European members of the Alliance and how much 
would be compatible with preserving linkage with the US.
The first of these had been attenuated only temporarily by the defeat of the 
Mansfield amendment. In the future, however, with absence of a strong political rela­
tionship within the Alliance and no prospect of concluding the MBFR negotiations, 
those pressures had, from the perspective of 1974, been only deferred not dispelled. 
Related to this was the second question of how the Alliance would withstand the con­
tinuing requirement to make concessions if the negotiations underpinning detente were 
to be concluded. Despite the reassurance in the declaration, no course had been chart­
ed for handling detente.
Finally, despite the oblique reference in the declaration to European defence, 
there was no consensus on how such cooperation could or should be achieved. If de 
Rose is right to say that one US objective was to set the Alliance on a new, more 
balanced course which removed some of the internal tension between an Atlantic and 
European Europe by bringing about closer French involvement - though realistically 
falling short of reintegration into the military organisation - then 1973/4 was an oppor­
tunity which slipped away. The anomalous French position and the potential for this to 
unravel the seamless web of the Alliance is not a lesson which could be learnt only 
with hindsight. For as long as there appeared to be an European alternative to alliance 
with the US, those tensions would re-emerge every time the Alliance went through a 
difficult period, and certainly when it attempted to address head-on the debate about 
long-term security interests. This it has done since the latter part of the 1980s, with no 
obvious means now of finding a durable position on which that debate can be conclud­
ed, short of compromising Alliance solidarity and the US-German relationship which 
has prevented serious conflicts of interest between the Community member states, 
notably over the respective long-term security roles of France and a non-nuclear but 
more assertive Germany.
The Brussels summit perm itted a respectable conclusion to the Year of
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Europe73. Whether the initiative coincided with or was the cause of a post-war "low" 
in Atlantic relations (at least since Suez) remains a moot point. The received wisdom 
is that the exercise was a symptom only of the need to set new Alliance objectives to 
reflect the views of both sides of the Atlantic. As a result of 1973/74, political rela­
tions within NATO were placed on a sounder footing despite the absence of new fora 
for political consultation and ways to enforce later on what suited the mood in mid- 
1974. Potential problems remained; the truce which the Ottawa declaration represent­
ed did, however, make it easier to look for solutions.
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"German-American Relations," The Wishington Papers No. 74, Sage Policy Paper for the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1980, p. 38.
(59) "The Franco-German Entente," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No 3, April 1976.
(60) The Times, 18 May 1974.
(61) Time and Chance, Collins, London, 1987, pp. 301 and 306.
(62) Private conversation, May 1982.
(63) The Guardian, 25 May 1974: "Callaghan's Atlantic pact riles EEC." The Nine interpreted in the British text 
the logical extension of the Labour government's reservations toward a political identity for the European 
Community. Sir Donald Logan (the UK's deputy Permrep at NATO) recalls (private conversation, May 1982) 
specific instructions from London around April 1974 that there should be no reference to European Union in the 
NATO text. When NATO permanent representatives met to consider the declaration on 7 June the British delega­
tion confirmed its refusal to include a reference to European union in the draft, such was its intention to stress the
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Atlantic Community at the expense of the European. At Schloss Gymnich on 10 June Callaghan reiterated this 
position (and found himself in a minority of one).
(64) The International Herald Tribune, 25/26 May 1974.
(65) The Times, 17 June 1974.
(66) The International Herald Tribune, 18 June 1974.
(67) The International Herald Tribune, 20 June 1974. Such was the difference between an arrangement which was 
workable for the NATO forum and one between the US and the Nine. NATO's permanent consultative mecha­
nism existed to take account of the eventuality of emergencies because it was a military as well as political al­
liance: the requirement to review its formal procedures (requested by Kissinger at the North Atlantic Council in 
December 1973) was a direct response to the failure of the 15 to see a collective threat to security from the Middle 
East War. The establishment of such an institutionalised arrangement between the US and Nine of, say a perma­
nent council, was a less significant requirement given that the US-Nine differences were generally self-inflicted 
and the fact that emergency military action would take place through NATO rather than through the EEC Presi­
dency.
(68) Text is in The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 
1981, p. 291.
(69) In Paris in January 1982.
(70) The reference was in fact resisted by the Italians and some of the other Community members in the Alliance 
on the grounds that possession of nuclear weapons by certain European countries should not give those countries 
increased political status. In discussions in the Nuclear Planning Group in early 1974, the Italians made clear they 
could not accept any specific role (e.g. second centre of decision-making) being assigned to nuclear forces owned 
by Britain and France, since this would suggest discrimination between the nuclear and non-nuclear allies in 
contributing to the European element of common defence. See Kissinger's earlier views on this debate in "The 
unsolved problem of European Defence", Foreign Affairs, No. 404, July 1962, pp. 64-9.
(71) The New York Times, 27 June 1974, wrote: "What saves the declaration from its flaws is its irrelevance."
(72) The International Herald Tribune, 28 June 1974. Hella Pick in The Guardian of 20 June 1974 ("West closes 
ranks behind US at Ottawa Conference") described the Declaration and Brussels Summit as a direct trade-off: the 
Nine would confine their dialogue with the Arabs to economic and technical issues in return for closer US consul­
tation on detente and the Middle East peace process.
(73) Kissinger rather overstates it (Years o f Upheaval, loc cit, p. 934) by describing Ottawa as "the single Alliance 
Declaration we had proposed in the first place," and believing that mid-1974 ushered in "one of the best periods 
of Atlantic co-operation in decades." In fact, once concluded, the Year of Europe was soon forgotten: Coral Bell 
described how the problems of 1973-74, rather than being resolved, simply became overwhelmed with other diffi­
culties: thus in "Kissinger in retrospect," International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 1977, Bell writes: "By 





The Year of Europe: a balance sheet
The Year of Europe brought to a head a divergence of views and logic about an 
Atlantic- or European-based Community similar to that which existed in the 1960s (and 
there are more striking similarities in the early 1990s). Although the 1973 exercise was 
a failure by the criterion of Washington's original objectives, the end result was to 
define more clearly than hitherto the American position with regard to closer European 
cooperation. Aware of the likely consequences of any renewed tendency for European 
political cooperation to be based on distinctiveness from the US, the Community also 
learnt lessons in 1973-74 about the limits of its freedom of action.
There were limits, however, to the value of the largely cosmetic changes agreed 
in 1973-74 in terms of how far they could influence the real variables in an Alliance of 
complex working relationships. Even though Washington secured the immediate 
objective of preventing intensified political cooperation in Europe regardless of the 
Nine's relationship with the US1, it was still unable to translate this into concrete trade 
and financial benefits. The question remains whether the US could have secured its 
objectives without the diplomatic upheavals of 1973/74, some of which were generated 
by outside developments but most of which were either of Kissinger's making or else 
exploited by him in order to maximise European discomfort about how the Nine fitted 
into the Alliance.
If the balance sheet in 1973 comes out just about to the advantage of the Ameri­
cans, the losers - France - are easier to identify. Despite Washington's conspicuous 
courting of Paris as the key to redefining the Alliance and to establishing a new work­
ing relationship which included full French participation; the US adm inistration's 
preference from the start to base the Atlantic reappraisal on something with which the
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French could live; and French ambitions to be Washington's principal European inter­
locutor, Franco-American relations deteriorated steadily throughout 1973/4. By forcing 
the US to look again to London and Bonn so as to marginalise rather than conciliate 
Jobert, the Year of Europe exercise became much more restrictive, and hence inade­
quate for the purpose of reconciling Alliance divisions. While British and German 
prescriptions would serve to produce a suitably Atlanticist document and bring the 
other members of the Community (apart from France) on board, this merely perpetuat­
ed the unsatisfactory, because unresolved, questions about Europe's future security and 
the long-term relationship between the US and Europe.
The US's failure to identify an Alliance structure within which France might play 
a full part had costs for the US as well as for the long-term coherence of US-European 
relations2. Franco-US relations are always complicated; in the early 1990s they were 
probably at the lowest ebb since 1973, beset by different perspectives on GATT, US 
policy on missile defences, aid to the former Soviet Union, the role of the North Atlan­
tic Cooperation Council (NACC), President M itterrand's own proposals for four- 
power talks on former Soviet Union nuclear weapons and a nuclear testing moratori­
um, and French refusal to clarify how the Franco-German corps would conform to 
WEU command. The underlying reasons were the same as 20 years before: the con­
viction that France, as a mainland power, must not be dependent on outside forces, 
however useful US forces were in balancing declining Russian influence and growing 
German power; the belief that the US would remain in Europe for only as long as it 
suited US not European interests; and the assumption that there was a continuing need 
to choose between the US and Europe on security issues. The result has been a con­
tinuing divide in Europe on how to handle the transatlantic relationship.
There was certainly pettiness on both sides of the Atlantic in 1973/74. The 
comment that tension arose from "vastly overdrawn versions of originally defensible 
points elevated to the level of mutually exclusive dogmas over which the different 
protagonists fought with the fervour of bygone theological disputes"3 has much truth in
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it. A willingness to raise the stakes as a way to constrain European cooperation, 
combined with Kissinger's tendency to personalise what were institutional as much as 
individual tensions, seemed to confirm that the Nixon administration remained unpre­
dictable in its handling of foreign policy and - despite the expressed purposes of the 
Year of Europe - largely deaf to European attempts to influence what was happening.
There was more to it than that, however, particularly in the lessons to be learnt 
by the US in seeking explicit commitments from the Nine about foreign policy objec­
tives for the fu ture . By attem pting to call the A lliance to order (and so blur 
NATO/Community distinctions in order to allow the security relationship to embrace 
changing economic and political circumstances), Kissinger's actions were open to 
interpretation as a blatant attempt to shore up US influence in Europe by stifling the 
increased European impetus towards self-organisation. The loftier purpose of providing 
for Alliance harmony became indistinguishable from the pursuit of American interests 
at the expense of Europe's. The Baker initiative in 1989 for a US-EC declaration had 
explicit provision for regular, high-level US-EC consultation (not an Alliance exercise, 
but heavily subsumed by the American desire to establish a new Atlantic framework). 
It was more likely to work, however, since it went with, rather than against, the trend 
of greater cooperation among the EC member states. The resulting EC-US Transatlan­
tic Declaration was a much more significant document than either the Ottawa Declara­
tion or the Schloss Gymnich formula of 1974. But it would fare little better than Kiss­
inger's in terms of keeping US and European policy together where self-interest dictat­
ed otherwise. This was particularly so unless the US was prepared to find a middle 
way between its wish either to dominate a certain area of policy or else have nothing to 
do with it.
With hindsight, the Year of Europe was a time when France missed the boat in 
terms of influencing the Alliance's future development4. By failing to respond to the 
US's overtures, and subsequently exposing the contradictions in French policy toward
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both the Community and NATO, the French position was weakened. US reliance on 
Bonn increased, and the Germans began to play a political role in NATO more 
commensurate with their economic weight and military significance. In Community 
politics from then on, the pattern was of France and Germany acting very much as 
equal partners, overtly so in the way the Giscard-Schmidt axis provided the basis for 
Community development. Of course, these trends were already in place before 
1973/74. How much the real and continuing difficulties between Washington and 
Paris in 1973 contributed to their acceleration is hard to say, particularly given the fact 
that both sides moved toward reconciliation under the Giscard presidency. Initially 
this was reflected in French abandonment of references to any European alternative to 
US protection, and an apparent French willingness to be more forthcoming on the 
importance of NATO and the US role in the Alliance. Likewise, the US's instinct to 
strong-arm the French back into the military organisation abated (articulated by De­
fence Secretary Schlesinger in a visit to Paris in 1975, during which he said there was 
"no need for France to be involved in the integrated command structure in order to 
participate fully in cooperation within the Alliance"5). But after 1973/74, the primacy 
of the French position was never again such an influential factor in America's Alliance 
management.
Kissinger has described the unresolved Alliance tension as one between Europe's 
continuing requirement for US involvement (to contain German influence and prevent 
Russo-German bipolarity in Europe) and America's need of Europe in order to avoid 
(rather implausibly) becoming "an island off the shores of Eurasia and turning gradual­
ly into a second-class power." Dealing with this reality had been prevented by the 
"perennial conflict" between US and French views of Atlantic relationships. The result 
of their stand-off is that "America's role is too large for the cohesion of NATO and too 
small for the vitality of the European Community. France's role is too small for 
NATO and too intrusive for the Community."6
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The Alliance then and now
Twenty years after the event, the Kissinger critique of future Alliance policy, and 
the dangers to Europe and the Alliance of France's getting its policies toward Germany 
wrong, was almost precisely that advanced by him in 19737. NATO was needed as 
the institutional link between Europe and America and the best protection against 
Soviet nuclear blackmail. But:
- the US should agree to a European identity within NATO;
- France should abandon its efforts to set up a European defence structure out­
side NATO;
- the EC should encourage a large political role for the US in its policy-making;
- an economic bargain needed to be struck between the US and EC to prevent 
the Alliance from dissolving amidst conflicting interests not directly related to 
security.
The continuing relevance of the diagnosis suggested that the events of 1973/74 
were a microcosm of the continuing tensions to which the Alliance remains prone. For 
instance, the need to address specific and urgent issues in all three of the central issues 
of European foreign policy in 1973 - Atlantic relations, European security and detente, 
and the Middle East - recurred in 1980s and again in 1990. The genuine acerbity of 
1973 has not, however, been repeated. What happened in 1973 was sui generis. The 
Year of Europe was part of a wider US international agenda and had strong US domes­
tic undertones. The result was that Washington was inevitably at odds with the 
Community at a time when the latter was absorbing a 50% increase in its membership. 
The Alliance's structural imbalance of power then worked in favour of Washington. 
But the Alliance has moved on considerably since 1973 as a result of the transforma­
tion of the circumstances in which it was created and which it was designed to address: 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the new Germany, and the new politics of 
the European states system. The prospect of the Europeans' exercising greater control 
over their destiny than at any time since 1945 (partly in order to pre-empt the slow but 
steady end to the presence of the US force and a lack of American interest in Europe
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which the Clinton administration shows all the signs of demonstrating), was a response 
to this greater fluidity in European security structures. It reflected the opportunities 
offered by greater flexibility in NATO's relations with former adversaries in Eastern 
Europe.
While the balance of the overall Alliance relationship has been transformed 
radically, parallels exist with 1973 in how the allies respond to certain themes and 
problems (though this should not be exaggerated). Then, as in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the future of the Alliance was in question because of the changed nature of its 
security and defence roles. Just at the time when the rationale for NATO appeared to 
be of diminishing coherence, new opportunities emerged for Euro-American coopera­
tion to cope with different sources of instability in Europe and the greater awareness of 
how out-of-area security issues might cut across Alliance interests.
Franco-American tensions over their rival conceptions of Europe's future ac­
counted as much as ever for difficulties in the Alliance9. In 1973 NATO was respond­
ing to superpower detente; in the early 1990s, to the disintegration of Soviet capability 
to pose a credible threat to security or to conduct war in Europe. Out of area, it is still 
questionable whether a new identity of Atlantic interests could replace Euro-centric 
concerns. Despite the Ottawa Declaration's reference to Alliance consultation out of 
area (a reference which Washington and London were not slow to emphasise), the Gulf 
War produced little evidence of solidarity within either the EC or NATO (although the 
US and Europe were able to support a more concerted line than in October 1973). 
NATO's failure to respond was a further example of the Alliance's deficiency in 
coping with upheavals on its doorstep.
The parallel between the early 1970s and early 1990s was more predictably in 
US-EC problems over the Uruguay GATT round. Unlike the situation in 1973, the 
establishment of the G7 forum meant that strategic economic issues such as coordina­
tion of economic policies and international monetary reform did not need to feature 
even on the edge of Alliance discussion. On the other hand, US-European political and
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economic interdependence had never been so great, as market and security interde­
pendence became matched by growing policy interdependence. Despite, therefore, the 
Community's affirmation of itself as an open trading community at the Rhodes Council 
in 1989 and the consultation procedures formalised in the US/EC declaration of 1990, 
strains persisted in trade relations. As in 1973, they threatened to have wider implica­
tions because of the effect on the US domestically10. A case in point was the problem 
in the context of the Uruguay negotiations over EC subsidies for oilseeds (subsidies 
resulting directly from the uncertainty about US supply after the 1973 embargo) and 
the resulting threat of US retaliation through tariffs on $1 billion of farm imports from 
the EC.
The exposure given by the European media to remarks made by the US vice- 
president in February 1992 about the linkage between resolving economic differences 
and a continuing commitment of US forces to NATO underlined sharp European anxie­
ty on this point. The process of reducing American forces in Europe was more low-key 
than in the early 1970s, but potentially more far-reaching, combined as it was with the 
CFE treaty, rationalisation of NATO force structures and changed American responsi­
bilities and means. The difference was that, whereas in 1973 a significant US troop 
reduction might have simply led to comparable European force reductions and greater 
reliance on US nuclear forces (so increasing the relative importance of the US security 
commitment as a result), in the 1990s US reductions might - for better or worse as far 
as Washington was concerned - have provided the impetus for a separate European 
defence identity.
The same question as before, of how to ensure transparency through effective 
US-European consultations, again dominated Alliance discussion. The solutions agreed 
at Ottawa in the Alliance context and at Schloss Gymnich in the US-EC relationship 
had continuing validity as serious attempts to address the issue of transatlantic trans­
parency. But the development of the Community over the past 20 years, and the
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changed Alliance role over the past five years, made it harder to find new ways to 
make the old system work more effectively. The end of the traditional US-Soviet 
security agenda, and the intense debate in Washington and Brussels about economic 
and security roles and priorities, had changed Alliance needs on the consultation issue. 
The painfully-engineered fix achieved in Ottawa in June 1974 no longer held good, 
given that linkage between security and economic issues had so much intensified. As 
the Atlantic role became both expanded and yet more confused, it might have increased 
the need for a more specific, contractual arrangement as conceived by Kissinger in 
1973, rather than one which still left US-European coordination largely to chance11.
Leaving to chance has been increasingly the trend of US policy, with a tendency 
to deal with European issues on a fairly superficial basis, focusing on those elements of 
immediate difficulty - bilateral relations with Russia, France and Germany - rather 
than an overall vision of longer-term European security. Losing interest, where this 
might lead to losing control, was the real danger in future US policy toward Europe. 
Whereas a revised US political and military strategy (arising as much if not more from 
political and budgetary pressures in Washington as from events in Europe) could be 
accommodated, a new Alliance framework in which the United States failed to grasp 
the mood in Europe and in which US-European interests diverged persistently, would 
be more troublesome.
NATO and EC consultation
The unresolved dilemma between sometimes competing EC/NATO obligations 
meant Europe was likely to continue to find itself pulled in two directions, between a 
US propensity to reach for military crisis management tools, and a European wish to 
try to go it alone in political crisis management, possibly with some independent activi­
ty at the low end of the military spectrum. Such a dilemma would be less problematic 
if US-European interests looked likely to stay in step on major issues. Again, here lay 
the seeds of potential long-term difficulties within the Alliance. As the sole super­
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power, with interests less tied to the European theatre, it became a serious possibility 
that (for instance, if the situation in the former Yugoslavia were not resolved) the US 
concern would increasingly be to avoid NATO's becoming an "entangling Alliance," 
and to avoid becoming involved in European brush-fire conflicts as a result of demands 
for greater intervention (for example, under the aegis of CSCE principles). Even if 
policy on important issues was being implemented in other fora (such as the Group of 
Seven, the permanent five in the Security Council, the European Union and, to a lesser 
degree, CSCE), a balance needed to be struck with the operations of these other organ­
isations and the degree of consultation within NATO (since to lose the US engagement 
in Europe would undermine the effectiveness of these other bodies).
Politically, NATO remained the main forum for discussion between the US and 
Western Europe. US contacts with NATO were far more numerous than political 
cooperation with the EC. Weekly meetings of the North Atlantic Council and ministe­
rial meetings several times a year meant that the amount of dialogue was far greater 
and the Treaty relationship more substantive than cooperation among, for instance, the 
Group of Seven. Procedure was no guarantee of vitality, however. The quality of the 
political dialogue in NATO had shortcomings because of the inhibitions of certain 
allies such as France, and because of the US tendency to corral the Europeans. Also, 
although NATO was still the primary transatlantic forum, it could not bear the whole 
weight of US-European relations or be a substitute for an equally effective EC-US 
dialogue. There was a continuing need to build up the US/EC strand in the relation­
ship, for instance by using US/EC channels for coordination on foreign policy issues. 
There would need to be coordination between this and normal NATO procedures, 
without making primacy of forum a contentious debate in itself. The reality was that, 
by the end of the 1980s, more active coordination with the US was needed urgently 
once European political cooperation (EPC) became increasingly extensive and detailed 
in the process of evolving into a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
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The Baker initiative, December 1989
The initiative launched by US Secretary of State, James Baker, on 12 December 
1989 responded to this need. While reaffirming the primacy of NATO and the impor­
tance of the G7, OECD and GATT, Baker said that this could not exclude the need for 
a clear institutionalised channel to the Community. Stressing the need for stronger 
transatlantic links, he specified that the European leg of that structure should be the 
Community. The new Euro-Atlantic architecture would, Baker said, need to be centred 
on the US and the EC, who should "work together to achieve, whether in treaty or 
some other form, a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultational 
links".12
Hence efforts began in early 1990 to improve the framework of EC/US consul­
tative mechanisms, culminating in the November 1990 EC/US Transatlantic Declara­
tion. Baker's declared intention in December 1989 when he spoke to the Berlin Press 
Club was to construct a new Euro-Atlantic architecture. Specifically he wished to 
pursue a framework document for consultations. It was significant that this immediate­
ly struck a chord in Europe. As well as fulfilling a long-standing US ambition, the new 
arrangements adumbrated in Baker's initiative could also work to EC advantage. 
Unless the US were allowed to exploit all means of consultation with the Twelve avail­
able to them, their frustration at being presented with fixed EC positions would grow 
as CFSP evolved. It would almost always be too late for Washington to change these 
positions once reached - and the attempt inevitably cause friction13. US concern to get 
in at an early stage of decision-making and establish the practice of consultation there­
fore arose because:
- an expanded EC would result in substantial differences of membership between 
the EC and the European part of NATO, increasing the likelihood of 
EPC/CFSP's cutting across the work of the Alliance;
- the eventual expansion of the Community would set EC positions in concrete 
even more than had been the case hitherto.
The result was that, rather than an exercise fraught with grudging recognition of
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shared interests as in 1973, in 1989/1990 both sides were acutely aware of the degree 
of their interdependence and of the requirement for its effective management. Unlike 
in 1973, there was a clear European input to the exercise, notably Washington's close 
cooperation with Bonn throughout the drafting process.
In fact, Baker's initiative had not come out of the blue. Jacques Delors, as 
President of the European Commission, had suggested such a framework in February 
1989; President Bush took up the theme in May 1989 in a speech at Boston University, 
calling for new mechanisms for consultation and for cooperation on political and global 
issues. In the light of the resulting careful preparations and the positive signs that an 
initiative would be well-received in Europe, the Baker proposal, once announced, was 
endorsed three days later at the US-European Commission ministerial meeting on 15 
December 1989 (in contrast to the five months it had taken the Europeans to respond in 
1973). This meeting agreed that active steps should be taken to strengthen the bilateral 
relationship, recommending that officials jointly examine ways of increasing coordina­
tion in the growing number of areas of common interest. The joint declaration referred 
to the close cooperation needed to assure the continued vitality of transatlantic ties at a 
time of accelerating European integration.14
At this stage, the consensus was that only an ad hoc basis for reinforcing the 
existing bilateral structure was needed. Institutionalising further contacts through a 
formal US-EC agreement had not been ruled out, however, and were to be actively 
considered. The primary mechanism for this close consultation proved to be the proce­
dures agreed in parallel by Delors and Baker for greater Commission/Administration 
contacts, and those developed separately between the Twelve and the US Administra­
tion.
As far as Commission contacts with the US were concerned, these were de­
signed to build on the regular discussions already provided for. Since 1982 there had 
been an annual "round table" between the US Secretary of State, US trade representa­
tive, the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and the Treasury, the President of the
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European Commission and the Commissioners involved in US/EC relations. These 
covered the international situation and economic and trade issues, both multilateral and 
bilateral. Until 1989 this high-level conference had followed the annual December 
NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. Following the agreement in December 1989 at 
the US-EC ministerial meeting, these formal ministerial meetings were to take place 
twice a year (the first took place under the new format in Washington on 23 April 
1990) and be combined with efforts to identify a dialogue in new areas of cooperation, 
for example transport and competition policy, science and technology.
The Commission/Administration arrangements were complemented by those 
outlined during talks between Charles Haughey (the then Irish prime minister and 
President of the Council) with President Bush on 27 February 1990. They agreed that, 
as part of closer ministerial and official contacts, it was necessary to build on the exist­
ing US/EPC consultation arrangement - itself a product of the entry into force in 1987 
of the Single European Act. Existing arrangements had provided for an annual meeting 
of the twelve foreign ministers and the Commission with the US Secretary of State, a 
visit to the US by the foreign minister of the EC presidency country, and meetings 
with State Department at political director level in the troika format twice a year, in 
addition to which the US also received regular debriefings on EPC meetings by the EC 
presidency. During the Haughey visit to Washington in February 1990, three addition­
al elements were agreed upon:
- biannual meetings of the US President with the President of the EC Commis­
sion and presidency of the Council;
- an additional meeting each year between the US Secretary of State and the 12 
foreign ministers and the Commission;
- contacts at EPC expert level in troika format.
The purpose, agreed Bush and Haughey, was to give "a better overall structure and 
direction to the wide variety of existing contacts and discussions".15
As a result of these new arrangements, the first "additional" EPC ministerial
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meeting (the twelve foreign ministers and the Commission) with the US Secretary of 
State was held in Brussels on 3 May 1990. For the first time, a US Secretary of State, 
the President of the Commission, and EC foreign ministers addressed an agenda which 
mixed Community and political cooperation subjects (specifically the agenda was: EC­
US relations; east-west relations including CSCE; the Uruguay Round; regional 
issues). The Irish foreign minister, Collins, in welcoming Baker, said that the meeting 
and the contacts agreed between Bush and Haughey in February 1990 constituted the 
Community's considered response to the Baker speech in Berlin. It recognised, said 
Collins, that the EC had come of age as a partner in world affairs. All agreed it was an 
historic meeting.
Although the new format could not eliminate the continuing American instinct to 
lobby in national capitals rather than Brussels on the really important issues, it had 
finally overcome the traditional Brussels bureaucratic compartmentalisation of econom­
ic and foreign policy in order to permit the genuinely global dialogue which Baker had 
sought. "It can be seen as the product of at least three, and more plausibly four, dec­
ades of interaction and learning between American and European institutions and 
policy elites."16
The Transatlantic declaration
Subsequent discussion among the Twelve during the second half of 1990 was 
about whether the formulae agreed in December 1989 and February 1990 for a more 
coordinated dialogue were sufficient or whether something more was desirable. The 
consensus among the Twelve was that more should be done to put them into a political 
context. The reason for this enthusiastic response from the Twelve was that, at a time 
of sudden and disorientating change (with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and imminent 
German reunification), Europe had an interest in promoting a clearer understanding 
between the US and the evolving Community: Baker's initiative had confirmed that, at 
a time of real change, there was also renewed conviction in the United States that good
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relations with Europe were in their national interest and needed to transcend the tradi­
tional concern with trade issues. The UK had signed up to the concept early on, and 
Mitterrand had agreed with Bush at their meeting in Florida Keys in April 1990 that 
France would contribute constructively to a more formal text endorsing the reinforced 
dialogue.
Germany was to be the main European interlocutor, however. It was Genscher 
in April 1990 who took the lead in promoting the concept of a transatlantic declaration 
(reflecting Bonn's particular concern to allay US doubts about the role of a unified 
Germany in the new Euro-Atlantic architecture). Throughout the spring of 1990, Bonn 
advocated an ambitious EC/US declaration to cover all aspects of the relationship. In 
particular, Genscher pressed the idea of a declaration in Washington, with little (pub­
lic) response: although Baker had initially suggested some sort of treaty (which would 
have had uncomfortable political overtones comparable to the over-arching NATO 
declaration to which Kissinger had aspired), this was later withdrawn in favour of 
leaving it to European capitals to decide on this procedural point. In the end, Gensch­
er's pressure within the Twelve and Baker's desire not to intervene heavy-handedly in 
the debate succeeded: the idea of such a declaration was subsequently endorsed, de­
spite some Commission concerns about mixed competence implications, at the Dublin 
European Council on 25/26 June 1990 as follows:
"The European Council expressed its satisfaction with the developments in the 
Community's relations with the United States, based on the structure laid down 
by the European Council in April and characterised by ever closer cooperation. 
They wish to take this cooperation further. Their commitment to this further 
cooperation could take the form of a joint transatlantic declaration on relations 
between the Twelve and the United States and Canada."17
The Transatlantic Declaration of November 1990 which resulted from this proc­
ess marked a major step forward from Schloss Gymnich. The difference was not the 
automaticity of consultations which, as after 1974, were still to be left open to interpre­
tation of when common interests were at stake. Moreover, where differences were 
genuinely substantive, no amount of consultation would help resolve the competitive
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cooperation which characterised the US/EC relationship. Indeed, the discussions 
among the Twelve about the declaration itself were soon complicated by the need to 
consider inclusion of controversial issues such as the Uruguay Round (a US-backed 
suggestion) and references to free trade at national and state level and the need for 
greater financial stability (EC points, which were resisted by Washington). In the end 
(partly owing to the enthusiasm of the Italians to secure a conclusion during their 
presidency), contentious issues were perforce excluded. The omens that this marked a 
new phase in US/EC relations were still not auspicious, however: last-minute negotia­
tion difficulties18 meant that, although the declaration was adopted at the CSCE 
summit in Paris on 20 November, it was not made public until 23 November. The 
result was that the mood in Washington at the moment of signing was soured, and 
much of the immediate political impact of the declaration was lost.
The declaration affirmed common goals (democracy, peace, economic growth 
with low inflation and high employment levels); it contained no new commitments on 
economic policy (confining itself to support for OECD/GATT principles of liberalisa­
tion); and, among the political goals, it referred to the fight against international crime, 
terrorism and drugs. Amidst such generalities, where the declaration did break new 
ground was by its formalisation of institutional links between the EC and the US, 
confirming the working arrangements agreed earlier in the year. Both sides committed 
themselves to a concrete, political framework for high-level consultations which could 
respond to increased economic and policy interdependence between the US and Eu­
rope. Thus the declaration contained the formula that each side would "inform and 
consult each other on important matters of common interest ... with a view to bringing 
the ir positions as close as possible w ithout prejudice to their respective 
independence."19
The mechanism at the disposal of both sides to transmit views to the other was 
set out in the declaration under the subheading "Institutional Framework for Consulta­
tion". The agreed procedures were as follows:
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"Both sides agree that a framework is required for regular and intensive consul­
tation. They will make full use of and further strengthen existing procedures, 
including those established by the President of the European Council and the 
President of the United States on 27 February 1990, namely:
- bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe 
between, on the one side, the president of the European Council and the Presi­
dent of the Commission, and on the other side, the President of the United 
States;
- bi-annual consultations between the European Community foreign ministers, 
with the Commission, and the US Secretary of State, alternately on either side of 
the Atlantic;
- ad hoc consultations between the presidency foreign minister or the troika and 
the US secretary of state;
- bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US government at 
cabinet level;
- briefings, as currently exist, by the presidency to US representatives on 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) meetings at the ministerial level;
Both sides are resolved to develop and deepen these procedures for consultation 
so as to reflect the evolution of the European Community and of its relationship 
with the United States.
They welcome the actions taken by the European Parliament and the Congress of 
the United States in order to improve their dialogue and thereby bring closer 
together the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic."20
It marked an impressive augmentation of transatlantic contacts, and a vindication of 
Kissinger's view - in 1973 - that a more organised dialogue had been needed.
Envoi
As in 1973/74, consultation is not by itself adequate to ensure a seamless web of 
Atlantic debate. The prospects are that, even with the mechanism for EC/US contacts 
agreed in 1990, consultation will be tested more severely than ever before. In econom­
ic terms, the respective weights of the US and the EC have shifted; more generally, the 
Europeans have again become increasingly tempted to define themselves as, in the first 
instance, separate from the US, at a time of self-doubt in Washington's approach to 
European issues generally. The need for NATO to adjust to a new partnership with 
East European countries and Russia may, moreover, reduce the opportunities for spe­
295
Chapter 8
cifically US-European consultation in that forum. So the requirement for a flexible 
alliance in the early 1990s holds good.
A looser basis for Western coordination on security/political issues may be the 
product, analogous to cooperation in energy, trade and monetary issues more generally 
through the UN and the G7. As Kissinger had said, "what is needed is a recognition 
that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to share responsibilities even 
more than burdens. This will involve a painful loss of some ... former pre-eminence. 
The assertions of European self-will which we find so irritating today can be the 
growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is of importance for 
us as well."21 Such a relationship might need to survive without the habit of frequent 
institutionalised consultation at NATO headquarters, and would require greater effort 
to ensure transparency in decision-making. As the survey of events in 1973/74 sug­
gests, it would have been a step unthinkable then for the Americans and the Euro­
peans. But it need be no less effective for that.
Comparisons and reflections
Notes
(1) Kissinger summarised his success in the Inaugural Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture to the IISS on 25 June 
1976 (reprinted in Survival, September/October 1976): "The doctrinal arguments of 1973 have been settled by the 
practice of consultations and co-operation unprecedented in intensity and scope." And see Coral Bell, "Kissinger 
in Retrospect," International Affairs, April 1977, loc cit, who wrote that the end result was an Alliance with a 
"more viable and realistic relationship" and concludes that Kissinger came out a victor on practically all points in 
what was essentially a struggle over the nature of the future West European identity. "This identity now seems to 
have acquired a settled Atlantic definition, with very little challenge remaining from the sponsors of the alternative 
view." Kissinger himself took the view: "The period in which Europe was attempting to define itself is at least 
temporarily over. We are now closer to the Atlantic partnership that we envisaged with the Year of Europe in 
1973" (speaking to US ambassadors in London in December 1975, quoted by W C Cromwell in "Europe and the 
Structure of Peace," Orbis, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 1978, loc cit)
(2) In this sense, Kissinger was prophetic when he wrote: "There is something of a Greek tragedy about the dis­
pute between the United States and France. Each chief actor, following the laws of his nature, is bringing about 
consequences quite different from those intended," in The Troubled Partnership, loc cit, p. 63.
(3) Karl Kaiser: "Europe and America," Foreign Affairs, July 1974, loc cit. See also Turbulent Era: The Year o f  
Europe in retrospect, Report on the Fifth Meeting of Members of Congress and of the European Parliament, 
March 17-24 1974: Report submitted to the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 14 
1974, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Document H382-25, which began: "The Year of Europe is over and none too 
soon... An unprecedented series of misunderstandings, bitter rhetoric and a bitter Middle East war have left the 
Alliance partners much further apart than when the Year began." Another report, American Interest in the Euro­
pean Community (Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, March 22, 1973 and June 11, 1974, 93rd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Document H381- 
10) recognised that "the quality of political leadership in both the Community countries and in the United States 
has been a serious concern during the two years these hearings have taken place. It is not surprising therefore that 
many of the issues between the Community and our country remain unresolved today."
(4) Costigliola strikes the right balance: "France won the paper battle of the Atlantic Charter (in terms of inclusion 
of references to French nuclear forces and omission of references to interdependence) but lost the struggle [sic] to 
build a Gaullist Europe." See Europe and the Superpowers, ed. R Jordan, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1991, Chapter 
5: "France between the Superpowers".
(5) Quoted from James Goldsborough: "The Franco-German Entente," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54 No 3, loc cit, p. 
496.
(6) "The Atlantic Alliance needs renewal in a changing world": The International Herald Tribune, 2 March 1992. 
This is the same thought as in Years o f Upheaval, p. 129, in analysing Pompidou's perspectives: "America was 
too powerful to be ignored and France was too weak to go it alone."
(7) Kissinger in the International Herald Tribune, 2 March 1992: "The Atlantic Alliance needs renewal in a 
changed world", loc cit.
(8) Described briefly by William Wallace in "Political Co-operation: Integration through Intergovemmentalism", 
in Wallace, Wallace and Webb (eds), Policy Making in the European Community, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1983.
A more stimulating account is in Theodore Draper's "The Western Misalliance" in The Washington Quarterly, 
Winter 1981 Vol. 4, No. 1, which explains US resentment at the lack of European support over Iran. He draws 
attention also to the difficulty of discerning benchmarks in the Alliance's development: "The crisis of the alliance 
is an old story... A succession of new eras has been proclaimed since World War II." p. 14.
(9) A subject attracting attention in the early 1990s, e.g. articles in Le Monde and The New York Times ("US-
297
Chapter 8
French Relations: The Big Chill") on 2 July 1992 in advance of the Bush-Mitterrand meeting in the margins of the 
G7 Munich summit.
(10) For an analysis of US negotiating positions in the Uruguay round and the increasingly adversarial US position 
in trade negotiations, see Ernest Preeg's "The US leadership role in World Trade: Past, Present and Future" in 
The Wbshington Quarterly, Spring, 1992.
(11) On the other hand, both Smith's survey of the literature of the time (in "From the Year of Europe to the year 
of Carter: Continuing patterns and problems in Euro-American relations", Journal o f Common Market Studies, 
September 1978, pp. 26-44) and Philip Windsor ("A watershed for NATO" in The World Today, Vol. 33, No, 11, 
November 1977) draw attention to the improvement in relations once Kissinger had left office and in the light of 
Carter's own commitment to consult Europe and Japan more fully and without the histrionics of a grand design.
(12) A new Europe and a new Atlanticism: James Baker, speech to the Berlin Press Club, 12 December 1993.
(13) Smith and Woodcock describe this rightly as a situation in which "an institution-rich transatlantic arena poses 
problems of attention, coordination and priorities. The legitimacy and efficacy of processes of consultation, and 
the relative salience of bilateral and multilateral relationships, is challenged by change but has not been conclu­
sively redefined." (The United States and the European Commimity in a Transformed 'World, loc cit, p. 12)
(14) The Financial Times, 16 December 1989.
(15) See the Financial Times, 28 February 1990.
(16) Quoted from The United States and the European Community in a transformed world, Michael Smith and 
Stephen Woodcock, RUA, London, 1993, p. 1.
(17) The last sentence was a late addition, made at Genscher's insistence.
(18) Raised by the French (after a text had been agreed by Bush, Delors and the Italian presidency) concerning the 
scope of consultations and references to NATO in Europe's future security role. Such problems would have been 
familiar to Kissinger. There were also unhelpful background noises at the time as a result of the difficulties of the 
Uruguay round, the discussion in the EC's inter-govemmental conference on security, and the lukewarm stand of 
some EC members over the West's role in the Gulf War.
(19) See "Declaration on EC-US Relations, November 1990" in Europe/Documents No. 1622, 23 November 
1990, or in European Commimity News, No. 41/90, EC Office of Press and Public Affairs, Washington, 27 
November 1990.
(20) Declarations on US-EC Relations, November 1990, loc cit.
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